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Traditional research into the mechanisms by which jurors in capital cases make 
punishment decision focuses on one of two relationships: the relationship between a 
juror’s individual characteristics and a sentencing outcome or the relationship between 
trial level characteristics and a sentencing outcome.  Many significant findings have 
come from this type of research, most notably that arbitrariness still exists in the 
application of capital punishment.  This arbitrariness takes on various forms, including 
poor comprehension of sentencing instructions (Bowers and Foglia, 2003; Foglia, 2003), 
racial bias in sentencing decisions (Baldus et al,. 1998; Bowers et al., 2001; Bowers et al., 
2004), and a homogenization of the jury pool through the process of death qualification 
(Haney. 1984).  What this research has failed to address, however, is the role that the act 
of deliberation may have on the relationship between these individual and trial level 
characteristics and their ensuing impact on sentencing outcomes.  The current study 
addresses this shortcoming by focusing on the role that the process of deliberation has on 
  
the juror’s perception of the group functioning, measured here through the construct of 
group climate.  The predictors of group climate are examined and the subsequent impact 
of group climate on sentencing outcomes is explored.  The results suggest individual 
juror level characteristics do not have a direct effect on sentencing outcome; rather, the 
level of group climate acts as a mediating variable between individual characteristics and 
sentencing outcomes.  Trial level characteristics, however, both directly predict to 
sentencing outcome and indirectly operate through the level of group climate.  Group 
climate is the strongest predictor of sentencing outcome, with juries who have more 
positive perceptions of group climate more likely to return the death penalty.  These 
results and their implications are discussed in detail, as are suggestions for both future 
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In 1971, the United States Supreme Court ruled in McGautha v California1 that 
giving sentencing bodies unlimited discretion in capital cases was not a violation of a 
defendant’s right to due process as described in the 14th Amendment.  The Court 
supported this ruling based on the fact that it was reasonable for the State to assume that 
its citizens would “act in due regard for the consequences of their decision2.”  The 
majority opinion pointed out that listing an appropriate set of circumstances under which 
the death penalty should be imposed would only serve to inhibit, not expand, the possible 
factors to be utilized by judges and juries during sentencing, as it would be impossible to 
create a complete list.  The Justices also argued that past attempts to formulate jury 
instructions had only served to interfere with the entire process of letting juries decide 
punishment3.  Just one year later, however, the Court realized that the consequences of 
such unfettered discretion were not what had been anticipated by the McGautha ruling, as 
an examination into the pattern of death penalty sentences had Justice Stewart remarking 
that the issue at hand was one where the death penalty was being “so wantonly and so 
freakishly imposed4.”  Indeed, no discernible pattern appeared to exist.  So, in the 1972 
landmark decision, Furman v. Georgia5, the United States Supreme Court deemed that 
                                                 
1 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. Citing Winston v. United States, 172 US 303 (1899). 





the application of capital punishment as it was currently being practiced was 
unconstitutional. 
This decision was based on several facts; chief among them was the issue that the 
imposition of a capital sentence seemed, at best, to be an uneven process.  The Court 
pointed to many instances where like cases were not receiving like sentences as evidence 
of the ways that the sentencing structure was irrational.  If anything, such irregular 
application appeared to be aimed primarily at minority and lower-class citizens, a 
penalty, suggested by the Justices, meted out against the “powerless and the hated6.”  
Such arbitrariness, the Justices concluded, had to be the result of the unfettered discretion 
that the sentencing body, judge or jury, had over the outcome.  The decision to sentence a 
defendant to death, especially in light of the fact that the sentence is irrevocable once 
carried out, was too important to be made without guidance and direction, a door that the 
Court left open for the states to improve. 
Because the Furman ruling did not conclude that the death penalty itself was 
unconstitutional, but rather its application, many states took their cue from the Court and 
rewrote their death penalty statutes in order to provide some semblance of guidance and 
direction to the sentencing body (judge or jury).  The ways in which the states responded 
to the ruling varied in their specifics, but generally legislatures passed statutes to limit the 
types of homicide that would be eligible to be tried as a capital case, enacted laws that 
directed juries to determine the balance between aggravating and mitigation factors, and 
saw to it that capital cases received expedited appellate review.  Questions remained, 
however, about the validity of these statutes, until the Court, ruling on Gregg v. Georgia7, 
                                                 
6 Cited in the judgment of Justice Douglas, quoting former Attorney General Ramsey Clark (408 US 238). 




and its companion cases Proffitt v. Florida8 and Jurek v. Texas9, helped lend clarity to the 
issue.  The Court held that the statutes enacted by the three aforementioned states, 
modeled in part after the American Bar Association’s Model Penal Code, would aid in 
the standardization of death penalty sentences and the entire process would no longer 
exhibit the uneven distribution that the Court was concerned about in the Furman ruling.  
In a related ruling, the Court also determined that those statutes that attempted to reign in 
the discretion of the jury by imposing a mandatory death penalty for the crime of first 
degree murder were a violation of a defendant’s eighth and fourteenth amendment rights.  
In the Woodson v. North Carolina10decision, the Court concluded that a mandatory death 
sentence was a violation of an individual’s eighth and fourteenth amendment rights 
because it did not allow the jurors to take into consideration the specific circumstances 
unique to each defendant; the Court acknowledged that prevailing standards of decency 
require that each death sentence be imparted only when it has been “exercised within the 
limits of civilized standards11.”  The Court further affirmed this stance in the Roberts v. 
Louisiana12 decision, where they recognized the mandatory death penalty statutes took 
away a defendant’s ability to ask for mercy from the court or the jury.  These decisions 
have paved the way for states to enact their own forms of guided discretion statutes in an 
attempt to make the application of the death penalty less “arbitrary and capricious.”   
The statutes enacted by the states in response to the favorable rulings in Gregg 
and its companion cases generally include a provision about the types of homicides that 
are deemed “death eligible,” where legislatures denote certain types of circumstances to 
                                                 
8 Proffitt v Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) 
9 Jurek v Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) 
10 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
11 Ibid. 




be considered worthy of capital punishment.  Generally, these circumstances include: the 
killing of a law enforcement officer in the line of duty; the killing of a person while in the 
commission of another felony; and, a killing that is especially heinous.  Such statutes 
direct that the decision to be made about whether a defendant is eligible for the death 
penalty be left to the local district attorney, who makes the final decision about whether 
or not to try a case as a capital case. 
Once the decision has been made to try a case as a death penalty case, all states 
then engage in a bifurcated trial/sentencing process, whereby an initial trial is held to 
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant and then, should a verdict of guilty of a 
capital crime be rendered, a second sentencing trial is held to determine the punishment.  
Depending upon the procedures within the state, at times the same jury serves for both 
the guilt and sentencing stages, whereas in other states a new jury is empanelled for the 
punishment stage of the trial.  Before they begin deliberation, the jury is instructed by the 
sentencing judge on the guidelines used by that state to direct sentencing deliberations.  
While the guidelines vary by state, they generally fall into three categories: 1) balancing 
statutes; 2) threshold statutes; and, 3) directed statutes (Bowers and Foglia, 2003).  
Balancing statutes require that jurors consider both the aggravating and the mitigating 
factors applicable to the case and return a death sentence when the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  All members of the jury should 
agree upon the weights that are to be assigned to each type of circumstance.  Threshold 
statutes require that a jury find that at least one aggravating factor be present.  The jury 
must also consider any mitigating factors that may be present.  Once they have done this, 




further guidance.  Directed statutes require that all of the jurors must answer specific 
questions in the affirmative before they can impose a death sentence.  The state of Texas, 
for instance, requires that jurors answer yes to three questions before they can return a 
death sentence; the questions pertain to the defendant’s future dangerousness, criminal 
responsibility for the killing, and whether there are any mitigating factors that would 
cause the jury to impose a life sentence (Bowers, 1995). 
In most states, the jury’s sentencing decision is binding.  Traditionally, however, 
some states, such as Florida, have operated under an advisory type of system, where the 
jury would only give a sentencing recommendation to the judge, who would then go on to 
make the final decision (Bowers, 1995).  This process, where juries would recommend a 
sentence to the judge, has since been examined and changed.  In a recent decision by the 
United States Supreme Court, Ring v. Arizona13, the Court ruled that all crucial facts of a 
case, including the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, must be 
decided on by the jury.  The Court asserted that a defendant’s sixth amendment right to 
trial would be violated if the law did not encompass the fact-finding necessary to put him 
(or her) to death in the same way that it encompassed the fact-finding necessary to charge 
him (or her) with a greater offense14.   
Since the enactment of the post-Furman statues, the Court has set forth several 
other provisions to help guide jurors through the capital sentencing process.  The Court 
has determined, for instance, that jurors cannot fail to deliberate on mitigating factors15 
and that in addition to those aggravating factors described in State statutes, they may 
                                                 
13 Ring v. Arizona, 000 U.S. 01-488 (2002) 
14 Ibid. 




consider aggravators not mentioned in the statute,16 such as a defendant’s prior criminal 
record.  Juries may, furthermore, consider the issues of future dangerousness and the 
defendant’s ability to adjust to prison life when trying to determine whether death is the 
most appropriate punishment17, although it is inappropriate for them to consider the 
possibility that their sentence may be overturned pending appellate review18. 
Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that these types of 
guidelines offer enough instruction for juries to, if not easily, at least systematically, 
reach a decision about whether or not to sentence the defendant to death, research on the 
decision-making processes of capital juries has found that many of these efforts to curb 
the aforementioned unfettered discretion of jurors have been in vain.  This line of 
research suggests that attempts to control discretionary death penalty application through 
legal proscriptions may have caused it to operate through a different process, with jurors 
making decisions about death sentences using criteria not controlled by the law (for 
examples, see Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000; Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, and 
Harrington, 1984).  This is consistent with the general trend of discretion within the 
criminal justice system; attempts to remove discretion from one part of the process 
generally results in it being moved to another (Walker, p. 12).  Zimring and his 
colleagues (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin, 2003), for instance, find that in a study of 
three California jurisdictions both before and after the implementation of three-strikes 
legislation, judges were using their discretion to change felony charges given to 
defendants who were at either their second or third strike; charging is generally a process 
                                                 
16 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) 
17 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) 




left to prosecutors but those judges interviewed felt that the application of their personal 
discretion would help serve the court system more so than would keeping the charges.  
Discretion within the criminal justice system tends to be based in personal 
decision-making; as such it can be a difficult construct to measure.  Such difficulties are 
amplified in the study of the discretion of jurors, as so much of the process of jury 
decision-making is hidden from anyone outside of the jury room.  To date, research into 
the discretion of jurors has generally consisted of interviewing the jurors after they have 
deliberated on a capital case and asking them about the processes in which they were 
engaged.  Several disturbing trends have emerged, many of which only further validate 
similar investigations that have been conducted using mock-trial and jury simulation 
experiments. 
Among the problems of capital jury sentencing identified, Bowers and Foglia 
(2003) list seven that are especially egregious in light of the constitutionally based 
provisions that have been set forth by the United States Supreme Court.  These seven 
errors include 1) the fact that jurors make premature sentencing decisions, coming to 
personal conclusions prior to the sentence deliberation phase (see also Foglia, 2003; 
Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells, 2001); 2) the fact that there is bias in jury selection, with 
an overrepresentation of pro-death jurors (Butler and Moran, 2002); 3) a widespread 
failure of jurors to understand the sentencing instructions (see also Foglia, 2003; Brewer, 
2004), especially in the ways that they related to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances; 4) confusion about whether death is required if a defendant is convicted of 
a capital crime (Geimer and Amsterdam, 1988); 5) generalized refusal to take 




decision19; 6) racial influence in the decision-making process (see also Bowers, Steiner, 
and Sandys, 2001; Bowers, Sandys, and Brewer, 2004); and 7) an underestimation of the 
alternatives to the death penalty (see Foglia, 2003). 
In general, what this line of research shows in that there is enormous variation in 
the ways that the jurors appear to follow capital sentencing guidelines.  For instance, in 
her study of the jury deliberation process in Kentucky, Sandys (1995) found that in 
approximately half of the trials (48.5%), jurors discussed the appropriate punishment 
during the guilt deliberation phase of the trial.  By violating both the spirit and the letter 
of the law of the bifurcated trial process and combining the punishment and the guilt 
deliberations, jurors are unable to correctly separate the aggravating circumstances that 
could lead a jury to a guilty verdict from those that should lead a jury to a sentence of 
death.  Similarly, in a related study of jurors in six death penalty states, Bentele and 
Bowers (2001) found that jurors identified guilt-related topics to be the most prevalent 
ones discussed during punishment deliberations.  For instance, respondents often used the 
strength of the evidence presented during the guilt phase of the trial as the reason that 
they voted for a death sentence.  Others believed that because the defendant admitted to 
committing the crime, he deserved a death sentence.  Many jurors also assumed that 
because the defendant was found guilty of a capital crime, the jury had to return a death 
sentence; this is, of course, directly contrary to the prohibitions against a mandatory death 
penalty as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the Woodson20 and Roberts21 
decisions.  Such variation does not seem to be directly related to the type of capital 
                                                 
19 This is especially problematic in light of part of the Caldwell v. Mississippi (472 US 320) ruling, which 
explicitly decided that any sentence of death could not be reliable if the jury believes that the ultimate 
responsibility for the penalty lay elsewhere. 
20 Woodson et al. v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 




sentencing guidelines employed by the individual states, as the problems with 
deliberation seem to occur under all derivations of guided discretion statutes.  In fact, 
Bentele and Bowers (2001) made sure to include data from states with all three of the 
types of sentencing guidelines in their analysis. 
Despite the variation in the ways that jurors are following the law, research does 
not suggest that there is a conscious process governing the unlawful behavior of either the 
individual jurors or the juries as an entity.  The literature in fact suggests the opposite: 
jurors are not purposefully trying to circumvent the law.  This leaves us to wonder what 
factors are influencing the deliberation process and thus what factors are contributing to 
the continuation of the uneven application of death penalty sentences.  Researchers have 
specifically looked at two categories of potential explanations: juror level characteristics 
and case level characteristics.  Juror level factors generally include demographic 
characteristics, such as juror race (Bowers et al., 2001), religion (Eisenberg, et al., 2001), 
social statues (Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983), and death-penalty attitudes (Butler 
and Moran, 2002).  Case level factors include the race of both the defendant and the 
victim (Bowers et al., 2004), the seriousness of the crime (Brewer, 2004), and the actions 
of the attorneys (Brewer, 2003).  While examining both of these types of potential 
explanations have been useful in helping researchers and legal officials alike understand 
the process by which death sentences are handed down, they both ignore the inherently 
group nature of jury deliberations.  Jurors are tasked with working together to create a 
consensus judgment about the fate of the defendant; doing so requires them to discuss, 
debate, and ultimately, decide as a group what the appropriate punishment should be.  By 




ignoring the potential utility that such explanations have on helping us to further 
understand the process by which capital sentences are made and more importantly, 
helping us to further understand why such disparity still occurs during the process of 
capital punishment, despite the fact that many safeguards have been put into place in 
order to make the process fair and evenhanded. 
This research is an attempt to begin to help fill the void in research about capital 
jury deliberation processes.  Using data collected from jurors who have served on capital 
trials in fourteen states, I examine the role that the perception of the climate of jury 
deliberations has on sentencing outcomes.  The climate of the jury, which will be 
explained in greater detail in later sections, can be most easily understood as the quality 
of the interactions that occur during deliberations and the way that the individual jurors 
interpret their experiences as part of a group.  Because the jury deliberation process is one 
that by its very nature requires twelve people to come to consensus about an outcome, it 
is a unique experience where group processes will arguably be present.  Due to the 
creation of what is essentially a forced working group, the assumption that the process of 
group deliberations would impact decision-making is one that makes logical sense.  The 
assumption that group dynamics impact decision-making processes is one that has been 
shown to have merit in research that is devoted to group functioning in other fields, most 
notably business and organizational psychology.  Building on this assumption and using 
language from these other fields, I hope to discover whether explanations based on group 
interactions during jury deliberations can help increase our understanding of the process 




The research to date on capital juries also suggests that racial divides exist 
between jurors, especially in cases where minority jurors are interacting with White 
jurors on trials with a Black defendant (see for example, Brewer, 2003; Bowers, Sandys, 
and Brewer, 2004; and, Fluery-Steiner, 2002).  What this research has been less 
successful in determining is by what process such racial divides occur, especially in light 
of the shared experiences of the voir dire process in jury selection, which often 
homogenizes the jury so that all jurors have similar predispositions towards the death 
penalty (for a discussion of this phenomenon, see Haney, Hurtado, and Vega, 1994).  In 
looking at the role that group climate plays in the decision-making process, I will also 
examine whether any differences of perception may occur along racial divides.  Such 
analysis is necessary in order to help increase our understanding of why Black and White 
jurors report very different reactions when asked about their capital jury experiences (see 
Fluery-Steiner, 2002).  The qualitative accounts from these reports, which will be 
described in the next section, offer some insight but do not allow for generalization; I 
offer more advanced statistical analysis in an attempt to help us understand these 













The process of jury decision-making has long been one of interest to social 
scientists and current empirical endeavors can be traced back to the pioneering work of 
Kalven and Zeisel (1966).  Their research was the first time that jurors and the process by 
which jury decisions were made were studied scientifically.  Researchers started to learn 
about juries through observation of courtrooms and through the collection of data from 
primary actors within the courtroom, especially judges.  It was the beginning of the phase 
where scientists sought to identify the factors that were important to jury deliberations 
and to verdict outcomes.  Their work, known to many as the Chicago Jury Project, was 
the impetus for another generation of social science researchers to turn their attention to 
the normally hidden process of jury deliberation.  Perhaps the most well-known take-off 
of the Chicago Jury Project is the recent collaboration of researchers in several states, 
who have taken on the task of interviewing jurors in fourteen states who have served on 
capital trials.  This research, known as the Capital Jury Project (see Bowers, 1995) is one 
of the few jury studies to take an in-depth look at the mostly secretive, but highly 
legislated, process by which capital sentencing decisions are made.  This section will 
discuss the research on capital punishment decisions from the context of the juror making 
those decisions.  Beginning with the origins of the understanding that come from Kalven 
and Zeisel’s (1966) seminal work and progressing through the most recent findings of the 




do indeed follow the guidelines provided to them by the United States Supreme Court 
and state legislative bodies and make their decisions in the ways acceptable by law. 
 
Early Jury Research 
 
  
In their influential work on the ways in which juries make guilt and sentencing 
decision, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) point out that the jury as a guilt determining body had 
come under scrutiny by critics who contended that juries did not follow the law, both 
because they lacked the ability to understand it and because they did not wish to enforce 
it.  In an attempt to address critics’ concerns, Kalven and Zeisel undertook the task of 
completing the first scientific research study of jury decisions.  Seeking to understand the 
process as it applied to criminal trials, the authors collected data on 3,576 criminal trials 
that took place in 1954, 1955, and 1958 (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966, p. 33).  In an attempt 
to answer two questions, the first being whether the jury did understand the facts of the 
case and the second being whether the jury’s decision was in line with the weight and 
direction of the evidence, the authors collected information on the 3,576 trials from 555 
judges in several states, who each reported on the facts of the case, the jury’s verdict, and 
the verdict he would have leveraged if it had been a bench trial. 
The authors felt that the best way to measure whether the jury’s decision was the 
correct one would be to assess the judge-jury agreement rate; therefore, in cases where 
the jury’s verdict agreed with the judge’s assessment of the case, the authors would 
conclude that the jury understood the facts of the case and came to the appropriate 




facts of the case or the evidence being presented to them, they would be making a 
decision about a case that is different than the one the judge is deciding and therefore be 
returning an inappropriate verdict.  The data collected from these cases showed that, 
overall, jurors did appear to understand the facts of the case, although simple analysis 
suggested that as the case became more complicated in nature (i.e. more expert 
testimony, less clear facts), judges did report that juries would ask more questions and 
deliberate longer (p. 154-155).  Nonetheless, the amount of agreement between the judge 
and the jury, as measured by having the same verdict returned by both sentencing bodies, 
was about equal for the cases where the judge felt that the outcome was clear, regardless 
of whether the judge deemed the case to be easy or hard (p. 157).  The authors felt that 
this was evidence not only that jurors understand the evidence presented to them, but that 
they also follow the direction of the evidence and made decisions that the judge agreed 
were the right decision (p. 159). 
Despite the evidence that there does appear to be overall judge-jury agreement, 
there are several instances where disagreement between the two decision-makers was 
evident.  The authors attribute approximately 14% of the disagreement to what they 
coined the “defendant factor,” where the judge attributed the difference of opinion to the 
way that the jury interpreted the weight of specific characteristics of the defendant (p. 
216).  For instance, attractive defendants, those who showed remorse for their crimes, 
prior military service, and the family responsibilities of the defendant all appeared to 
favor the defense (p. 202-208).  Conversely, cases with Black defendants seemed to elicit 
less favor (p. 210-211).  Jurors favored defendants whom they thought had skilled 




the cases where the disagreement occurred because the jury was more sympathetic than 
the judge, the judge attributed the disagreement to the attorney’s performance (p. 368-
369).   
Kalven and Zeisel (1966) were quick to point out, however, that these findings 
were only applicable to regular felony trials.  Admitting that capital trials are a 
completely different experience, the authors went on to collect data on 111 capital trials, 
with both life and death outcomes (p. 435).  Both the judge and the jury agreed that life in 
prison was the appropriate sentence in 68% (76) of the cases, with the two agreeing on a 
death sentence in 13% (14) of the cases.  In the cases where the judge and jury disagreed, 
the jury was more sympathetic in 13% (14) of the cases and less sympathetic in the 
remaining six percent (7 cases) (p. 436).  The authors noted that clear patterns existed in 
the cases where the judge and the jury agreed that the punishment should be death; most 
notably, those cases with multiple victims, victims defined as more defenseless (such as 
children), and cases where sex crimes were involved were more likely to be sentenced to 
death (p. 437).  Disagreement occurred when there was a question about the mental 
and/or emotional stability of the defendant, in cases where there appeared to be a lack of 
sympathy for the victim, and in cases where the victim may have provoked the defendant 
(p. 439).  Most often, the lack of sympathy for the victim was attributed to the victims 
being African-American or to the victims being women with bad reputations.  These 
findings are especially pertinent, given that they are a precursor to much of the modern 
day jury decision-making research, which suggests that death sentences are more likely to 




1990; Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, and Broffitt, 1998; Bowers et al., 2001; 
King, 1993; Sommers and Ellsworth, 2001; Sweeney and Haney, 1992).   
While Kalven and Zeisel (1966) did indicate that some bias may be occasionally 
operating in those capital trials where there was disagreement on the sentencing outcomes 
between the judge and the jury, especially in the few cases where the judge would be 
more likely to give a life sentence but the jury returned a death sentence, on the whole, 
the authors interpreted these results as suggestive of the fact that the jurors may indeed 
have been making decisions based on the facts of the crime and not based on outside 
influences.  But as this research was being conducted in an era prior to when the United 
States Supreme Court had begun to identify and attempt to remedy the serious flaws 
inherent in the capital trial process, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) had little impetus and even 
less opportunity to delve more deeply into the subject.  Using only a measure of 
discordance between jury sentences and judicial recommendations to look at the validity 
of jury sentences, the authors were unable to tap into many, if any, of the flaws that have 
since been identified in this process, such as the ability of jurors to understand the 
definitions of aggravating and mitigating circumstances or the impact that the defendant’s 
character has on the jury’s final decision.  More recent research has attempted to fill in 
these gaps; much of the research on capital trials after Kalven and Zeisel’s (1966) 
influential work has looked at several areas of potential problems, many identified by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  Pertinent topics include whether or not those individuals that have 
been chosen to sit on juries are truly qualified to return a verdict, the ability of jurors to 
understand the task that they have been assigned, issues of racial bias, questions about the 










One of the ways in which the United States Supreme Court has attempted to exert 
control over the process of capital sentencing is by the regulation of which citizens are 
allowed to serve on a capital jury.  Recognizing that some individuals may possess 
attitudes that would prohibit them from fairly and impartially rendering either a guilty 
verdict or a valid sentencing decision in a capital case, the Court has traditionally given 
the lower courts guidance in determining which individuals would constitute “death 
qualified” jurors – those jurors who would be able to follow the instructions presented to 
them in order to come up with legally permissible verdicts and sentencing decisions.  
Traditionally, the Court recommended that any juror who exhibited “general scruples” 
against the death penalty be excluded from serving on a capital trial.  This standard was 
re-evaluated in the 1968 Witherspoon v. Illinois22 decision, which excluded potential 
jurors who were unalterably opposed to the death penalty.  Over time, however, the 
standard has been shaped by both the Wainwright v. Witt23 and Morgan v. Illinois24 
decisions, which have attempted to further clarify the circumstances by which an 
individual should be excluded from serving on a capital jury.  All three cases will be 
discussed here, as will the effects that each of these standards have had on the process of 
jury decision-making in capital cases. 
                                                 
22 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) 
23 Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.Ct. 884 (1985) 




Witherspoon v. Illinois 1968 
 
 Known as the Witherspoon standard of death qualification, the decision set forth 
in the Witherspoon v. Illinois case excludes from capital jury service those individuals 
who felt that they would not, under any circumstance, vote for the death penalty.  Such 
individuals could not take part in either the guilt deliberation phase of the trial or the 
penalty deliberation phase.  In essence, the Witherspoon standard is a two part test.  First, 
jurors were excluded if they felt that their attitudes towards the death penalty would 
prevent them from making an impartial decision about the defendant’s guilt.  If a juror 
passed the first part of the test, s/he could still be excluded if s/he felt that no amount of 
evidence could convince her/him to vote for the death penalty during sentencing 
deliberations.  This standard of death qualification prevailed for almost two decades, 
despite scores of evidence that suggested that juries comprised of individuals who met 
the Witherspoon standard were not representative of the population as a whole 
(Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, 1984). 
 Much effort has been expended in trying to understand whether or not juries 
comprised of only those individuals who meet the Witherspoon standard are indeed 
impartial.  In a telephone survey of 811 potentially eligible jurors in California, 
Fitzgerald and Ellsworth (1984) identified almost 20 percent of the sample (17.2%) who 
would be considered excludable under the Witherspoon criteria.  From this sample, they 
were able to estimate that approximately seven out of every ten people who oppose the 
death penalty are eliminated from capital jury service through the process of death 
qualification.  After determining which individuals would qualify for jury service, the 




those individuals who would be excluded and those who would be retained in the jury 
pool.  They found that the excludable respondents were more likely than the death 
qualified respondents to have a “due process” orientation, meaning that they were more 
likely to emphasize the fallibility of the criminal justice process.  For instance, 
Witherspoon excludable respondents were more likely to agree that it was better to let a 
guilty person go free than it was to convict an innocent person.  Individuals who qualified 
for jury service under the Witherspoon standard, however, were more likely to choose 
punitive punishment options and believe in the strict enforcement of all laws.  The 
authors also pointed out that Blacks were more likely than any other group to be 
excluded, noting that the process of death qualification disproportionately removes both 
minorities and women from the eligible jury pool (see also Cowan, Thompson, and 
Ellsworth, 1984).  Such differences between the two groups raise serious questions as to 
how representative death qualified juries truly are. 
 Similar research addresses the question of whether death qualified and excludable 
jurors interpret the information presented to them during the trial differently.  Cowan and 
her colleagues (1984) asked mock jurors to deliberate after watching a simulated 
homicide trial in an effort to understand the role that death qualification had both on the 
initial verdict preference and the quality of the deliberation.  What they found was that 
death qualified jurors were more likely to convict the defendant at the initial (pre-
deliberation) verdict and that the percentages stayed approximately the same for the post-
deliberation verdict.  Death qualified jurors also tended to be more favorable about the 
prosecution witnesses than were excludable jurors; conversely, the excludable jurors 




jurors.  When death qualified jurors and excludable jurors were assigned to deliberate a 
case together, the researchers found that those juries were more likely to remember 
evidence presented at trial and also to rate the defendant’s credibility as higher than those 
jurors who deliberated with only other death qualified jurors.  The authors suggest that 
the presence of excludable jurors may actually stimulate more debate and discussion, 
even though there were no significant differences in pre and post deliberation voting 
changes between the two types of juries. 
 In an attempt to determine just how strongly jurors’ death penalty attitudes, as 
measured by Witherspoon death qualification, impact behavior in the form of verdicts, 
Thompson and his colleagues (Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, and Harrington, 1984) 
found that those individuals who were death qualified were more conviction prone than 
their excludable counterparts.  In a sample of 35 jury eligible individuals, the authors 
found that death qualified jurors were more likely to interpret the evidence in a simulated 
assault trial in favor of the prosecution.  Similarly, the death qualified individuals had a 
lower threshold of conviction, meaning that they were willing to convict on a lesser 
certainty of guilt than were those individuals identified as excludable under the 
Witherspoon standard.  When the same sample of individuals was asked about whether 
they would feel if they were responsible for returning an incorrect verdict, death qualified 
individuals were less likely to feel regret if they voted for a guilty verdict and the 
defendant was actually innocent (defined as harsh errors).  Death qualified individuals 
were also more likely to express regret for the cases where an innocent verdict was 




jurors were more likely to express regret for harsh errors and less likely to regret the 
lenient errors. 
 The stark difference between death qualified and Witherspoon excludable jurors is 
very obvious in much of the research, begging the question of how death qualified 
individuals, a diverse group in their own right, can be so consistent in their attitudes and 
behaviors.  Haney (1984) makes the point that the one thing that all death qualified 
individuals have in common is the process of voir dire.  He argues that by going through 
the process of voir dire, potential jurors see that those individuals in opposition to the 
death penalty are punished by being taken out of the jury pool, leading them to the 
conclusion that both the attorneys and the judge want a pro-capital punishment jury.  
Haney even goes on to speculate that because individuals think that both the attorneys 
and the judge want a pro-capital punishment jury, they begin to see a death sentence as 
the only acceptable punishment.  In a study of death qualified adults, subjects were 
assigned to one of two conditions.  The experimental group watched a videotape of a voir 
dire process that included a segment on death qualification.  The control condition 
watched the same voir dire process without the death qualification segment.  Results 
indicated that those subjects in the experimental condition attributed a higher level of 
guilt to the defendant in a hypothetical penalty phase than did the control subjects.  
Furthermore, the subjects in the experimental condition were more likely to believe that 
the hypothetical defendant would be convicted of first-degree murder and that he would 
be sentenced to the death penalty.  The subjects in the experimental group were also 





 Haney (1984) points out that the pro-death penalty attitudes of death qualified 
juries are not necessarily the result of putting together a group of death qualified 
individuals, but rather of having those individuals experience the process of death 
qualification during voir dire.  The subjects in the experimental group, who watched a 
death qualification segment of voir dire, were more likely to believe that the law 
punished people who opposed the death penalty than were the subjects in the control 
group.  Haney (1984) postulates several reasons for the differences between the 
seemingly similar groups, noting that persons in novel situations (such as the voir dire 
process) are likely to take their cue from authority figures.  During the process of voir 
dire, the authority figures are very interested in death penalty attitudes and as a result, 
may make subjects believe that the death penalty is warranted in the situation at hand.  
The process of death qualification also forces individuals to take a public stand about 
their willingness to enforce the death penalty, perhaps increasing the likelihood that they 
will act on this willingness.  Regardless of the reasoning, however, Haney (1984) 
acknowledges that several flaws exist in the voir dire process, further predisposing an 
already pro-death jury towards the death penalty. 
  
 Wainwright v. Witt 1985 
 
 Over time, the United States Supreme Court realized that the Witherspoon 
standard of death qualification was unintentionally creating juries who were predisposed 
to death, and just as some individuals would be unable to serve on a capital jury because 
of their strong opposition to capital punishment, other jurors could potentially be 




since been criticized as an extremely vague and unhelpful revision of the definition of 
death qualification (see Dillehay and Sandys, 1996; Sandys and McClelland, 2003), the 
Court decided in Wainwright v. Witt that any individual could be excluded from capital 
jury service if they held attitudes towards the death penalty that would “prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror.25”  This standard left 
the door open so that those jurors with strong opinions of both sides of the capital 
punishment debate could be excluded; meaning that both those jurors who would never 
vote for the death penalty under any circumstance and those jurors who would always 
vote for the death penalty under all circumstances could be disqualified. 
 Research on the impact that the Witt standard has had on capital juries shows 
consistently that death qualified jurors remain as different from excludables as they did 
under the Witherspoon standard.  Ellsworth (1991) observes that regardless of both the 
standard employed in the research and the types of questions utilized to determine 
qualification, those individuals who are considered death qualified are always more 
conviction prone than those who are excludable.  The research appears to support this 
conclusion.  Dillehay and Sandys (1996; see also Sandys and McClelland, 2003) argue 
that the Witt standard is a more difficult one because the criteria by which a potential 
juror is to be judged becomes much more subjective, giving trial judges more discretion 
to determine an individual’s behavior, instead of asking the individual to decide for 
him/herself how he/she would behave under certain circumstances.  In an attempt to 
determine how the pool of eligible death qualified jurors had changed under the adoption 
of the Witt standard, the Dillehay and Sandys (1996) interviewed 148 former jurors from 
felony trials in Kentucky.  Approximately one-tenth of the jurors would have been 
                                                 




excluded under the Witt standard and those who were death eligible were more likely to 
report greater ease with performing the tasks that would be asked of a capital juror. 
 These findings are in line with those of Butler and Moran (2002), who used the 
Witt standard as a way to measure the likelihood of a potential jurors’ receptivity to 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  Jury eligible adults were classified as death qualified 
or excludable using the Witt standard and then asked to determine the validity of several 
statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The authors found 
that those individuals who were identified as death qualified were more likely than Witt 
excludables to endorse statutory aggravating factors.  Neither group endorsed the 
statutory mitigating factors, although the excludable group was more likely to endorse the 
non-statutory mitigating factors.  Both of the groups did agree, however, that the statutory 
mitigating factors were valid reasons for choosing a life sentence over a death sentence.  
Given these results, the authors question the ability of both groups to fully understand the 
sentencing instructions that require jurors to give equal weight to both aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  Despite the effects that the Court may have anticipated from the more 
relaxed Witt standard, the evidence is conclusive that the differences between the death 
qualified and excludable groups remain consistent, with death qualified individuals 
always more prone to choose the death penalty, regardless of the circumstances under 









 Morgan v. Illinois 1992 
 
 The Witt standard set the stage for the 1992 Morgan v. Illinois ruling, which was 
much more explicit about the exclusion of individuals from capital jury service if it 
appeared that their pro-death penalty attitudes would prohibit them from being able to 
perform their duties impartially, ensuring that all jurors chosen to serve on capital cases 
would be able to conscientiously vote for both a life or a death sentence.  Those jurors 
excluded by both the Morgan standard and through certain interpretations of the Witt 
standard, often called “Automatic Death Penalty” (ADP) individuals (see Haney, 
Hurtado, and Vega, 1994), are the ones who would vote for a death sentence in every 
circumstance, a direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.  The 
Morgan decision was clear in its directive that the Fourteenth Amendment demands that 
a sentencing jury be impartial and must in good faith consider all aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, as the sentencing instructions require.  The Court, in Morgan 
rules that the defendant has a right to remove from his or her trial any jurors who will 
always vote for the death penalty, regardless of the individual circumstances, as failure to 
consider mitigating factors is also a failure to follow the law.  
 Many researchers have tried to estimate the impact that excluding the ADP jurors 
will have on jurors serving on capital trials.  Many researchers believe that the eligible 
pool of jurors will decrease dramatically; Dillehay and Sandys (1996) estimated that 
almost thirty percent of their sample of former jurors in Kentucky felony trials would 
have been identified as ADP jurors.  Haney and his colleagues (Haney, Hurtado, and 
Vega, 1994) were more conservative in their estimate of ADP jurors in a California 




sample as excludables.  The application of the Witt standard brought the number of 
excludable individuals up to just over eight percent of the sample.  The increase in the 
number of people who would be disqualified due to the ADP status, however, was 
smaller than that identified by Dillehay and Sandys (1996).  The number of ADP 
excludables increased from just about one percent of the sample to almost three percent 
(Haney, Hurtado, and Vega, 1994).  The authors point out, however, that while the point 
of the Witt and Morgan decisions may have been to expand the category of persons 
identified as excludable, they have not increased the size of the excludable category 
because more people than ever support the death penalty.  This means that, relative of 
any other changes, the size of the category of individuals who are death qualified has 
actually increased. 
 Despite the legal changes that have been implemented over the years, however, 
the group of jurors that is considered eligible to serve on a capital trial remains 
significantly different than the excludable individuals on several dimensions, including 
legal attitudes, demographic characteristics, conviction proneness, and the ability to 
correctly interpret and apply sentencing instructions.  As a result, the process by which 
jurors are supposed to return evenhanded and well thought-out verdicts and sentences, as 











 Sitting on a capital jury is both an emotionally stressful experience and an 
intellectually taxing one.  While states may differ in the specific laws that exist to guide 
juror discretion, each state still has many rules and guidelines to help jurors come to a 
legally binding decision.  The scope of these guidelines is becoming larger all the time, as 
the United States Supreme Court is routinely modifying the rules by which jurors make 
decisions.  Many of these updated guidelines revolve around issues of sentencing 
instructions, including the ability of the jury to consider any mitigating factors that they 
deem relevant26, any aggravating factors not previously defined in statutes27, and issues 
like the defendant’s future dangerousness and adjustment to prison life28.  The Court has 
also ruled that it is permissible to ask the jury not to be swayed either by sympathy for the 
defendant29.  Such instructions are in addition to those specific to the sentencing 
guidelines of individual states and point to the complex issues surrounding the 
punishment decision.  Research about a juror’s understanding of these complex issues has 
left us with a sense that, while most jurors do try to take their position and the 
responsibilities that come with it extremely seriously, many are unable to accurately 
apply the sentencing schema in order to come up with a constitutionally sanctioned 
punishment decision. 
 The research on instructional comprehension generally looks at the ways that 
jurors’ understand the application of aggravating and mitigating factors to a sentencing 
decision.  Various circumstances can impact how a juror understands the judge’s 
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sentencing instructions, including the race of the juror (Brewer, 2004), the race of the 
defendant (Lynch and Haney, 2000), and whether a juror is considered “death qualified” 
(Butler and Moran, 2002).  Most of the research on jurors’ understanding of sentencing 
instructions can be broken into two categories: research using simulation exercises and 
research interviewing jurors after they have served on a trial.  The results using both 
types of samples are consistent in their findings that jurors often misunderstand the ways 
in which they should use aggravating and mitigating factors in making their decisions.  
Findings from both types of research will be discussed for the sake of a comprehensive 
review. 
Much of what we know about the ways that real jurors on capital cases make their 
decisions is based on interviews with jurors after they have completed serving on the 
trial.  Many of these interviews are part of the Capital Jury Project (CJP), a multi-state 
research project that has been collecting data from interviews with jurors who have 
served on capital trials in 14 states since 1988.  The states were chosen because they fell 
into one of the three categories of sentencing guidelines: 1) balancing statutes; 2) 
threshold statutes; and 3) directed statutes (Bowers, 1995).  Balancing statutes require 
that jurors take into consideration both the aggravating and mitigating factors in the case; 
a death sentence can be returned only if the jury determines that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  Some states, such as California, 
only read a list of factors to the jury, without identifying which are aggravating and 
which are mitigating.  Others typically give jurors a list of both aggravating factors, such 
as the killing of a law enforcement officer in the line of duty, and mitigating 




require a jury to determine that at least one aggravating factor is present; most states have 
a statutorily accepted list of aggravating circumstances that are presented to juries for 
their deliberation.  The jury must also consider any mitigating factors presented to them.  
Once they have done this, they are free to return a death sentence without further 
guidance (Bowers and Foglia, 2003).  Directed statutes require that all of the jurors 
answer specific questions, about such things like the defendant’s future dangerousness, in 
the affirmative before they can impose a death sentence (Bowers and Foglia, 2003).  In 
the past, the jury’s decision may or may not have been binding, depending on the state.  
In some states, such as Florida and Alabama, the jury returned a sentencing 
recommendation of either life or death to the judge.  The United States Supreme Court 
decision in Ring v. Arizona30, however, has changed this rule, so that now all states must 
require that the jury to be the only finder of fact in questions of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and therefore the jury’s sentence must be binding (Bowers, 
1995; Bowers and Foglia, 2003). 
In their examination of the experience of South Carolina jurors, who were 
interviewed as part of the larger Capital Jury Project, Eisenberg and Wells (1993) found 
that jurors did not appear to understand the burden of proof necessary for finding the 
presence of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The South Carolina statute is 
considered a threshold statute; South Carolina law requires that if at least one aggravating 
circumstance is present, the jury has the option, although it is not required, to sentence a 
defendant to death.  Furthermore, the presence of aggravating factors must be unanimous 
and must be proved using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  The jury may also 
consider any statutory mitigating circumstances, such as lack of prior convictions for 
                                                 




violent crimes and the mental capacity of the defendant, although the presence of 
mitigating factors is not held to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  Jurors, 
however, tended to infer from these instructions that the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard also applied to mitigating circumstances and more than half of the jurors also 
thought that the presence of mitigating factors must also be unanimous.  On average, 
those jurors who had lower comprehension were more likely to vote for death than those 
who understood the judge’s instructions, leading the authors to conclude that the 
sentencing phase, which is already biased towards death, is so confusing that jurors end 
up voting for death by “default” (Eisenberg and Wells, 1993). 
Findings from other Capital Jury Project sites are consistent with the South 
Carolina results.  Using a qualitative approach to understand the responses of jurors 
involved in six Capital Jury Project states31, Bentele and Bowers (2001) discerned two 
major trends with regards to juror comprehension of sentencing instructions.  The first 
was that jurors incorrectly assumed that the presence of an aggravating factor required a 
death sentence.  The second trend was that the jurors failed to understand, consider, or 
give weight to mitigating factors.  While the amount of weight a juror must give to a 
mitigating factor is left up to the discretion of the individual juror, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has been clear that all mitigating factors must at least be considered.  This trend 
was especially evident in the juror responses to the question about what topics were 
discussed during deliberation.  Jurors overwhelming reported discussing guilt related 
topics, such as the evidence presented during trial, instead of the statutorily required 
aggravating or mitigating factors (Bentele and Bowers, 2001).  When jurors do not 
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consider the mitigating circumstances, they are more likely to think that a death sentence 
is a mandatory sentence once guilt has been established.  Foglia (2003) found similar 
evidence in her study of jurors from the Pennsylvania site of the Capital Jury Project, 
which utilizes a balancing statute, where more than one-third of respondents thought that 
mitigating circumstances had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 Haney and his colleagues (Haney, Sontag, and Costanzo, 1994) find similar 
results in their study of jurors serving on capital trials in both California and Oregon.  
California’s sentencing guidelines, like Pennsylvania’s, are considered to be balancing 
statutes.  Jurors are expected to weigh the aggravating and mitigation factors presented to 
them, although the statute only lists which factors the jury can consider.  The California 
statute does not, however, identify whether a factor is a mitigating or an aggravating 
factor; this is left to the determination of the jury.  Oregon’s sentencing guidelines are 
more along the lines of a directed statute, with jurors being asked three specific questions, 
the answers to which guide the penalty phase of deliberations.  Two of the questions are 
answered during the guilt phase of the trial (one is whether or not the crime was 
committed deliberately, the other is whether the crime was provoked by the victim).  The 
third question asks whether there is a probability that the defendant would be dangerous 
in the future, committing future acts of violence that would threaten society.  Fifty-seven 
jurors, 30 in California and 27 in Oregon, from 19 capital trials (of which 10 were death 
sentences and 9 were life sentences) were questioned about the process by which the 
juries made their sentencing decision.  Through interviews, the authors found that many 
of the California jurors cited the absence of any mitigating factors as their reason for 




for clarification about the definitions of mitigating and aggravating factors, only to be 
told that the jury should figure it out amongst themselves.  Oregon jurors were less likely 
than California jurors to accurately describe the sentencing instructions, although both 
groups showed considerable confusion.  Only two Oregon jurors were able to accurately 
recall the instructions, compared to thirteen California jurors.  Jurors in both states, 
however, reported that they doubted that their verdicts would be carried out, making them 
feel better about the sentencing phase of the trial, which many readily described as “more 
difficult” and “more emotional” than the guilt deliberation phase (Haney, Sontag, and 
Costanzo, 1994).  This research points to the fact that a juror’s inability to understand the 
sentencing instructions told to him/her does not appear to be a function of the type of 
sentencing guidelines employed by the state; jurors have trouble understanding the 
guidelines regardless of whether they are meant to be threshold, balancing, or directed 
statutes. 
 Research using student samples engaged in simulation exercises shows consistent 
results on the inability of individuals to adequately understand the concepts of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  In several examinations of the ways that 
college students interpret the California sentencing guidelines, Haney and Lynch (1994; 
1997) find that a majority of the respondents had a more difficult time understanding and 
defining mitigating factors than they did aggravating factors, although the understanding 
of aggravating factors was still not as high as the authors expected from the college 
students.  In one study, the respondents were read the California sentencing instructions 
and asked to correctly define both aggravation and mitigation.  The results showed that 




students were able to define aggravating circumstances than were able to define 
mitigating circumstances (15% compared with 13%) (Haney and Lynch, 1994).  The 
authors also found that most of the subjects used factors related to the circumstances of 
the crime in order to both understand and define both aggravation and mitigation.  As a 
result, subjects did not take into consideration circumstances that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has identified as mitigating, such as the background and personal characteristics of the 
defendant.  The same sample of students also misidentified several of the California 
specific factors, with between one-quarter and one-third of respondents choosing seven of 
the nine mitigating factors to be aggravating factors.  The authors point out that, at least 
for the state of California, jurors are confused about the interpretations that they should 
be making about aggravating and mitigating circumstances, casting doubt on the 
sentencing decisions made under these circumstances (Haney and Lynch, 1994). 
 The authors conducted a follow-up study shortly after, in order to assess the 
progress of changes made to the California sentencing instructions in capital cases 
(Haney and Lynch, 1997).  The penalty phase instructions had been revised in order to 
improve juror comprehension, by adding detailed definitions of both aggravation and 
mitigation.  Despite the revisions to the state guidelines, the authors still found that the 
majority of their college student sample was unable to correctly define both aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, with only 41% of subjects able to correctly define both 
terms.  Most respondents also did not understand the weighing process necessary to come 
up with a death sentence; only half of the respondents knew that a life sentence was the 
necessary outcome when mitigation outweighed aggravation.  Also of note is the fact that 




outweighed mitigation, despite the fact that it is unconstitutional for the death penalty to 
be the mandatory sentence under any circumstances.  The authors concluded that the 
results of this study are indicative that the problems jurors have with sentencing 
instructions are greater than previously understood, as even the revised instructions did 
not increase comprehension to a place where it would inspire confidence with the current 
system (Haney and Lynch, 1997). 
As mentioned previously, certain factors, such as death qualification, can also 
make a juror more or less receptive to the consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, a sign that jurors are interpreting sentencing instructions from their own 
perspectives and not based upon the guidelines given to them.  Further examination of 
this type of research shows that racial bias may be implicit in the ways that jurors 
understand and apply aggravation and mitigation, and it has been suggested that the lack 
of instructional comprehension may actually free a juror to act on his or her own 
stereotypes and biases.  In an examination of the instructional comprehension of jury 
eligible adults in the state of California who participated in a simulated jury trial, Lynch 
and Haney (2000) found that respondents were more likely to sentence a Black defendant 
to death when their understanding of the sentencing instructions was low.  This pattern 
appeared in both the cases where there was a Black defendant and a Black victim and the 
cases where there was a Black defendant and a White victim.  Respondents also used 
mitigating evidence differently in the cases with Black and White defendants; subjects 
were more likely to discount evidence of substance abuse, evidence of child abuse, and 
evidence of being loved by family for Black defendants than for White defendants.  This 




Philadelphia capital cases were more likely to find aggravating factors in cases with a 
Black defendant and a non-Black victim and that jurors were less likely to find mitigating 
circumstances in cases with a non-Black victim. 
To further understand how the relationship between instructional comprehension 
and individual factors impacts jury decision-making, Brewer (2004) examined the 
interaction between the race and the gender of the jury members and their receptivity to 
mitigation.  Using data from all fourteen states in the Capital Jury Project, he found that 
females were consistently more receptive to mitigation than males, as were Black jurors 
when compared to White jurors.  Black jurors also appeared to be more receptive to 
mitigation when there was a non-White defendant and both Black and White jurors were 
more receptive to mitigating factors when they were of the same race of the defendant but 
not the victim.  Similarly to the research looking at the ways in which death qualified 
jurors apply mitigation and aggravation, Brewer (2004) also found that jurors who held 
strong pro-death penalty attitudes were also less likely to be receptive to mitigation.   
It should be noted that Foglia (2003) makes an interesting point about the impact 
that lack of instructional comprehension can have on sentencing outcomes.  She points 
out that the majority of the Pennsylvania jurors made their punishment decision prior to 
the commencement of the punishment phase and prior to the review of sentencing 
instructions.  This finding is consistent with other studies that have examined the timing 
of the punishment decision (see Bowers, 1995; Bowers and Foglia, 2003; Bowers, 
Sandys, and Steiner, 1998), which show that approximately half of the jurors make their 
punishment decision prior to the punishment phase of deliberation.  If this is the case, and 




against the defendant due to lack of instructional comprehension may not be as large as 
previously thought.  A majority of Pennsylvania jurors, for instance, make their 
punishment decision before the punishment phase commences and the sentencing 
instructions are reviewed.  As a result, the direct impact of any instructional 
misunderstanding over sentencing instructions may be overestimated.  Nonetheless, we 
still know that almost half of all jurors go into the penalty phase of the trial undecided 
(see Bowers and Steiner, 1999), and as such, the impact of sentencing comprehension on 
those jurors is still an important consideration. 
 This line of research clearly demonstrates that instructional comprehension does 
have at least some negative impact on capital case outcomes when jurors do not fully 
understand what they have been tasked with accomplishing.  Bowers and Foglia (2003) 
point out that these findings are consistent regardless of the types of sentencing statutes 
used by the individual states, suggesting a fundamental problem with the administration 
of punishment instructions and not a problem with laws and procedures that could be 
specific to one state or another.  As Haney and Lynch (1997) have pointed out, revisions 
of sentencing guidelines also do not appear to help increase comprehension.  These two 
observations shed light on the fact that sentencing instructions may be inherently flawed, 
despite the hopes of the United States Supreme Court when they forced states to institute 
a bifurcated process as a way to ensure that the defendant had a fair opportunity to 







Racial Bias in Jury Decision-Making 
 
 
 The issue of the impact of racial bias on jury verdicts has always been a 
convoluted one.  Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) point out that the interpretation of bias 
has become more difficult over time, as social advancements have changed the way in 
which prejudicial behavior is actualized.  Advancements in statistical techniques have 
also changed the way that researchers have attempted to measure the effects that racial 
bias may have on deliberations and on jury verdicts, making it difficult at times to trace 
the role that race has had on this process over time.  Early research on the role that race 
played in the decision-making context suggested that White jurors were more likely to 
convict Black defendants (Johnson, 1985), Black jurors tend to give Black defendants the 
benefit of the doubt even when evidence is strong (Ugwuegbu, 1979), and that mock 
jurors were more likely to convict in a rape case when the victim was of their race (Miller 
and Hewitt, 1978).  In an observational study of rape cases tried in Indianapolis during 
the early 1970s, LaFree (1998) also found that jurors were more likely to acquit in cases 
where the victim was a Black female (p. 219).  This leads to questions not only about the 
credibility of the defendant, but also of the victim.  LaFree’s research suggests that many 
White jurors may have been willing to overlook testimony or evidence in cases where the 
defendant was Black because jurors tended to believe that Black women behaved more 
promiscuously than their White counterparts and were therefore less trustworthy (p. 220).  
Such convictions of the jurors interviewed in those trials points to the muddied nature of 
the issues of race and the legal system. 
Over time the direction of the relationship between race and negative sentencing 




findings for racial bias (see Sweeney and Haney, 1992).  For example, Baldus and his 
colleagues (1998) point out that while the effects that the victim’s race has on the 
outcome are generally well understood (i.e. cases with a White victim often get a harsher 
punishment than those with a non-White victim), the role that the race of the defendant 
plays in the decision-making process tends to be less understood.  Recent research has 
attempted to bring more clarity to this issue. 
 While the mechanisms that control the impact that racial bias may have on 
outcome decisions are still not well understood, there is a general consensus among 
researchers that racial bias does in some way influence the capital sentencing process.  In 
recent years, many studies with sound methodological techniques have been undertaken 
as a reaction to the United States Supreme Court case McKlesky v. Kemp32, when the 
Court ruled that scholarly research33 showing that racial discrimination existed in the 
application of the death penalty in the state of Georgia was not sufficient evidence to 
grant the petitioner’s request to overturn his death sentence, since the evidence did not 
show that the discrimination was intentional nor did it in any way individually impact the 
petitioner’s trial and subsequent sentencing.  Such evidence of racial disparity has been 
identified at several stages of the capital trial process (for examples, see Baldus et al. 
1990; Paternoster, 1991), but for the sake of brevity, only those examples that are specific 
to the issues inherent in juror decision-making and jury deliberation will be reviewed 
here. 
 In a meta-analysis examining the influence of race on sentencing outcomes, using 
all of the experimental mock-jury studies to date, Sweeney and Haney (1992) conclude 
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that three factors significantly contribute to racially biased sentencing outcomes.  The 
first is the medium which the experiment employs; research designs that are more 
realistic were more likely to show racial bias in outcomes.  The second and third factors 
were the race of the defendant and the race of the victim.  Thirteen of the fourteen studies 
utilized for this meta-analysis were non-capital cases, making it difficult to generalize 
these findings to capital trials.  The authors point out, however, that this racial bias is 
likely to be even stronger for capital cases and therefore cannot be ruled out as a potential 
factor in arbitrary sentencing.  King (1993) suggests several ways that this bias can 
operate, such as in the tendency of jurors to use their own experiences to interpret the 
evidence; Black and White jurors may reach different conclusions based on the same 
evidence because they interpret that evidence based on very different life histories. 
 One study that has attempted to use increased statistical sophistication to better 
understand the role that racial bias plays in jury sentencing outcomes is Baldus and 
colleague’s (1998) account of the decision-making process in Philadelphia’s capital 
cases.  The authors found that when case characteristics were accounted for, the presence 
of a non-Black victim enhanced the probability of a death sentence.  Furthermore there 
was a minor enhancement effect for those cases with a Black defendant.  Jurors were also 
more likely to find aggravating circumstances in cases with a Black defendant and a non-
Black victim.  In one part of the study, which looked at sentencing outcomes for over 300 
capital trials in Pennsylvania, analysis indicated that once aggravating and mitigation 
circumstances were accounted for, being Black increased the defendant’s odds of 
receiving a death sentence by a factor of 9.3.  Baldus and colleagues (1998) also pointed 




studies of capital trial sentencing outcomes in the South, where much of the 
discrimination appears to be a function of prosecutorial decisions to seek the death 
penalty.  The authors suggest that the disparity works more subtly through the jury 
process in this northern city, a similar argument advanced by Sommers and Ellsworth 
(2001). 
 Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) argue that stereotypes are alive and well in 
society, despite the attempts of most Whites to maintain a non-prejudiced appearance.  
They postulate that this prejudice exhibits itself in the way that race influences jury 
verdict outcomes.  In a study of mock jurors presented with trial transcripts of an 
interracial domestic battery (a Black defendant and a White victim), both Black and 
White defendants were less likely to act based on racial stereotypes when the issue of 
race was brought to their attention and made salient in the trial transcripts.  The authors 
suggest that in cases where potential jurors are forced to address the issue of race, they 
are more likely to be evenhanded in their assessments of the evidence because they have 
been made aware that they should act in a racially neutral manner.  In those cases where 
race was not made a salient part of the trial, however, racial bias was found on both the 
part of White and Black respondents.  Sommers and Ellsworth (2001) argue that in these 
instances, respondents were free to act on racial stereotypes because they did not have to 
confront the issue of race.  This study confirmed earlier findings by Sommers and 
Ellsworth (2000), where respondents chosen from an airline terminal waiting room were 
also more likely to exhibit bias towards different-race defendants, regardless of the 
respondent’s race.  The authors also found that Black jurors were more likely to see racial 




While these particular studies did not look explicitly at the way race influences 
capital cases, the results are consistent with research on the role of racial bias in both 
mock jury simulations and in interviews with jurors who have served on capital trials.  In 
the Capital Jury Project, many of the findings point to several ways in which racial bias 
impact jury deliberations.  In their examination of results from all fourteen states, Bowers 
and colleagues (Bowers et al., 2001) find that jurors are more likely to take a premature 
stand on punishment when the juror and the victim were of the same race.  Same race 
jurors were also more likely to take an early punishment stand in favor of death.  
Furthermore, Whites and Blacks differed considerably on three punishment conditions: 
lingering doubts over guilt, impressions of defendant’s remorsefulness and perceptions of 
future dangerousness.  Blacks were more likely to doubt the guilt of a Black defendant, 
more likely to interpret the defendant’s behavior at trial as remorseful, and less likely to 
believe that the defendant posed a future threat to society.  These effects were especially 
pronounced in the cases with a Black defendant and a White victim.   
 Fluery-Steiner (2002) points out that racial bias will differ depending upon the 
identity of the individual juror employing such bias (see also Crenshaw, 1995).  Focusing 
on only a subset of death cases with Black defendants from the larger Capital Jury 
Project, he found that more educated White jurors were more likely to express sympathy 
towards Black defendants and the circumstances of the crime.  More educated Black 
jurors were also more likely to express sympathy towards the difficulties White jurors 
had in relating to the Black defendant.  Less educated White jurors, however, were more 
likely to make explicit remarks about the “us versus them” mentality that is an indicator 




likely to express frustration with racist White jurors.  Race was just one aspect of the 
individual juror’s identity that played into their overall interpretation of the racial facts 
that they were presented with; as Fleury-Steiner’s (2002) work makes explicit, there is 
the potential for interactions between race and other mediating factors, such as social 
status. 
 Because many of the racial patterns identified appear to be rooted in the cases 
with a Black defendant and a White victim, further analysis of those cases is warranted.  
Looking at results from all of the states involved in the Capital Jury Project, Bowers and 
his colleagues (Bowers et al., 2001) found that White jurors were three times more likely 
than Black jurors in this circumstance to take a pro-death stand on punishment.  They 
were also four times more likely than Black jurors to take the pro-death stand 
prematurely, namely, prior to both the sentencing phase of the trial and before sentencing 
instructions are explained.  The authors also found that qualitative differences existed 
between the decision-making behaviors of Black and White jurors (Bowers et al., 2004).  
Black jurors were less likely to use negative attributions, such as cold-blooded and 
depraved, when asked to describe the crime.  White jurors were also more likely to 
describe a case as being aggravated than Black jurors who served on the same trial.  
Black male jurors were also more likely on every dimension to identify with the Black 
defendant and Black jurors of both genders were more likely to have “found the 
defendant likable as a person,” which the authors point out appears to discourage the 








 Premature Decision Making 
 
One of the systemic problems identified with jury decision-making in capital 
trials is the tendency of jurors to make their decisions about what sentence the defendant 
should receive prior to hearing evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial and 
receiving the judge’s instructions on the matter (Bowers, 1995; Bowers and Foglia, 
2003).  In making their sentencing decision prematurely, jurors are not as receptive to the 
evidence presented during the penalty stage of the trial, especially mitigating 
circumstances.  The end result is that the jurors are not making their decisions in the way 
that was intended by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark decision Gregg v. 
Georgia.  The Court pointed out in that case that the bifurcated trial process was 
necessary because the types of evidence offered during the punishment phase of the trial 
may unfairly prejudice a jury against a defendant if brought up during the guilt phase.  By 
making their decisions prior to the punishment phase, jurors are effectively invalidating 
the constitutionally prescribed instructions. 
 Research findings from the on-going Capital Jury Project (CJP) have offered 
some of the most compelling evidence that jurors are making their punishment decision 
prematurely.  In his initial preview of some of the earlier findings from this study, 
Bowers (1995) pointed out that approximately half of the jurors interviewed in fourteen 
states admitted to making a decision about punishment after the guilt phase but prior to 
hearing evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial.  The results indicated that not 
only were these decisions made too early during the trial, but that the jurors also felt 




which punishment decision a juror made early on in the trial, for life or for death, the 
juror was unreceptive to any arguments or evidence presented after that decision was 
made, including mitigating circumstances described during the penalty phase of the trail 
(Bowers et al., 1998).   
 While premature decision-making is in its own right a violation of the ways in 
which jurors are expected to behave during the course of the trial, it also poses an 
additional risk to many defendants, as there is some evidence that indicates that racial 
bias may influence proceedings through early punishment decisions.  In an extension of 
the work of the Capital Jury Project, Bowers and his colleagues (2001) found that Whites 
were more likely to take an earlier punishment stand than were Blacks, especially in 
cases where there was a Black defendant and a White victim.  Whites were also more 
likely in this case to take a pro-death stance, making them less receptive to mitigating 
circumstances and therefore more likely to impose a death sentence in cases with Black 
defendants and White victims, without making attempts to individualize verdicts based 
on the facts of the case at hand.   
 Overall, the results indicate that half of the jurors in capital cases are making early 
sentencing decisions, oftentimes during the guilt deliberations (Foglia, 2003).  These 
early decisions also have a permanent impact on the outcome of the trial, since more than 
half of those who make early pro-death decisions do not modify that initial position 
during the course of deliberations (Bowers and Foglia, 2003).  They are unlikely to take 
into account mitigating circumstances during the course of the sentencing phase of the 




death to life do so only to avoid the prospect of a hung jury, further complicating the 
deliberation process (Bowers and Foglia, 2003). 
 
 Erroneous Belief That Death Is Required 
 
One of the more problematic results of a juror’s failure to understand the 
sentencing instructions set forth by the court is the tendency of many jurors to believe 
that death is a required sentence after guilt has been established.  This seems to happen 
even when a juror is undecided about sentencing at the guilt phase or is favoring a life 
sentence at the outset of punishment deliberations (Bentele and Bowers, 2001).  Geimer 
and Amsterdam (1988) described this phenomenon in their study of capital jurors in the 
state of Florida.  The jurors reported feeling that they were required to return a death 
sentence unless they were convinced otherwise during the penalty phase of the trial. 
In an analysis of data from eleven of the fifteen states participating in the Capital 
Jury Project, Bowers and his colleagues (1998) found that jurors who made premature 
pro-death decisions were more likely to believe that if a defendant is found guilty, he 
should be sentenced to death.  Those jurors believed that proof of guilt was enough of a 
reason to justify a death sentence.  The premature death jurors were also more likely to 
believe that when the crime was heinous in nature or there was evidence of future 
dangerousness, a death sentenced was required.  Jurors who made early pro-life 
decisions, however, were more likely to recognize that the presence of mitigating factors 
should negate a death sentence, regardless of the other circumstances of the crime. 
A corollary problem with jurors believing that death is the required sentence after 




rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Woodson et al v. North Carolina34 and Roberts 
v. Louisiana35 decisions.  In both circumstances, the defendants had been sentenced to 
death based on their respective states’ mandatory death penalty statutes for individuals 
convicted of first-degree murder.  In each case, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the 
death sentence for the defendants, claiming that taking all discretion out of the hands of 
the jury was just as egregious as allowing the juries the unfettered discretion that ran 
rampant in the pre-Furman years.  The Court ruled that because a mandatory death 
sentence does not give the jury the power to decide whether or not the circumstances of 
individual defendants warrant mercy, its application would be constitutionally 
unacceptable.  Jurors needed to be given the opportunity to consider the unique 
culpability of each defendant, as well as the unique mitigating circumstances that may be 
present in each case; mandatory death statutes, however, do not allow for such 
individualized reasoning.  The sentence of death, the Court reasoned, was qualitatively 
different from any sentence of imprisonment and therefore, greater consideration was 
necessary to mete it out properly.  Proper application requires more information than just 
what is required for a conviction; the relevant characteristics of the defendant must also 
be taken into account for the punishment to be fair and reliable.   
 
 Evasion of Responsibility 
 
In the Caldwell v. Mississippi36 decision, the United States Supreme Court made it 
clear that one of the requirements for a legitimate death sentence is that the members of 
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the jury take responsibility for the punishment.  This means that a death sentence can 
only be valid if the jurors themselves feel a personal responsibility for both sentencing an 
individual to death and for the subsequent death of that defendant; passing off that 
responsibility to the judge or to some other actor would be directly contrary to the 
Court’s proscriptions of how punishment decisions should be reached.  Research as to 
whether or not that is happening has been mixed.  In his review of the current issues 
facing capital juries, Haney (1995) points out that jurors may distance themselves from 
the decision in much the same way that the subjects in Stanley Milgrim’s infamous 
obedience study distanced themselves from their actions.  In her review of some of the 
Capital Jury Project findings, Hans (1995) points out that jurors in states where the jury 
decision is binding are more likely to acknowledge having some degree of responsibility 
in the death decision than those jurors in states where the jury’s decision only serves as a 
recommendation to the judge.  Her point, however, may not hold weight in the future, as 
the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ring v. Arizona37 has changed the process by 
which jurors can recommend a sentence to the judge in capital cases.  The Court ruled 
that all capital cases must be sentenced by a jury, so recommendations to the judge are no 
longer allowed and all jury sentences are binding.  Future research is needed to know 
whether this change will impact the way in which jurors view their own responsibility for 
a death sentence in those states that were affected by the ruling. 
 In a large-scale study of the way that capital jurors assumed responsibility for 
their sentences, Eisenberg and his colleagues (1996) used survey responses from the 
South Carolina Capital Jury site to examine whether or not jurors were taking 
responsibility for their sentencing decisions.  The results suggested that different 
                                                 




circumstances lead to differing levels of acceptance of responsibility by jurors.  
Separating responsibility into two categories, role and causal, the authors sought to 
distinguish whether jurors were able to accept their legal obligations in returning a 
sentence (role responsibility) and whether they were capable of accepting that they 
individually factored into the death of the defendant when that was the recommended 
punishment.  The authors noted that more jurors seemed prepared to accept their legal 
responsibility for the sentencing outcome than they were to accept the fact that they were 
individually responsible for sentencing a person to death.  This was ascribed to the fact 
that a sense of causal responsibility, or accepting individual responsibility for the 
decision, depends heavily on the circumstances surrounding the case that are not easily 
changed, such as the conduct of the defendant; hence, jurors tend to feel limited in the 
amount of responsibility that they can accept.   
The majority of jurors (approximately 59 percent) did take role responsibility 
however, stating that they were mostly or strictly responsible for the verdict, although the 
amount of responsibility that the jurors were willing to accept diminished as the number 
of options of who to ascribe responsibility increased.  While it was difficult to determine 
why some jurors accepted responsibility and others did not, the authors did find that 
individual factors such as religiosity appeared to increase the likelihood that a juror 
would accept responsibility.  Conversely, jurors active in politics tended to ascribe 
primary responsibility for the sentence to the judge.  Case level characteristics also 
played a role in whether or not jurors accepted responsibility for the punishment decision. 
Jurors appeared to accept more responsibility when the killing was defined as vicious and 




more likely to accept responsibility when they believed that the defendant intended to kill 
the victim or was integral in the planning of the homicide (for those defendants that were 
not “triggermen”).  Jurors were less likely to take primary responsibility in cases where 
the defendant exhibited extreme emotional distress or the defendant was female (although 
it should be noted that the defendant was female in only two of the cases, making any 
inference subject to extreme caution). 
It should also be noted, given the previous discussion of the lack of understanding 
of the judge’s sentencing instructions, that the authors found no relationship between 
acceptance of responsibility and a juror’s understanding of the law.  Many of the jurors in 
this sample were able to understand that there was no mandatory death sentence allowed 
under South Carolina law, but even those that did believe that a death sentence was 
mandatory were no more likely to shirk responsibility than other jurors.  In fact, close to 
three-quarters of the jurors (103 out of 150 who answered the questions) told the 
interviewers that their capital jury experience was an emotionally upsetting one.  The 
authors suggest that this can be interpreted as evidence that jurors were indeed taking 
responsibility for the punishment decision (Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells, 1996). 
Despite their findings of variability in the degree to which jurors accept 
responsibility for the punishment decision, the multivariate analyses of Eisenberg and his 
colleagues (1996) suggested that there was no relationship between the acceptance of 
responsibility and the case outcome.  Haney (1997) would argue, however, that such a 
relationship is inherent in the ability of a juror to vote on the death penalty.  He suggests 
that jurors find many different ways in which to disengage themselves from the 




convincing themselves that they are “following the law” (p. 1482), feeling that they are 
acting in a socially acceptable manner38 (p. 1474), and through the dehumanization of the 
defendant (p. 1451).  These differing opinions suggest that we are still far from advanced 
in our understanding of how individuals justify their sentencing decisions and how that 
justification impacts verdicts and sentences in a constitutionally prescribed way. 
 
 Underestimation of Non-Alternatives 
 
 Another element of decision-making that frequently comes up during deliberation 
is that of the alternatives to the death penalty, should the jury decide on a life sentence 
instead.  On average, jurors who vote for the death penalty think that the defendant will 
serve a significantly less amount of time in prison than those jurors who vote for a life 
sentence.  In their study of South Carolina jurors, Eisenberg and Wells (1993) found that 
the average death case juror thought that the defendant would serve approximately 
seventeen years in prison, whereas the average life juror thought that the defendant would 
serve almost twenty-four years.  This difference was highly significant.  Haney (1995) 
also points out that studies of California jurors and potential jurors find that more people 
do not believe that life without parole is truly a sentencing option, despite the fact that 
California is one state where this is the statutory mandated alternative to a death sentence.  
He speculates that respondent perceptions on death-penalty alternatives would be even 
worse in states where there is no life without parole options or in states where the 
                                                 
38 As mentioned previously, the fact that the death penalty is the more socially acceptable punishment 
option is often times inferred by jurors who sit through the death penalty voir dire process, where they see 




sentencing instructions do not explicitly define the life without parole option for the 
jurors39. 
 In her examination of the decision-making process of Pennsylvania capital jurors, 
Foglia (2003) found that jurors did not have accurate information about death penalty 
alternatives.  She also found that jurors’ understanding about death penalty alternatives 
was not improved after they had taken part in a capital trial.  Those jurors who thought 
that the defendant who received a life sentence would be out in fifteen or fewer years 
were more likely to vote for death, compared to those jurors who estimated that 
defendants sentenced to life would receive longer sentences.  In fact, for the Pennsylvania 
jurors in this study, the strongest prediction of a death sentence was whether the jury 
thought that the alternative to death was a short prison sentence.  And while temporal 
order could not be established because the interviews took place after the fact, the author 
argues that it is possible that those jurors who underestimate the amount of time that a 
defendant would serve in prison if sentenced to life are also more likely to consider death 
the only acceptable punishment, which would then force them into a premature decision 
and ultimately skew them in favor of a death vote. 
 The tendency of capital jurors to underestimate the alternative penalties to death is 
also important in light of recent research suggesting that attitudes toward the death 
penalty change when individuals are given the option of choosing meaningful alternatives 
to death.  In a multi-state study of American’s attitudes about the death penalty, Bowers 
(1993) suggested that public support for the death penalty, which reached an all-time high 
                                                 
39 The most recent data supplied by the Death Penalty Information Center (www.deathpenaltyinfo.org) 
shows that of the thirty-eight states with the death penalty, only New Mexico does not offer a life without 
parole sentencing option.  Of the twelve states without the death penalty, only Alaska does not have a life 




in the mid to late 1980s, may have been misinterpreted.  He suggests that people will 
abandon support for the death penalty if they are presented with a genuinely harsh and 
meaningful alternative.  He found that a majority of respondents (up to 66%) in several 
jurisdictions (six states and one major city) who claimed that they “strongly” favored the 
death penalty were willing to support an alternative sentence of life without parole with a 
restitution component, which would force the defendant to work while in prison to earn 
money to be given to the victim’s family.  This is an important finding in that it helps 
place a context around the kinds of decisions made by jurors in capital cases.  Just as 
Haney (1995) speculated, the process of deciding to sentence a defendant to death is only 
in part a function of the evidence before a jury – a large part of the process is also 
dependent upon the jurors’ understandings of the alternative punishments.  As Bowers’ 
(1993) research makes clear, much of the public would be in favor of alternative 
punishments, making it even more important to educate jurors about their availability. 
 
Group Dynamics in Deliberation 
 
 
 Much of the research to date about jury decision-making focuses on the jury as a 
collection of individuals and asks questions about how individual jurors respond to the 
different tasks that they are assigned (i.e. weighing aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances) or how they make their individual punishment decisions.  Recently, 
researchers have begun to utilize a new approach to understanding capital jury decision-
making, as they have begun to realize that the outcome of jury deliberations is much 




collection of individual components into a system oftentimes results in something 
altogether different than the sum of those individual components (p. 24).  This 
characterization is particularly apt when discussing the collection of jurors into a jury; the 
jury, after all, is meant to be an entity which, through the course of deliberation, acts to 
sway individual opinions and create consensus.  Haney and his colleagues (1994) 
acknowledge the creation of this entity when they point out that, because of the rules of 
the courtroom, the jury deliberation process is one of social isolation.  Therefore, because 
service on a jury is an unfamiliar situation, the jurors must work together to understand 
the information given them, making them even more susceptible to any group processes 
that may result. 
 In their scientific study of the ways that jurors make decisions, Kalven and Zeisel 
(1966) suggested that final verdicts are generally the result of majority rule at first vote; 
in their estimation, in approximately 90% of juries, the first ballot is the same as the final 
verdict.  Replication of their findings, however, has been difficult, as social science 
researchers have been barred from the jury room ever since their seminal work.  As a 
result, their “majority rules” finding has been accepted at face value (see Devine, 
Clayton, Dunford, Seying, and Pryce, 2001),  In recent years, however, scholars have 
been able to circumvent this problem by interviewing jurors at the completion of their 
jury service.  Sandys and Dillehay (1995) interviewed 142 jurors who had served on 
felony trials in the state of Kentucky in an attempt to replicate Kalven and Zeisel’s (1966) 
findings.  Their analysis shows similar amounts of agreement between first ballot votes 
and final verdicts; in the sample of Kentucky jurors, the final verdict was the same as the 




percentage appears to be stable, regardless of whether juries take a first vote as soon as 
they begin deliberations (defined as verdict driven deliberations) or if the first vote was 
taken after a period of discussion and deliberation (defined as evidence driven 
deliberations).  The authors caution, however, that first ballot preferences may not be 
indicative of pre-deliberation preferences, as many of the juries appeared to engage in 
some type of discussion before taking the first vote.  These discussions may influence 
some of the jurors, showing that there is a need for more research to understand how 
group process impact individual decisions. 
 In an attempt to further understand how individual jurors are impacted by group 
deliberations, Sandys (1995) reports on the results of interviews with jurors who 
participated in the Kentucky site of the Capital Jury Project (CJP).  She focused 
specifically on those jurors who changed their vote between the jury’s first vote and the 
final verdict, either from life to death or from death to life.  Sandys argues that any 
changes in voting behavior should be the result of the juror weighing the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances discussed in the penalty phase of the trial.  The results suggest 
that this is not the case.  Jurors who reported changing their votes from a death vote to a 
life vote largely report doing so in order to avoid a retrial.  Many jurors said that they felt 
very negative about the possibility of a re-trial and often worked consciously to avoid 
one.  Some of the jurors who changed their votes from death to life also reported that 
there were a small number of very strong personalities on the jury who refused to vote for 
death, essentially forcing the death juror to change his/her mind or face a hung jury.  The 
role that mitigating circumstances played in the decision of jurors to change their votes 




over jurors were slightly different.  These jurors reported initially voting for a life 
sentence due to their personal beliefs, not because of mitigating circumstances presented 
at the trial.  Many of those jurors reported wanting to follow the law and after 
deliberations, they felt that the lawful decision would be to change their vote to death.  
The author also points out that because these jurors thought that they had to vote for 
death to follow they law, they in essence did not believe that they could evaluate the 
mitigating circumstances, leading to one to doubt the ability of these jurors to understand 
the sentencing instructions. 
 Other research has attempted to understand how the group dynamics are affected 
by racial factors.  Bowers and his colleagues (2001), expanded on past findings which 
suggest that Blacks and Whites have different reactions to jury service.  Using data 
collected from interviews with 113 Black jurors who served on 83 capital trials in 14 
states, Bowers and colleagues examined how the racial composition of the jury, 
combined with the race of the individual juror, may impact the jury’s decision-making 
processes.  What they found was that two consistent patterns emerged.  The first was a 
“White male dominance” effect, which showed that the likelihood of a death sentence in 
a case with a Black defendant and a White victim (historically the most racially charged 
defendant/victim combination) increased when there were five or more White males 
serving on the jury.  The second pattern that emerged was coined the “Black male 
presence” effect, which suggested that having one Black male serving on the jury 
decreased the likelihood of a death sentence in cases with a Black defendant and a White 
victim.  These effects, furthermore, appear to be independent of one another.  The 




sentencing rate of 30%, which subsequently declined to just over twenty percent (21.4%) 
when there were two Black jurors.  The rate of death sentences is also lower when there 
are three or more Black female jurors, although the authors suggest that female jurors do 
not add anything of substance to the dynamics of sentencing deliberations.  Conversely, 
on juries without a Black juror and with six or more White males, the death sentencing 
rate was almost ninety percent (87.5%).  The authors attributed much of this difference to 
three main considerations: 1) Black jurors are more likely to doubt the guilt of the 
defendant and therefore do not want to vote for death; 2) Black jurors are more likely to 
believe that a Black defendant is showing remorse; and 3) White jurors are more likely to 
believe that a Black defendant will be dangerous in the future.  Results in cases with 
defendants and victims of the same race showed that jurors who shared the race of the 
victim were more likely, when compared to other race jurors, to take a pro-death stance.  
Polarization, however, was much more likely in cases with a Black defendant and a 
White victim. 
 Because a capital trial with a Black defendant and a White victim tends to be the 
most racially charged, Bowers and his colleagues (2004) used the prior study as a starting 
point and, again using Capital Jury Project data, attempted to take a more in-depth look at 
the ways Black and White jurors contribute to jury deliberations.  Several findings stand 
out.  Among them is the fact that Black jurors were much less likely to attribute 
pejorative terms, such as cold-blooded and depraved, to Black defendants.  Whites, 
furthermore, were more likely to consider the cases on which they served to be more 
aggravated than did the Black jurors with whom they served.  Black jurors were also 




likely to think that the defendant did not act appropriately during the trial (i.e. he acted 
bored and/or did not wear appropriate attire).  The authors also suggest that the “Black 
male presence” effect identified in earlier research (Bowers et al., 2001) can be explained 
by the fact that Black male jurors were more likely to identify with the defendant on 
several dimensions, including being able to identify with the defendant’s situation and 
being reminded of someone by the defendant.  The authors posited that the “White male 
dominance” effect, on the other hand, occurred because when several White males served 
on a jury together, they were able to reinforce each other’s negative views of the 
defendant.  White jurors were also less receptive to mitigation than were Black jurors in 
cases with a Black defendant and a White victim, although both Blacks and Whites were 
more likely to be receptive to aggravation than mitigation (see also Butler and Moran, 
2002). 
 Such findings offer convincing evidence that the process of deliberation is one in 
which group dynamics matter, although much of the research to date has not been able to 
collect data from all of the individuals involved in deliberation.  Even results from the 
Capital Jury Project, one of the most well developed and comprehensive studies on the 
decision-making processes of capital jurors, must be understood in the context by which 
they are offered; interviews are only conducted with a small number of jurors in each 
trial.  As a result, Bowers (1995) is clear that one cannot take those experiences and 
generalize to the experiences of the jury as a whole.  This limitation has been overcome 
by the work of Marcus and his colleagues (2000), who were able to interview between 
ten and twelve jurors serving on 8 jury trails in two Texas counties (seven felony criminal 




impacted jury decision making; to do so, they employed a new statistical technique which 
allowed them to measure influence as a function of interaction between the jurors.  They 
discovered that jurors with certain psychological traits, most notably high scores on 
measures of agreeableness and conscientiousness, were more likely to report having been 
influenced by their fellow jurors during deliberations.  The jurors who were most likely 
to be rated as influential measured high on a measure of extroversion and were more 
likely to be tall.  Male jurors were also more likely to be rated as influential when 
compared with female jurors, although the authors contend that this may be the result of 
the conservative location where the trials took place.  More surprisingly, however, was 
the fact that there was a lack of consensus among jurors about which of their counterparts 
were determined to be influential.  This offers a cautionary tale about the kinds of 
conclusions that can be made by only asking a small number of jurors about their 
perceptions of deliberations; in order to get the full picture of how group interactions 
impact outcomes, it is important to have information from all of the actors. 
 This line of inquiry opens up a new direction for understanding jury deliberations, 
namely a new focus which extends our analysis beyond the level of understanding the 
impact of individual juror characteristics on the decision-making process to 
understanding the impact that the group interactions will have on the jurors taking part in 
that process.  This is an important extension, as jury deliberations do not occur in a 
vacuum and in fact, the main task of a jury is to work as a group to come up with a 
consensus, and indeed, in this case, a unanimous, decision.  By extending our 
understanding of the capital jury deliberation process, we in turn can parcel out the 




and the trial) and group level dynamics can have on sentencing outcomes.  This leads to 
the question of whether the assumption that individual level characteristics, such as juror 
race, can influence the ways in which jurors perceive the interactions of the group is 
indeed a valid assumption.  This research will test this assumption, along with the testing 
whether group level dynamics can impact sentencing outcomes, net of other individual 
and case related variables.  But in order to get to the point where group interactions can 
be examined, it is important to have the vocabulary necessary to discuss deliberations in 
terms of group interactions; the next chapter discusses the literature to date on the impact 
that groups, group interactions, and group climates can have on a decision-making 
process.  Because this line of inquiry examines what is known about capital jury 
deliberations and the way that sentencing decision are made from both a legal perspective 
and a group psychology perspective, the next chapter will serve as an introduction to the 




Chapter 3: Group Process: A Literature Review 
 
The Group as an Entity 
 
 Scholars in many diverse fields within the social sciences have recognized the 
independent importance of the group, as opposed to treating a group like the sum of its 
parts made up of individual people.  Watts (2004) has even pointed out that the behavior 
of the group can be predicted without actually knowing anything about the individual 
characteristics of the people who make up the group (p. 26); in fact, it may be easier in 
many cases to predict group behavior than it is to predict individual behavior in the same 
circumstances.  Groups are important in many aspects of life, especially when it comes to 
decision-making.  Juries, for instance, are only important to the justice system because 
they are a group comprised of individuals, presumably individuals who are representative 
of society at large, who make a decision using a shared belief system.  Defendants are, 
after all, allowed to have their fates decided by a judge, but only after they have 
successfully waived their rights to a jury trial because the American justice system 
recognizes the inherent importance of this group function.   
 Of course, the use of juries is not the only place where society has recognized the 
importance that group behavior can have on certain outcomes.  Rioting behavior, for 
example, is one instance where society recognizes that group dynamics can have negative 
outcomes.  And in the business world, managers recognize the importance of the group 
when it comes to functions such as brainstorming and problem solving.  It is in the role of 




plays come.  The remainder of this section will explore what little is known about how 
groups influence jury deliberations and will then expand into what we have learned from 
other fields about the ways that groups can influence decision-making processes. 
 
The Impact of Deliberating Groups 
 
 
In light of the inherent importance of the role of the group in jury deliberations, 
several researchers have undertaken to study the impact that group behavior has on trial 
and sentencing outcomes; for instance, Rotenberg and his colleagues (Rotenberg, 
Hewlett, and Siegwart, 1998) examined the role that individual level moral reasoning had 
in predicting jury outcomes.  Using information gathered from 226 students who either 
read about or saw a simulation of a robbery trial, the authors found that those students 
who scored high on levels of moral reasoning were more likely to dominate deliberations, 
which in turn appeared to influence the verdict.  While this finding comes from research 
done with mock jurors, and thus is not as robust as those findings from research 
conducted with actual jurors, its suggestion that jury deliberations may well be dominated 
by individuals who can influence group behavior lends credibility to the notion that the 
actions of the group consists of more than the additive nature of the actions of those 
individuals within the group. 
 Other mock-jury research that has also examined the impact that group 
deliberation has on trial outcomes suggests that some biases, specifically situational bias, 
may be eliminated by having jurors deliberate (Kaplan and Miller, 1978).  Others also 
suggest that participation in group deliberation increases a juror’s ability to consider 




attorneys (see Ellsworth, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1994).  McCoy and her colleagues (McCoy, 
Nunez, and Dammeyer, 1999) suggest that the process of group deliberation will correct 
some of the shortcomings of an individual juror’s reasoning.  Using a videotaped first-
degree murder trial and 104 undergraduate students, the authors tested the subjects’ 
ability to reason prior to group deliberations, after group deliberations, and without group 
deliberations.  Their findings indicate that  jurors who were questioned after participating 
in group deliberations were more likely to consider alternative verdicts and more likely to 
critically assess the chosen verdict, which the authors interpreted as support for the fact 
that deliberation led to higher competence by the jurors.  These jurors were also more 
likely than those questioned before deliberation or without deliberation to accept that not 
all of the evidence would fit their verdict, which the authors also interpreted as indicative 
of higher levels of reasoning skills for those jurors deliberating in groups.   
 While this line of inquiry makes it clear that the process of group deliberation has 
some sort of impact on the individual jurors and therefore, may impact verdict and 
sentencing outcomes, it does little to inform us as to what specific aspects of group 
deliberation are responsible for influencing outcomes.  This is where we turn to the 
literature on organizational and industrial psychology, where scholars have more closely 
examined which aspects of group dynamics have the most influence over group 
outcomes, such as performance and satisfaction.  While these outcomes are not directly 
analogous to the capital sentencing decision that must be made by juries, an 
understanding of how group processes work in these situations are a way to help gain 






Understanding Processes Within Groups 
 
 
 In many work environments, working together as a group is a normal way to 
achieve outcomes and make decisions.  As a result, much research has focused on the 
ways that working in groups may impact these outcomes and decisions.  And more 
importantly, this research has focused on the specific processes within groups that can 
lead to outcomes of varying degrees of quality.  Through this line of research, four types 
of group dynamics have consistently been identified as having an important influence 
over the climate, or the prevailing set of conditions, of the group relations and therefore, 
over the outcomes and decisions made by the group.  These four constructs are cohesion, 
collaboration, conflict, and critical evaluation.  Each of these four constructs will be 




 The fields of industrial and organizational psychology have long explored the role 
that group cohesion has over the influence of group outcomes, especially in terms of 
group performance in the workplace and employee satisfaction.  Seashore (1954) defines 
group cohesion as group solidarity, or an indicator of a group member’s desire to remain 
in the group (p. 10; see also Dailey, 1977). To measure cohesion in the industrial 
workgroup, Seashore asked employees a set of five questions, including: whether they 
felt that they were really part of the work group; whether they would do the same work in 
another group or would prefer to stay in their current group; how well the group got 
along; how well the group “stuck together;” and, how well the men helped each other on 




spends together positively increases the level of cohesiveness among the group, as is the 
size of the group, with smaller groups being more cohesive (p. 95-96).  Furthermore, 
members of groups with high levels of cohesiveness were less likely to exhibit anxiety 
about group activities.  Also of importance was the fact that cohesive groups were more 
likely to force uniformity among members (p. 97), something that has potential utility in 
explaining how juries come to a group decision.  Seashore also noted that the degree of 
cohesiveness was a function of the attractiveness of the members of the group as 
determined by the degree of similarity among group members (p. 98), another potentially 
useful explanation as to why there appears to be a relationship between the racial 
composition of a jury and the sentencing outcome (see Bowers et al., 2001). 
 Others have gone on to explore the role of cohesion on group performance in 
greater detail.  Stogdill (1972) suggests that productivity and cohesiveness are 
interrelated, helping to explain why cohesion can have such a strong impact on group 
performance and on satisfaction with group interactions.  Dailey (1977) goes on to 
suggest that the reason cohesion has such an impact on work group performance is 
because it is interrelated with other types of group interaction, specifically collaboration.  
He suggests that the interaction between cohesion and collaboration increases the ability 
of the group to engage in problem solving, open communication, and risk-taking.   
 Several researchers have also updated Seashore’s (1954) cohesion measure in 
order to better understand the role of group interactions in decision-making, especially in 
the workplace.  Keller (1986) found that group cohesion was significantly related to 
project performance for work groups engaged in the process of research and design; in 




controlling for variables such as job satisfaction and innovation within the organization.  
These findings are in line with those of both Klein and Mulvey (1995) and Guzzo and 
Shea (1992), both of whom who looked at the role that group cohesion played in 
influencing group performance.  Klein and Mulvey (1995) attempted to further the 
understanding of the impact of group processes as originally examined by Roethlisberger 
and Dickson (1939), who demonstrated that group processes can have a strong influence 
on group performance.  In doing so, they (Klein and Mulvey, 1995) suggested that 
cohesion should have a positive effect on group goal setting and therefore, on group 
performance.  Using Seashore’s (1954) measurement of cohesion, Klein and Mulvey 
(1995) found that group goal setting mediated the effects of group cohesion on 
performance.  More cohesive groups, therefore, were more likely to set and achieve 
difficult goals.  Guzzo and Shea (1992), although they did not use the Seashore (1954) 
measure, also found a positive association between group cohesion and group 
performance (see also Budman, Soldz, Demby, Feldstein, Stpring, and Davis, 1989; 




 As Dailey (1977) suggested, collaboration is also an important component of 
group interactions and is often related to the ability of a group to form a cohesive unit.  
Aram and Morgan (1976) define collaboration as “the presence of mutual influence 
between persons,” and point out that it is very similar to the conceptualization of 
cooperation.  In this way, collaboration can be seen as the ability of the group members to 




finds that groups where members share task-relevant information were more accurate in 
obtaining their goals and were more likely to perform better than those groups who did 
not share information with one another.  Similarly, Gladstein (1984) suggests that open 
communication and supportiveness, two constructs that are closely related to 
collaboration, are most likely to have a positive effect on self-reported group 
effectiveness, although she does point out that such variables may have more of an 
impact on perceived effectiveness than actual effectiveness; these variables did not have 
any impact on the objectively measured outcome of sales revenue.  Still, such findings 
point to the importance of individual perceptions on experiences and outcomes.  Jehn and 
Shah (1997) also find that cooperation, as measured through a question asking 
respondents “how helpful were your group members,” is also positively related to task 




 One issue that has become increasingly more examined in the group climate 
literature is how the process of conflict impacts groups and their performance.  Cosier 
and Schwenk (1990) suggest that in some groups, conflict can actually lead to better 
decisions, especially through an environment of open communication where it can 
encourage participation.  They caution, however, that conflict may be better suited to 
some environments than others, pointing out that smaller firms may benefit more from 
trying to foster consensus than by trying to stimulate conflict. 
 This cautionary tale was examined by Jehn (1995), who defined conflict as the 




incompatibilities.  She suggests that whether or not conflict is beneficial is dependent not 
only on the type of firm involved but also on the type of conflict and the structure of the 
group.  When tasks were non-routine, for example, conflict was more likely to be 
beneficial.  Separating conflict into two components, task conflict and relationship 
conflict, Jehn (1995) found that in her sample of 633 employees at a large transportation 
firm, those groups that engaged in task conflict were more likely to facilitate critical 
evaluation between members, which in turn appeared to decrease the “groupthink” 
phenomenon and force more discussion between group members.  Relationship conflict, 
however, was always detrimental to group outcomes, regardless of the task being 
performed.  In general, she concluded that the role that conflict plays in influencing group 
performance is still muddied; in many work environments, individuals tend to structure 




 Critical Evaluations 
  
 Similar to conflict, in that it can cause tension within the group, critical evaluation 
is the process by which one or more members find fault with other members of the group 
(Jehn and Shah, 1997).  In the examination of the differences between the ways that 
friendship and acquaintance groups make decisions and work together to achieve group 
goals, Jehn and Shah (1997) found that in acquaintance groups, non-friends were more 
likely to be perceived as providing negative evaluations on the basis of flaws inherent 




received.  Despite this difference, both friendship groups and acquaintance groups were 
equally likely to engage in critical evaluation of group members. 
 This brings to light an important limitation in the current literature about juries as 
working groups; little is known about whether prior relationships between jurors who 
serve together has any impact over the group climate.  Even though friendship and 
acquaintance groups were just as likely to engage in critical evaluation, the authors did 
not examine how the quality of the critical evaluations impacted the group climate.  One 
could suggest that individuals who thought they were being evaluated on the basis of 
inherent personality flaws would be more likely to perceive the group climate as being 
negative than those individuals who perceived critical evaluations to be the result of some 
external force, like a lack of knowledge about evidentiary procedures.  This is one 
limitation that the current research attempts to improve upon. 
 
Related Group Process Research 
 
 
 Two other areas of group process research are also important for the current line 
of inquiry, although they are not directly related to issues of group climate and its impact 
on group outcomes.  The first issue is that of the impact of minority viewpoints on group 
functioning.  As Kalven and Zeisel (1966) pointed out in their seminal work on the 
decision-making processes of juries, the majority verdict ended up being the final verdict 
in approximately 85% of trials.  Nemeth (1986) suggests that while group majorities may 
create convergence of attention and thought and may limit the number of alternative 
viewpoints considered, minority viewpoints are also important in their ability to stimulate 




contributing new information, the minority viewpoint is able to help create situations 
where decisions are qualitatively better, if not actually different.  She suggests that both 
majority and minority influence stimulate different problem-solving and decision-making 
processes. 
 These differences are able to help create situations where more information is 
exchanged within the group and helps to ensure that decisions are better.  Furthermore, 
the more consistent and more confident the minority position, the more likely that 
individuals within the group will switch their position away from the majority and to the 
minority.  Research indicates that movement to the minority happens later in the 
decision-making process, making the consistency of the minority viewpoint an important 
consideration as to whether people will change their mind over the course of making 
decisions.  Furthermore, while majorities may force groups to concentrate on their 
position, minority participation encourages the consideration of alternatives.  The 
consideration of alternatives is in itself a way to stimulate better decision-making 
processes; Hoffman and Maier (1961) point out that the pressure for consensus and 
uniformity, something that is inherent in the process of jury deliberation, is often times an 
impediment to a group’s ability to make a good decision.  As such, the contribution of 
minority members should not be overlooked. 
 Another recent line of research that has emerged from the investigation of the role 
that group process has on various outcomes is that of the role of diversity in aiding or 
negating the quality of the outcome.  Jehn and her colleagues (Jehn, Northcraft, and 
Neale, 1999) identify three types of diversity that may impact group functioning: social 




is defined as explicit differences among group members with regard to social category 
membership, such as race or gender (see also Jackson 1992).  Value diversity occurs 
when members of a workgroup do not agree as to what they believe the group’s real 
mission to be.  Informational diversity is that which can be described as the differences in 
knowledge bases and perspectives that members bring into the group.   
Generally, the authors find that different kinds of diversity may exacerbate 
different kinds of conflict within the group, although for the current research, the results 
of how both social category and informational diversities impacts group dynamics are the 
most applicable.  The authors are quick to point out that no theory of workplace diversity 
suggests that diversity on outward personal characteristics, like race or gender, will 
actually impact the workgroup, net of the extent to which such diversity creates other 
types of diversity in the workgroup.  Nonetheless, the authors acknowledge that when 
social category diversity exists, group members tend to exhibit favoritism to members of 
their own social category (see also Billing and Tajfel, 1973), oftentimes leading to 
discrimination and self-segregation, which in turn may provoke hostility within the group 
and have a negative impact on group outcomes.  Similar outcomes may occur when 
groups have a large amount of informational diversity; when groups are diverse, it may 
prevent the group from getting along and therefore from realizing any benefits that come 
from the combination of so many different perspectives. 
The issue of diversity is especially salient in light of the fact that capital juries are 
comprised of a group of somewhat arbitrarily chosen people, forced to work together and 
tasked with the job of coming to a consensus about whether or not another human being 




any experience working with groups to make such important decisions; as a result, it is 
possible that the negative influence that diversity can have on group processes and 
outcomes is more likely than any positive influences to occur during the course of 
deliberation.  This research seeks to further our understanding about whether this would 
happen and how such diversity would impact sentencing outcomes. 
  
The Next Step 
 
 These studies suggest that group climate variables, such as cohesion and conflict, 
are an important part of the process of group interaction and point to the need to switch 
our focus on studying juries from one solely at the individual level to one that can take 
into account the characteristics of both the individual juror and the group as a whole.  
Because we know, for example, that higher levels of group cohesion lead to stronger 
measures of group satisfaction as well as more positive outcomes, it is important to see 
how such group climate variables would impact the functioning of juries, especially in 
capital cases.  Capital trials are an important place to look at how the group influences 
decision making and performance because the rules of decision-making are very 
concrete, yet research shows that jurors do not always follow these rules (see Bowers and 
Foglia, 2003; Foglia, 2003).  One distinction that must be made, however, is that the 
study of decision-making among capital juries does not necessarily lend itself to 
conclusions about the objective quality of either the interaction or the outcome.  While 
there may be distinct rules that much be followed during the decision-making process, the 
guidelines allow for the consideration of mitigating factors such that juries may return a 




difficult, therefore, to determine whether or not a jury has made a patently “correct” 
decision.  Much of the research conducted on group decision-making and the impact on 
group functioning on decision-making has been able to measure objective criteria from 
which to determine whether or not the group’s performance was successful; for instance, 
some studies have looked at the way that group functioning was related to amount of 
sales revenue brought in by the group (Gladstein, 1984).  Due to data limitations, which 
will be discussed further in the next section, it is not possible at this time to make an 
objective determination of the “success” of the jury in reaching its decision.  It is 
possible, however, to determine whether or not group processes can add anything to our 
understanding of the process by which capital trial outcomes are reached.  Research on 
the subject to date has only been able to look at the power of individual and trial level 
characteristics to understand sentencing outcomes; the current research examines whether 
group level constructs, such as the climate of the jury during deliberations, can add to our 










 This research will examine the effect that group climate has on juror experiences 
and on capital trial sentencing outcomes.  Group climate can best be defined as a series of 
interactions within a group that lead to group related outcomes, which in this case would 
be sentencing outcomes for capital cases (Kivlighan and Tarrant, 2001).  Little research 
has been conducted that looks at how group processes can influence the decisions that 
juries make.  Instead, much of the research on jury deliberations focuses on juror level or 
case level variables, without taking into consideration the group context of deliberations.  
Measuring group climate, of course, is difficult.  One potential way to understand the 
group climate, however, is to look at the perceptions that jurors have about their 
interactions with other jurors during the course of deliberations.  A juror’s perceptions of 
the quality of the climate can give insight into how he or she perceives their relationships 
with other members of the jury.  Research conducted in the fields of social and 
organizational psychology also suggest that group climate can have an impact on how 
well the group works together, which can then in turn impact performance (Jehn and 
Shah, 1997; Kivlighan and Tarrant, 2001; Webster and Whitmeyer, 2001). 
 It is important to note one major distinction between the impact that group climate 
variables can have on performance, especially in the work place, and the impact that 
group climate variables can have on jury deliberations.  In a work place, assumptions can 




because employers generally have well-defined metrics by which to compare behavior.  
For instance, many businesses expect employees to meet certain sales goals or to 
complete projects within a set time frame; meeting these goals can be considered an 
objective measure of positive performance.  Measuring performance at the level of jury 
deliberations, however, is much more difficult, as objective measurements of jury 
performance in capital cases have not been previously defined.  Conventional wisdom, 
coupled with prevailing legal precedent on capital trials, suggests that determining 
whether a capital jury returned the correct verdict is difficult in the best situations and can 
in fact be next to impossible.  Juries are given instructions by which to guide their 
discretion within a legally defined framework, but are nonetheless asked to evaluate a 
very specific set of circumstances and make what amounts to a very personalized 
decision about each individual case.  In order to determine if the “correct” decision was 
made, observers would have to evaluate each case on both its legal merits and on the 
somewhat more intangible characteristics that lead to decisions made about mitigating 
circumstances, such as whether or not the defendant will continue to be dangerous in the 
future or will instead adjust well to life in prison.  Objectively judging verdicts by these 
criteria requires intimate knowledge about the facts of the case and the intricacies of the 
deliberation process, a set of information that has yet be collected in any known data 
source.   
 As a result of the complications involved in objectively measuring performance in 
jury deliberations, the distinction between performance and outcome measures is an 
important one.  The group processes literature generally assumes that the outcome being 




1995), increased revenue (Gladstein, 1984) or job satisfaction (Dailey, 1977; Gladstein, 
1984; Kivlighan and Tarrant, 2001).  These same kinds of objective measures are not 
available when the outcome of interest is jury verdicts; as such, it is not possible in most 
cases to judge the “correctness” of verdict returned by the jury.  Rather, the interest here 
in on whether group climate as it is currently defined acts as an intervening factor 
between those juror and trial characteristics of interest and the eventual verdict returned 
by the group.  In essence, group climate acts as a proxy for the dynamics involved in the 
group deliberations process. 
 The use of a global group climate measure as a variable of interest is not 
unprecedented; MacKenzie and colleagues (1987) measured group climate, defined as a 
participant’s perception of the group atmosphere, in their assessment of group member 
outcomes, finding that successful groups were more cohesive and engaged and less 
superficial and conflicted.  Kivlighan and Tarrant (2001) used the same measurements to 
test the hypothesis of whether group climate mediated the relationship between levels of 
leadership and group member outcomes in semi-structured adolescent therapeutic groups.  
They found that positive group climate was related to treatment benefit.  While the 
outcomes of interest here are certainly different, these findings speak to the importance of 
group climate in several settings and offer valid arguments for the potential utility of 
using a group climate variable to better understand jury functioning. 
 Research on capital juries also suggests that race is a very salient issue during the 
deliberation processes; as such, this research will also examine how race impacts an 
individual’s perceptions of the group climate during deliberations.  Earlier research 




Blacks, for instance, are more likely to feel that the experience of serving on a capital 
trial was a negative one (Fluery-Steiner, 2002).  Black jurors also appear to be more 
receptive to mitigating evidence in cases with non-White victims (Brewer, 2004).  It 
stands to reason, therefore, that Blacks and Whites may perceive the climate of 
deliberations differently.  Other aspects of the trial experience may also impact a juror’s 
experience of group climate during the deliberations, such as the race of the victim; 
research to date indicates that jurors are more likely to return a death sentence when they 
and the victim are the same race (Foley and Chamblin, 1982).  Research also indicates 
that Blacks in general tend to be less trustworthy of the criminal justice system than are 
Whites (see Abshire and Bornstein, 2003), something that would inevitably impact their 
interpretation of sentencing instructions and the experience of jury deliberations.  It is 
possible to assume, therefore, that a juror’s feelings about what kind of justice is 
appropriate for the victim would impact their interpretation of the group climate. 
 The relationship between individual juror characteristics, such as race, the 
perception of group climate and the subsequent impact of this relationship on the 
outcome of a capital trial can best be understood by the visual representation in Figure 1.  
Individual level characteristics, such as race and gender, help shape a juror’s perception 
of group climate; perception of group climate, in turn, is a measure of group functioning 
that then has an independent impact on sentencing outcome.  In essence, group climate 
mediates the relationship between the individual level characteristics and the sentencing 
outcome, such that the individual jury level characteristics operate on the death or life 
outcome through the process of group functioning.  Research to date also suggests that 




on sentencing outcomes (Bowers et al., 2001; Eisenberg, et al., 2001).  Due to the legal 
nature of the decision surrounding a death sentence, however, it is also important to 
include within the model trial level characteristics, such as aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, that can operate independently on sentencing outcomes.  Such trial 
characteristics may also be interpreted through the experiences of the individual juror, 
such as when Black jurors are more likely to find mitigating circumstances present in 
trials with a Black defendant, so trial level characteristics can also mediate the 
relationship between individual level juror characteristics and sentencing outcome.  For 
the purposes of these analyses, the path of interest is whether or not the group climate 
variable, which acts as a proxy for group functioning, mediates the relationship between 
individual juror level characteristics and sentencing outcome; future analyses will focus 
on the relationship between individual level characteristics and trial level characteristics 
and their joint impact on sentencing outcome. 
The following sections detail the hypotheses that will be tested during this 
analysis, as well offers a detailed description of the variables that will be used in testing 





H1A: Perception of the quality of group climate varies between capital juries. 
 
H1B:  Black jurors who serve on capital trials will be more likely than White 







H1C: The race of the victim will affect the association between the juror’s race 
and the juror’s perception of the quality of group climate.  Black jurors will be 
more likely to perceive the quality of the group climate as negative when the 
victim is Black. 
 
H1D: The race of the defendant will affect the association between the juror’s 
race and the juror’s perception of the quality of group climate.  Black jurors will 
be more likely to perceive the quality of the group climate as negative when the 
defendant is Black. 
 
H1E: The combination of the race of the victim and the race of the defendant will 
affect the association between the juror’s race and the juror’s perception of the 
quality of group climate.  Black jurors will be more likely to perceive the quality 
of the group climate as negative when the defendant is Black and the victim is 
White. 
 
H1F: The percentage of Black jurors on the jury will affect the association 
between the juror’s race and the juror’s perception of the quality of group 
climate.  Black jurors will be more likely to perceive the quality of the group 
climate as positive when there are a higher percentage of Black jurors. 
 
 
H2: Juries with a higher average level of perceived climate will be more likely to 
return a death sentence than those juries with a lower average level of perceived 






 The data that will be used for this analysis will come from the Capital Jury Project 
(CJP).  The original Capital Jury Project is a multi-state, university-based consortium of 
researchers specializing in the analysis of data collected about capital jury deliberation in 
their respective states.  Data on capital jury deliberations were originally collected from 




collection40.  The primary objectives that the CJP research teams are working to achieve 
are: 
 
1. To examine and systematically describe jurors’ exercise of capital sentencing 
discretion; 
2. To identify the sources and assess the extent of the arbitrariness in jurors’ 
exercise of capital discretion; and 
3. To assess the efficacy of the principal forms of capital statutes in controlling 
arbitrariness in capital sentencing (Bowers, 1995, p. 1077). 
 
The data were collected through the process of lengthy in-person interviews with 
jurors who had served on capital trials in their respective states between 1988 and 1995 
(see Appendix A for a copy of the instrument used).  After capital trials had been 
randomly selected in each state, four jurors per trial were also selected by a random 
selection process, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  Once 
the trials were selected for the study, the jurors involved in those trials were sent a letter 
from the investigator in their state explaining the research study, promising full 
confidentiality, offering an incentive for participation and asking for their participation if 
they were to be one of the four jurors selected for the sample.  An interviewer would then 
follow-up with the four randomly selected jurors and a time for an interview was set up 
(Bowers, 1995). 
                                                 
40 The fourteen original states included California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Tennessee, New Jersey, and Alabama.  
Missouri was later added because problems with the data from New Jersey prohibited it from being 




The interviews were designed to elicit information about the jurors’ experiences and 
thoughts over the course of all parts of the trial, including the voir dire process, the guilt 
trial, guilt deliberations, the sentencing trial, and sentencing deliberations.  A fifty-page 
instrument was utilized during these interviews.  The questionnaire consisted of both 
open-ended questions that encouraged the juror to give detailed answers and close-ended 
questions with a structured response set.  Interviews lasted approximately three hours on 
average and were tape recorded with the respondent’s permission.  Many of the 
researchers involved in the project have commented on how forthcoming the jurors were 
with their responses; individuals were candid in speaking about their experiences and 
were often willing to expand on their answers and give interviewers detailed information 
about their thoughts and actions during the trial.  Jurors often expressed appreciation for 




 State Sample Selection 
 
The original Capital Jury Project employed a three-stage sampling design.  In the 
first stage, the investigators selected those states from which capital trials would be 
chosen.  States were selected in order to have a representative sample of the types of 
guided discretion capital statutes.  Priority was given to those states which would have a 
large enough number of capital trials to meet sampling quotas as well as make sure that 
the selected states would enhance regional diversity within the sample.  Eight states were 




included both narrow and traditional definitions of capital murder41.  The first eight states 
included in the sample were California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Pennsylvania42, 
South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.  After the first year, four additional states were 
added to the sample Georgia; Louisiana; North Carolina; and, Tennessee.  Three more 
states, New Jersey, Missouri and Alabama, were subsequently added, so that the final 
sample included fifteen states with varying types of guided discretion statutes.  Due to the 
legal prohibition against attorneys interviewing jurors in the state of New Jersey, 
however, the data from that state has not yet been analyzed43.  In this sample, Missouri 
was substituted for New Jersey.  Table 1 shows the breakdown of the fourteen 
participating states by type of discretion statute and type of definition of capital murder 
(Bowers, 1995). 
 The large sample of states allows for analysis of both geographic diversity and 
statutory variation and also allows for flexibility in exploring other differences among 
states.  For example, states have different statutory guidelines about the aggravating 
factors that jurors may or may not consider and oftentimes have different sentencing 
instructions.  Having such a large sample also makes analysis less sensitive to any state 
specific biases (Bowers, 1995). 
 
                                                 
41 Traditional definitions of capital murder require that the jury find that at least one of several aggravating 
factors is present during the sentencing phase of deliberations.  Narrow definitions of capital murder 
require that the jury agree on the presence of at least one aggravating factor during the guilt phase of the 
trial (Bowers 1995). 
42 Pennsylvania replaced New Jersey in the original sample of eight states.  New Jersey was taken out of the 
first sample because of the small number of capital trials during the sampling time period.  New Jersey was 
subsequently re-added to the study and the sampling time frame was re-assessed, but the complications 
associated with the phone interviews conducted in New Jersey have led to the data being left out of the 
current sample. 
43 This information was obtained through personal communication with the Principal Investigator of the 




 Trial Sample Selection 
 
 Once the states were chosen to participate in the Capital Jury Project, a sampling 
procedure was implemented to ensure that there was a representative number of both 
death and life outcome capital trials.  The criterion for including trials in the sampling 
framework was that each trial must have gone through both a guilt and punishment phase 
during the sampling time period, which started in 1988.  For the original eight states, the 
target sample was thirty trials, half where the jury voted for life and half where the jury 
voted for the death penalty.  For the remaining six states, the target sample was twenty 
trials per state, also with a breakdown of half of the trials ending in a life verdict and half 
in a death penalty verdict.  An attempt was made to over-sample the more recent trials 
under the assumption that those jurors would be more likely to remember the experience 
in more vivid detail.  Occasionally, investigators have had to depart from the sampling 
criteria in order to ensure the diversity of the sample; for example, in some states, trials in 
rural areas were over-sampled, either to ensure regional diversity or to ensure that each 
region of the state was equally represented with regards to type of capital murder charge. 
(Bowers, 1995)   
 In three of the states, California, Florida, and Texas, the sampling of capital trials 
was restricted to specific areas within the state.  The investigators made the decision to 
restrict the sample to smaller geographic areas because of the long distance within state 
borders and the large numbers of capital trials within each state.  In California, the cases 
were from the middle third of the state, bounded by the cities of San Francisco, 
Sacramento, and Fresno.  The cases in Florida came from the northern and the central 




cases were drawn from the south-central portion of the state, which includes the cities of 
Austin, Houston, and San Antonio and the surrounding rural counties.  By limiting data 
collection to these portions of the state, the investigators were able to best utilize both the 
time and resources necessary to conduct a sufficient enough number of interviews to 
meet the sampling needs (Bowers, 1995). 
 
 Juror Sample Selection 
 
 The researchers chose to randomly select four jurors per trial for participation in 
the project.  In states with a target of thirty trials, a total of 120 interviews were 
conducted; in states with a target of twenty trials, 80 jurors were interviewed.  In some 
cases, additional interviews beyond the original four were conducted when the trial was 
of special interest.  This often happened when the original interviews left questions 
unanswered or raised additional issues and the state investigators felt that a more in-depth 
understanding of the deliberation process was necessary (Bowers, 1995).   
 The four jurors were randomly selected using a systematic procedure to ensure a 
representative sample.  Jurors were first numbered from one to twelve, based on the order 
that they were listed on the jury list obtained from the courts.  A starting point was then 
picked at random in order to prevent any bias that may have existed through the process 
by which the jurors were listed (for instance, if the foreperson was always listed first or 
always listed last).  From that starting point, jurors were successively assigned an 
alphanumeric code (A1, B1…C4).  The first panel of jurors selected for inclusion in the 
study were those on the A panel; up to five attempts over a three-day period were made 




selection bias, the random selection continued through the jury panel if any juror did not 
agree to participate.  For instance, any panel A juror who did not agree to participate in 
the study was replaced by the corresponding panel B juror.  Replacement continued in 
this way, with a panel C juror replacing a panel B juror, until all four interviews were 
scheduled (Bowers, 1995).   
 Because only four jurors were interviewed per case, it is important to note that the 
experiences of these four jurors cannot be generalized to the experiences of all twelve 
members of the jury (Bowers, 1995).  The interviews with the four jurors should be used 
as “contextual” data, where agreement on matters of fact can be interpreted as a sign of 
reliability.  The unit of analysis for many of the analyses to be conducted, therefore, is the 
individual juror.  The subsequent analyses that examine the impact that individual level 
characteristics have on the individual juror’s perception of the group climate will all 
utilize the individual juror as the unit of analysis.   
Some of the subsequent analyses, however, will examine the role that aggregate 
jury level characteristics will have on sentencing outcomes.  While the experiences of the 
jurors on each trial cannot on their own be generalized to the larger population of capital 
trials, it is possible to aggregate individual level characteristics into jury level 
characteristics and model the experiences of the jury as a unit under two assumptions.  
The first assumption is that such analyses take into account the fact that individual jurors 
are nested within juries, so that more than one juror will share an experience on a jury.  
Such shared experiences include variables such as the race of the defendant and the level 
of heinousness of the crime.  The nesting of jurors within juries will be discussed more 




will be utilized in order to correct for the fact that the observations of jurors within juries 
are not independent of one another. 
The second assumption that will allow for the aggregation of individual level 
juror data into jury level variables rests on the assumption that those jurors represented in 
the sample are representative of all of the jurors on the particular jury in question.  Such 
an assumption, however, cannot be tested with these data, as there is no information 
about those jurors who are not part of the sample with which to compare.  Fortunately, 
this assumption has been dealt with in the community crime literature, where theorists 
also operate on the assumption that the group context within which certain processes 
unfold are important to understanding those processes (Bursik, 2000).  In testing certain 
hypotheses at the group level, researchers have used information from individuals that 
has been aggregated to create community level variables.  In their examination of the role 
that community structure played in the understanding of crime rates, Sampson and 
Groves (1989) created a community friendship measure, meant to measure friendship 
groups at the aggregate level, by taking the mean level of friendship networks reported by 
individuals living within the community in question.  Similarly, jury level characteristics 
will be created by taking the mean level of the responses from the individuals who serve 
on each jury.  For example, as will be described shortly, the jury characteristic of group 
climate can be created by taking the mean level of responses for those jurors on each jury 
and attributing it to the jury, much the way that Sampson and Groves attributed group 






The Final Sample 
 
 
 The data from the original Capital Jury Project contains information from 1198 
individual jurors sampled from 353 trials in fourteen states.  For the purposes of these 
analyses, a sample of 1069 jurors from 269 trials was derived from the original sample.  
This smaller sample contained information on all variables of interest for these analyses; 
when possible, the creation of scales was conducted using all of the available data, which 
included information from all fourteen Capital Jury Project states with available data are 
represented in this sample.  This final sample includes only responses from those jurors 
who have served on trials where at least two other jurors per trial were also interviewed, 
meaning that each trial in the final sample utilized here must be represented by at least 
three jurors.  Because the planned sample size of four jurors per trial could not always be 
obtained, a decision was made to include all trials in the current sample where at least 
three jurors were interviewed, in an attempt to ensure that the sample size was as large as 
possible.  Analysis conducted showed that there were no significant differences between 
trials where only three jurors were interviewed and trials where four or more jurors were 
interviewed.   
 Table 2 shows a breakdown of how many of the trials each have 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 
8 jurors included in the sample.  In keeping with the sampling framework, in the majority 
of trials (57.4%), four jurors were interviewed.  In just over a quarter of the trials (26.2%) 
three jurors were interviewed.  In light of the fact that the original Capital Jury Project 
sampling framework attempted to always interview at least four jurors per trial, 
descriptive analysis of the sample was conducted both with and without those jurors who 




analyses indicated that there was no difference between those trials where only three 
jurors were interviewed and those trials where four or more jurors were interviewed.  
Because of this, a decision was made to include all jurors in the sample who served on a 
trial where at least three jurors had been interviewed; doing this also increased the 
number of Black jurors whose information would be available for analysis.   
 When the smaller sample was further analyzed, it became apparent that missing 
data existed.  Cases with missing data were then eliminated due to several conditions, 
including missing information about the key variables in the analysis.  After all missing 
data were eliminated, the final sample for all subsequent analyses was 918 jurors who 
served on 244 trials.  The process by which missing data were eliminated will be 
discussed in a following section; nonetheless, it is important to note here that all cases 
with available data were used for the creation of the scales and for the examination of 
jury level averages.  This was done in order to ensure that all of the information was 
included in the creation of new variables and to improve the ability to aggregate from 
juror level to jury level characteristics.  Independent samples t-tests confirmed that there 
were no significant differences between either the original sample, the smaller sample 
from which scales were created, or the final sample used for the analyses. 
 Of this sample, 504 jurors served on 136 trials where the final verdict was a death 
sentence.  Table 3 shows a breakdown of the number of trials in each state, for both life 
and death outcomes.  In order to better understand the use of the different kinds of 
sentencing guidelines utilized in these fourteen states, Table 4 shows how many trials 
were sampled under each sentencing guideline, while Table 5 shows the breakdown of 







 All of the variables are for these analyses are taken from the responses of the 
jurors from the interviews conducted in the first phase of the Capital Jury Project.  Some 
of these variables were recorded as structured responses to close-ended questions.  Other 
variables were extracted from the qualitative responses to open-ended questions.  It 
should be noted that preliminary analysis of Capital Jury Project data also shows that the 
jurors report high levels of recall for all stages of the capital trial process, lending 
credibility to the jurors’ responses (Bowers, 1995).  Table 6 replicates these preliminary 
findings with data from jurors in the final sample used in these analyses.  As Table 6 
indicates, the majority of jurors report remembering the punishment deliberation phase of 
the trial “Very Well” (70.9%), and almost all of the jurors responded that they 
remembered the punishment deliberations “Very Well” or “Fairly Well” (97.5%).  
Despite the apparent high level of recall, however, it is important that these data, like all 
other data that asks respondents to remember some time period in the past, may suffer 
from problems related to respondent memory; this limitation and any others will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
Appendix B reports the bivariate correlations between each of the variables of 
interest.  This information is reported in order to obtain a better preliminary 
understanding of the relationships between each of the variables.  It should be noted that 
the relationships found in these data are consistent with those seen in prior literature; for 
example, there is a significant negative relationship between verdict and the percentage 
of Black jurors.  This is on par with the findings of Bowers and his colleagues (2001) that 




of death.  Also of note is that there is a significant negative relationship between an 
individual’s perception of the group climate and his or her race; Black jurors are more 
likely to perceive the group climate more negatively than are White jurors.  These 
correlations offer some insight into the relationships that exist between these variables; 
the following sections will describe in greater detail the advanced statistical techniques 
that will be used to test these relationships and the data used in the analysis. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
Group Climate: The dependent variable for the first set of hypotheses is group 
climate, a global measure of group functioning at the jury level.  This variable at the 
aggregate level will also serve as one of the independent variables for the second 
hypothesis.  Its function in the aggregate will be discussed in the next section.  There are 
fifteen measures available within these data that appear to tap into what can be described 
as the construct of group climate.  The fifteen variables came from two separate parts of 
the survey instrument; they included a set of questions asking respondents about their 
experiences with the jury and a set of questions asking respondents about their general 
experiences serving on a capital trial.   
The first eleven variables came from the section of the questionnaire where 
respondents were asked to describe how well several phrases described the jury on which 
they served.  The responses to each of the eleven phrases were scaled on a four point 
scale which ranged from 1, Very Well, to 4, Not At All.  The eleven phrases were: 
likeminded, saw things the same way; close-minded, intolerant of disagreement; too 




guilt and punishment at the same time; dominated by a few strong personalities; got too 
emotionally involved in the case; was confused by the judge’s instructions; did not follow 
the judge’s instructions; kept making mistakes; and, you felt like an outsider.  The next 
four variables came from the section of the instrument that asked respondents a series of 
questions about their experiences serving on a capital trial.  The first question asked of 
the respondent was whether he or she wished that s/he had done anything differently over 
the course of the trial.  The respondent answered either Yes (0) or No (1).  The next 
question asked whether the juror found the experience to be emotionally upsetting; again, 
the response set with either Yes (0) or No (1).  The third question asked jurors whether or 
not they had any trouble sleeping; jurors again responded either Yes (0) or No (1).  The 
last question asked jurors whether or not they would again serve on a capital trial if 
asked.  The response set for this question was: I would welcome the opportunity (4); I 
would do so reluctantly (3); I would try to get out of it (2); and, I would refuse to serve 
(1).  Table 7 shows the mean and standard deviation for each one of these fifteen 
variables. 
 Using the analytic technique of principal components analysis, these variables 
will be examined to see if they contain common factors which can then be compared to 
one or more of the more common constructs of group climate, such as cooperation, 
cohesion, conflict, and critical evaluation.  Prior research has identified these four 
constructs as potentially useful ones in explaining the ways that group interaction affects 
both the performance of a group and the satisfaction with their task of those individuals 
within the group.  The responses to the questions will be recoded so that higher values on 




accomplish this, the questions “likeminded, saw things the same way,” and “friendly and 
respectful to one another” will have to be reverse coded, as will the questions “Do you 
wish you had done anything differently,” “Was the experience emotionally upsetting,” 
“Did you have trouble sleeping,” and “If asked to serve on another capital trial, would 
you?”.  By reverse coding these items, all responses will indicate a positive experience. 
  
Sentencing Outcome: The sentencing outcome of the trial is contained in the 
original Capital Jury Project data; as seen in Table 3, just over half of the jurors sampled 
(56.5%) served on trials where the sentencing outcome was a death sentence and the rest 
served on trials where the sentencing outcome was a life sentence.     
  
 Independent Variables 
 
 Average Group Climate: The group climate independent variable for hypothesis 
two will be measured in a very similar way as the group climate dependent variable for 
the first set of hypotheses.  The above section details the way in which the group climate 
scale will be created for each individual juror.  The average group climate scale will be 
the mean value of the group climate scale for each of the jurors serving on a particular 
jury.  For example, if three jurors that have served together on a capital trial have been 
interviewed, the average group climate score for the jury will be the mean value of the 
three scores from the individual jurors; if five jurors are interviewed, the average group 
climate score will be the mean value of the five scores from the individual jurors.  An 




included in this analysis.  The average group climate score across all 244 trials is 3.44 
(S.D. = .27) with a range of 2.33 to 3.97.  
 
 Race of Juror: Respondents were asked to identify their race as falling into one of 
the following categories: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, or Other.  The majority of 
respondents interviewed identified their race as either White (87%) or Black (9.4%).  
There were very few other minorities included in the sample.  As a result, the Hispanic, 
Asian, and Other categories are collapsed into one “Other” category.  As mentioned 
above, the final sample of 918 respondents contains 90.2 percent of jurors who identify as 
White and 9.8 percent who identify as Black.  The reference category for this variable 
will be jurors who identify themselves as White.  Descriptive statistics for this variable 
can be seen in Table 8. 
 
Race of Defendant: Research is still unclear as to the direct impact that the race of 
the defendant has on a sentencing outcome, although there is evidence to suggest that a 
minority defendant may be more likely to receive the death penalty than a White 
defendant, an effect that is often conditioned by the race of the juror (Baldus et al., 1998; 
Bowers et al., 2001).  This research, however, shows that often times the race of the 
defendant matters earlier in the process, such as during the decision to file a death 
petition (Baldus et al., 1990; Paternoster, 1991), suggesting that once the case has 
reached the penalty phase of deliberations, the effect of the race of the defendant is wiped 
out by the effects of the race of the victim.  In order to lend clarity to this issue, I will 




White or Black.  In the original sample, the majority of the defendants were White 
(53.5%), followed by Black defendants (39%).  Of 244 trials in the final analysis, 58.2% 
of the defendants (142 trials) were White.  Table 13 includes the race of the defendant for 
the final sample.  The reference category for this variable will be White defendants. 
 
 Race of Victim: Prior research suggests that one of the most important factors in 
whether a death sentence is meted out is the race of the victim, with death sentences more 
likely to occur in cases where there is a White victim.  Research also suggests that jurors 
are more likely to be sympathetic to same race victims and thus more inclined to vote for 
death.  The race of the victim is identified by the jurors, although in most cases it has 
been independently confirmed by the researchers.  The race of the victim in all of the 
trials is coded as Black, White, or Other.  The majority of the victims in these capital 
cases are White (75%), followed by Black victims (17.2%).  Final analyses will only 
include those cases in which the victim was identified as either Black or White; of those 
244 trials in the final sample, 196 (80.3%) had a White victim.  Table 13 includes the 
race of all of the victims in the final sample.  The reference category for this variable will 
be White victims. 
 
 Defendant/Victim Race Interaction: There is much evidence to suggest that those 
cases with same race victims and defendants are treated more leniently than those cases 
with a victim who is a different race than the defendant, specifically when the defendant 
is Black and the victim is White.  Much of the previous research using the Capital Jury 




interaction will be constructed to control for cases where there is a Black defendant and a 
White victim.  Out of the 244 capital trials included in this analysis, 59 trials (24.2%) had 
a Black defendant and a White victim; table 14 shows the breakdown of the 
defendant/race interactions in these data.  Of the 918 jurors who served on these 244 
trials, 217 (23.6%) were jurors who served on a trial with a Black defendant and a White 
victim.  Because there are not enough trials where either the defendant or the victims are 
of a race other than Black or White, these cases have been omitted from the analyses. 
 
 Juror/Victim Race Interaction: Qualitative analysis suggests that jurors tend to 
feel more sympathy towards victims who are of their same race and therefore are more 
likely to return a death sentence under these conditions.  Research also suggests that 
Black jurors are more likely to feel sympathy for Black victims than are White jurors, due 
in part to a speculation that Black jurors are more likely than White jurors to feel 
sympathy for Black victims.  It has also been speculated that Black jurors are more likely 
to feel that the jury deliberation experience is negative in trials with a Black victim 
because White jurors may dismiss the importance of the Black victim.  In order to test 
whether or not the relationship between the juror’s race and the victim’s race impacts 
perceptions of group climate, an interaction variable will be created.  Cases that contain 
both a Black defendant and a Black victim will be coded as 1, while all other cases will 
be coded as 0.  Only a small percentage of cases (2.2%) consist of both a Black juror and 
a Black victim; the majority of cases (73.3%) consist of both a White juror and a White 





 Juror/Defendant Race Interaction: Qualitative analysis also suggests that jurors 
tend to be more sympathetic in trials where they share the same race as the defendant; 
this appears to be especially salient in trials where both the juror and the defendant are 
Black.  Accounts of jury deliberations have shown evidence that Black jurors feel that 
they have to explain the actions of Black defendants to their fellow White jurors, making 
the experience a difficult one, as they report often feeling that they have to serve as a 
cultural liaison to White jurors.  Such accounts suggest that the interaction between the 
race of the juror and the race of the defendant may act as a way to explain any differences 
between the ways that Black and White jurors perceive group climate.  Cases that contain 
both a Black juror and a Black defendant will be coded in this analysis as 1; all other 
cases will be coded as 0.  In the final sample, approximately 5 percent of the cases 
include both a Black juror and a Black defendant; the majority of cases (55%) include a 
White juror and a White defendant.  Table 16 shows the cross-tabulations for each of the 
juror/defendant race interactions. 
 
 Control Variables 
 There are several reasons to believe that other variables will have a factor into the 
decision-making process at both the individual and the group levels.  Prior research 
suggests that individual level characteristics may determine how a juror makes a 
decision.  For instance, Whites are more likely to support a death sentence than are 
minorities (Bowers et al., 1994; Ellsworth and Gross, 1994).  Case level characteristics 
may also come into play, with some research suggesting that cases with multiple victims 




some group dynamics have been identified in impacting sentencing decisions, most 
notably the racial composition of the jury (see Bowers et al., 2001).  The variables 
included as controls are described below. 
 
 Individual Juror Level Control Variables 
 
 Prior work with the Capital Jury Project data suggests that individual level 
characteristics may impact how jurors make their decisions in capital trials.  For instance, 
Eisenberg and his colleagues (2001) find that Southern Baptists are more likely to vote 
for a death sentence than jurors with other religious preferences.  Other research (see 
Haney et al., 1994; also Butler and Moran, 2002) suggests that women and minorities 
may be less likely to vote for a death sentence.  In order to control for these individual 
level differences, several control variables will be used in this analysis.  All of these 
variables were self-identified by the subjects, who were asked about their demographic 
characteristics at the end of each interview; where possible, these responses were 
confirmed by the interviewer.  Table 8 contains the descriptive statistics for all of the 
juror-level control variables. 
 
 Gender of Juror: Gender is coded as 0 for female and 1 for males.  The overall 
sample is slightly skewed in the direction of female respondents (52.5%); this trend 
remains in the final sample, where 53.3 percent of the 918 final respondents identify as 






 Age: This variable was self-reported by the subjects as the age on their last 
birthday.  Jurors ranged in age from 20 to 85, with the average age of respondents in the 
overall sample being approximately 46 years old (S.D. = 12.75 
  
 Education: Respondents were asked about the last grade in school that they had 
completed.  The responses available to them were less than twelfth grade, finished high 
school, some technical school beyond high school, some college, college graduate, and 
attended graduate/professional school.  The modal category for this variable was finished 
high school (25.9%), followed closely by some college (23.6%). 
 
 Religious Preference: Respondents were asked to identify their religious 
preference; eight religions were available to them or the respondent could choose to 
identify another religious preference.  Respondents could also choose no religious 
preference.  Previous analysis on death qualification (see Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, 1984; 
also Haney et al., 1994) suggests that those individuals who identify themselves as 
Catholic or as Jewish are less likely to favor the death penalty when compared to those 
who identify themselves as Protestant.  Earlier work on the role that religious preference 
plays in death penalty decisions suggests that Southern Baptists are more likely to vote 
for death than individuals who have other religious preferences (Eisenberg et al., 2001).  
The majority of respondents in the sample identified themselves with one of the 
Protestant religions (62.9%), with almost a fifth of the Protestant respondents (16.6%) 




 Due to the large number of religions preferences that are contained within these 
data, these variables will be collapsed into a series of dummy variables.  The dummy 
variables have been chosen to represent those four most common religious preferences in 
these data: Southern Baptist; Baptist; Jewish; and Roman Catholic.  Each of these 
religious preferences also has theoretical significance.  Respondents who identify 
themselves as Southern Baptists have been more likely to vote for death in prior research 
than have respondents identifying with other religions (Einsenberg et al., 2001).  And 
while the distinction between Baptist and Southern Baptist is a well-defined one, the 
possibility of confusion on the part of respondents between these two responses suggests 
that including the Baptist religious preference may be a conservative measure that is 
appropriate for these analyses.  Other research also suggests that Jewish and Roman 
Catholic respondents are less likely to vote for the death penalty, so these two categories 
will also be included.  Because Roman Catholic contains the highest percentage of 
respondents of one religion, this category will be the reference category.   
 
 Income: Respondents were asked to pick an income range which best described 
their current family income.  The income categories ranged from less than $10,000 a year 
to more than $75,000 a year.  There was also an option for respondents to refuse to 
answer the question.  The modal category for income is between $30,000 and $50,000 
per year, with more than a quarter of respondents choosing this option (27.7%).  The next 
most common response was between $50,000 and $75,000 per year (20.2%).  Only a 
small number of respondents (83 or 7.9%) refused to answer this question.  The reference 




Foreperson: Respondents were also asked whether or not they had served as the 
foreperson on their trial.  Of the jurors interviewed, approximately 11 percent (121 in the 
overall sample, 109 in the final sample) of jurors reported that they had served as the 
foreperson.  Because a foreperson is traditionally asked to guide the jury in its duties, it is 
possible that those individuals who have served as a foreperson may be more likely to 
view the deliberations process differently than did other jurors.  As a result, this variable 
will be controlled for in the final analysis.   
 
Prior Relationships:  Jurors were also asked to identify whether they had known 
any of their fellow jurors prior to serving on the trial with them.  Almost a quarter of 
jurors interviewed (22.5%) responded that they had some type of prior relationship, 
whether it be as a friend or an acquaintance, with at least one other juror with whom they 
had served.  Because there is research that suggests friendship groups may differ in both 
their processing and perspective of group climate than acquaintance groups (see for 
example, Jehn and Shah, 1997), it is important to control for any prior relationships that 
may have existed on the jury.  This variable will be coded 0 for those jurors with no prior 
relationships and 1 for those jurors who have identified a prior relationship of some sort 
with someone else on the jury. 
 
 Case Level Control Variables 
 
 Research suggests that sentencing decisions may be directly related to how 
heinous the jury deems the crime and to the jury’s reaction to the defendant.  In order to 




be included in the analysis.  These variables will include both the facts of the case and the 
characteristics of the defendant.   
 
 Number of Victims: Prior research suggests that cases with multiple victims are 
more likely to result in a death sentence.  Multiple victims were reported by 
approximately one-quarter (25.6%) of the respondents.  When the trials were analyzed 
separately, this percentage was almost exactly the same (25.7%).  In trials where there 
was juror disagreement about the number of victims, a decision was made to use the most 
common response.  For example, if two jurors reported that there were two victims and 
one juror reported one victim, the trial was coded as having two victims.  Of those trials 
with multiple victims, the majority had only two victims (45 trials in the final sample or 
approximately 76%).  The remainder of the trials were reported as having anywhere from 
three to six victims. 
 
 Presence of Aggravating Factors: Respondents were asked to identify whether 
several aggravating circumstances were presented during the trial.  Aggravating 
circumstances are any factors that the jury could use during the process of deliberation to 
justify returning a death sentence.  These aggravating circumstances included both legal 
aggravating factors, such as the case of a felony homicide, and extra-legal aggravating 
factors, such as the fact that the victim was a child.  In order to control for the presence of 
aggravating factors, both legal and extra-legal, which existed for each trial, a scale was 
created to measure the presence of these factors.  Each factor was measured by either its 




the number of aggravating circumstances that was present according to each individual 
juror.  The thirteen44 aggravating factors included in this scale are: the murder occurred 
during the commission of a felony; the victim was a child; the victim was respected in the 
community; the victim had a loving family; the defendant had a history of violent crime; 
the defendant was a stranger in the community; the defendant showed no remorse; the 
defendant would be dangerous in the future; the victim’s family suffered severe loss or 
grief; the victim’s family asked for the death penalty; the community was outraged; the 
community wanted the death penalty; and, the defendant did not testify on his/her own 
behalf.  Table 9 shows the mean values for each of the individual items in the scale; table 
19 shows the mean and standard deviation for the scale.  The mean of the scale was .40 
(S.D. = .18), and the reliability was good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .608.   
Because this variable can also be aggregated into a jury level characteristic, the 
average scale score for each juror serving on a particular jury was computed, creating an 
average aggravating factor score for each trial.  When this new average scale of reported 
aggravating factors was computed for the 244 trials in the final sample, the mean was .40 
(S.D. = .14) with a range of .08 to .87. 
 
 Presence of Mitigating Factors: The respondents were also asked to identify 
whether any mitigating circumstances were present in the trial on which they served.  
Mitigating circumstances are those which can be used by the jury to justify returning a 
life sentence, even though the defendant was found guilty of capital murder.  Unlike 
                                                 
44 The original scale was comprised of fourteen aggravating factors, including whether or not the victim 
was female.  Reliability analysis indicated that removing this item would increase the reliability of the 
scale.  This original scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .586 with a mean of .408 and a S.D. of .174.  The 
variable of whether or not the victim was female was retained as a separate variable in the analysis in order 




aggravating circumstances, the consideration of all mitigating circumstances is 
considered legal.  Depending upon the sentencing guidelines followed by the state, jurors 
may either be given a list of mitigating circumstances from which to choose as reasons 
for returning a life sentence or they may return a life sentence for any reason that they 
deem fit.  In order to control for the presence and use of mitigating factors in each trial, 
an averaged scale of mitigating circumstances was developed in the same way that the 
scale of aggravating factors was created.  The presence of each mitigating factor was 
measured with a 1, its absence with a 0.  Respondents were given a list of twenty-one45 
mitigating factors to potentially identify, of which nineteen were used for the creation of 
the scale.  The mitigating circumstances were: the defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol; the defendant was under the influence of drugs; the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional distress; the victim was a stranger in the 
community; the victim was a known trouble maker; the victim had a criminal record; the 
victim was an alcoholic; the victim was a drug addict; the defendant had no prior criminal 
record; the defendant was mentally retarded; the defendant was under 18 when the crime 
was committed; the defendant was an alcoholic; the defendant was a drug addict; the 
defendant had a history of mental illness; the defendant had a background of extreme 
poverty; the defendant had been seriously abused as a child; the defendant had been 
placed in institutions but never given real help for his/her problems; the defendant had 
been convicted with evidence obtained from an accomplice who was given a lesser 
sentence because of his/her cooperation; and, the defendant would be a hardworking and 
                                                 
45 The original instrument contained twenty-one mitigating factors.  Reliability analysis indicated that the 
Cronbach’s alpha could be improved by removing the factors that the defendant had a loving family and 
that the juror had lingering doubt.  The scale using all original twenty-one items had a mean of .62 and a 




well-behaved inmate.  Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics for each item in the scale; 
table 19 shows the descriptive statistics for the scale.  The mean of the scale was .14 
(S.D. = .12) and the scale reliability was acceptable, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .573.   
 The reliability of this scale could have been increased by dropping several of the 
included items.  Dropping these items, however, would have meant that many of the 
legally relevant mitigating factors would have been omitted.  In order to maintain the 
integrity of this scale, a decision was made to keep these nineteen items in the scale.  One 
potential explanation for the low Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is that jurors do not 
always respond correctly to the mitigating factors in a trial.  Oftentimes, jurors will 
misinterpret mitigating factors; instead of recognizing them as reasons to return a life 
sentence, jurors will instead use them as reasons to return a death sentence.  These 
perverse effects most often occur with such mitigating factors as mental defect or drug 
abuse.  Jurors are supposed to interpret these as reasons for mercy, but instead interpret 
them as reasons for harsher punishment (see Bentele and Bowers, 2001; Brewer, 2004; 
Foglia, 2003).  Therefore, while reducing the number of items in the scale would have 
increased the Cronbach’s alpha, it would have conceptually changed the scale from one 
measuring the ways that jurors interpret mitigating circumstances to one that only 
includes those mitigating circumstances that are clear to jurors.  Doing so would have 
changed the way that this variable operates in the model when compared to the way that 
it operates during jury deliberations. 
This variable is also a jury level characteristic; as such, the average scale score for 
each juror serving on a particular jury was computed, creating an average mitigating 




sample, the mean number of reported mitigating factors was .14 (S.D. = .10) with a range 
of 0 to .39. 
 
 Level of Heinousness: During the interview, jurors were asked to state their level 
of agreement to several words that potentially described the crime.  They words that the 
juror was asked to consider included the following adjectives: bloody; gory; vicious; 
depraved; calculated; cold-blooded; senseless; repulsive; the work of a “mad man”; it 
made you feel sick to think about it; the victim(s) was/were made to suffer; and, the 
body(ies) was/were maimed or mangled after death.  The respondents answered these 
based on a four-item scale that contained the following categories: Very Well; Fairly 
Well; Not So Well; and, Not At All.  The response set ranged from Very Well, coded as 
4, to Not At All, coded as 1.  The scale was created by taking an average of the juror’s 
responses to each of the twelve items.  Upon creation of this scale, reliability analysis 
indicated that the Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .785.  Higher values on this scale 
indicate a higher level of heinousness reported about the crime.  The mean value for this 
scale is 3.10 (S.D. = .61).  Table 11 reports the mean and standard deviation for each of 
the twelve items in this scale, while table 19 reports the mean and standard deviation for 
the scale.  The responses to the scale ranged from 1.0 to 4.0 
Because this variable can also be considered a jury level characteristic, the 
average scale score for each juror serving on a particular jury was computed, creating an 
average level of heinousness score for each trial.  When this new average was computed 
for the 269 trials in the sample, the average level of heinousness scale reported was 3.14 





Defendant Demeanor: Research suggests that the defendant’s demeanor may have 
a significant impact on the sentencing outcome, with those defendants whom the jury 
believes to be remorseful and repentant more likely to receive a life sentence over a death 
sentence.  Jurors were asked several questions over the course of the interview about the 
defendant’s dress and demeanor, including a scale that asked about their interpretations 
of the defendant’s attitude during the trial.  The question asked of the respondents was: 
How did the defendant appear to you during the trial?  The jurors were then asked to state 
whether or not the following phrases sufficiently described how the defendant appeared 
during the trial, using a Yes (scored as 1) or No (scored s 0) response: bored, indifferent 
or remote; sorry for what s/he had done; sincere and honest; self confident; and, bitter or 
resentful?  The following questions were reverse coded so that a scale of positive 
defendant demeanor could be created: bored, indifferent or remote; and, bitter or 
resentful.  The scale was created by taking the average of the juror’s responses to each of 
the five questions.  Higher values on the scale indicate a more positive defendant 
demeanor.  The reliability for this scale was good; the Cronbach’s alpha was .715.  The 
mean value for this scale is .42 (S.D. = .30).  Table 12 reports the mean and standard 
deviation for each of the five46 items; table 19 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
scale.   
Because this variable can also be a jury level characteristic, the average scale 
score for each juror serving on a particular jury was computed, creating a defendant 
                                                 
46 The original scale consisted of eight items and also included the items: the defendant was uncomfortable; 
the defendant was defiant; and, the defendant was spruced up.  Reliability analysis of the original scale 
indicated that the scale would be improved by removing these three items.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the 




demeanor score for each trial.  When this new average was computed for the 269 trials in 
the sample, the average defendant demeanor was .44 (S.D. = .22) with a range of 0 to 1.0. 
 
 Gender of the Victim: One of the more common aggravating factors identified in 
the capital punishment literature is whether or not the victim is female; in cases where the 
victim is female, juries appear to be more likely to return a death sentence, especially if 
there is evidence of a sex crime (see Kalven and Zeisel, 1966; p. 437).  Information is 
available as to whether or not there was a female victim in each trial; almost half (47.5% 
or 116 trials) of all trials included a female victim.  This variable will be included as a 
control, since research does suggest that there is a strong possibility that jurors may react 
differently to cases with a female victim. 
 
 
 Jury Level Characteristics 
 
 Racial Composition: Prior research suggests that the racial composition of the 
jury may have a very strong impact on the sentencing outcome.  Bowers and his 
colleagues (2001) suggest that in those cases where there are at least five White males on 
the jury, a death sentence is reached in almost ninety percent of cases.  In those trials 
where there is at least one Black male serving on the jury, however, a death sentence is 
only reached in approximately thirty percent of trials.  Black males, furthermore, seem to 
have more control over the sentencing outcome that do Black females; it takes three 
Black females to have the same impact on the outcome as one Black male (Bowers et al.., 




on the outcome, therefore, it is important to control for the number of Black jurors, both 
male and female, who serve on the trial.  On average, almost half (47.3%) of the jurors 
reported that they had served on a trial with at least one Black male juror, whereas just 
over half (52.4%) of jurors reported serving on a trial with at least on Black female juror.  
When these responses were combined, jurors reported that, on average, approximately 
two Black jurors (mean = 1.70, S.D. = 1.80) served on each capital trial.  Table 17 shows 
how many Black jurors each juror reported serving on his or her capital jury.   The 
majority of jurors report that no Black jurors served on their trial (30.7%), with the next 
largest category being having served on a capital trial with at least one Black juror 
(25.2%).   
 The racial composition of the jury will be measured by the percentage of Black 
jurors, which is created by taking the reported number of Black jurors serving on a trial 
and dividing it by twelve, the total number of jurors who serve on a trial.  When 
individual jurors reported the percentage of Black jurors on their trial, the average was 
14.27%, with individuals reporting the percentage of Black jurors on a jury ranging from 
0% to 75% of the jury.  When the individual juror level data was aggregated to create a 
jury level file, the percentage of Blacks serving on a jury was created by taking the 
average of the individual responses; in the majority of cases, all of the jurors agreed on 
the number of Blacks serving on any given capital jury.  Table 19 shows the descriptive 
statistics for this variable. 
 When the juries were analyzed as their own unit, the average percentage of Blacks 
serving on the jury was 13.24% with a range of between 0% and 72.2% of the jury 





 Gender Composition: Prior research also suggests that males are more likely than 
females to favor the death penalty (Ellsworth and Gross, 1994).  This is evident in 
Bowers and colleagues’ (2001) discussion of the roles that both race and gender play in 
the probability that a capital jury will return a death sentence.  The authors found that 
juries with at least five White males were more likely to return a death sentence than 
those with less than five males; similarly, juries with at least one Black male were more 
likely to return a life sentence.  These findings did not, however, translate to similar 
verdicts when the number of females on the jury was examined.  In general, Bowers and 
his colleagues (2001) found that females, despite their propensity to favor life over death, 
did not appear to drive verdicts on capital juries.  The one exception occurred when there 
were no Black males serving on the jury and there were at least three Black females.  In 
these situations, the probability that the jury would return a life sentence increased, 
although the affect disappears when the presence of a Black male is controlled. 
 In order to ensure that the impacts of gender composition on the jury can be 
accounted for, a variable for the percentage of male jurors has been created.  The 
percentage of male jurors serving on an individual trial is calculated by taking the 
reported number of males on the jury and dividing it by twelve, the total number of jurors 
who can serve on a trial.  At the individual juror level, jurors report that, on average, 
approximately half of the jury (48.9%) is male, with the percentage of males serving on 
the jury ranging from 0 percent to 91.67 percent.  Table 19 shows the descriptive 




 When the individual juror level data was aggregated to create a jury level file, the 
percentage of males serving on a jury was created by taking the average of the individual 
responses; in the majority of cases, all of the jurors agreed on the number of males 
serving on any given capital jury.  When the juries were analyzed as their own unit, the 
average percentage of males serving on the jury was 46.96% with a range of between 0% 
and 91.67% of the jury consisting of male jurors. 
 
 Number of Jurors:  Each jury contains between three and eight jurors who were 
interviewed about their experiences on a capital trial.  Because the number of jurors per 
jury is not consistent across cases, it is important to control for the number of jurors per 
trial that are contained in the sample.  This variable will be included in all analyses in 




The original CJP investigators realized that variation in sentencing outcomes may 
exist due to several factors, including the geographic location of the capital trial and the 
type of guided discretion statutes used by the state.  These differences, as well as other 
potentially important community factors, must be taken into consideration because a 
representative jury should be culturally similar to the community.  The jurors, therefore, 
represent a smaller version of the community at large and will therefore reinforce those 





 State: The state from which the capital trial was drawn.  Table 18 shows the 
distribution of the number of individual jurors interviewed in each of the fourteen states.  
A dummy variable will be created in order to indicate each state where the trial took 
place.  The reference category for this variable will be the state of California, as this is 





 As is often the case when dealing with social science data sets, some of the cases 
within these data contain missing information.  In an effort to retain as much data as 
possible, three decision rules were made about missing data.  The first decision was to 
remove all cases from the analyses that were missing information on the dependent 
variable (perception of group climate).  This decision was made in part to ensure that all 
cases could be utilized in the final statistical models and in part because any cases 
missing the perception of group climate information could not be aggregated into a jury 
level characteristic.  As a result, fifteen cases were removed from the data.  A second 
decision was made to remove all cases that had missing information about individual 
juror level demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, or age.  Demographic 
information could not be obtained in any other way and as a result, another forty-eight 
cases were removed from the analysis. 
 Other cases were missing information about trial level characteristics, specifically 
information about the aggravating and mitigating factors, the level of heinousness, and 




these variables.  In order to retain as many cases as possible, a decision was made to 
replace missing trial level variables with the average value for that variable from the 
other jurors who served on that trial.  For instance, if an individual juror was missing 
information about the aggravating circumstances scale, the scale was replaced with the 
mean aggravating circumstances scale from the jury on which that individual juror 
served.  A similar decision rule was created and imputed for those cases where a juror 
was missing information about the jury level characteristics, such as the percent of Black 
jurors serving on the jury and the percent of male jurors on the jury.  The jury level 
information was imputed into the individual juror information, so that those variables 
were replaced with the jury level variable.  In those rare instances when the other jurors 
serving on a trial disagreed as to the percent of Black or male jurors on their trial, their 
responses were averaged and this average was imputed for the missing information. 
 Independent samples t-tests were conducted to see if there was a difference 
between any of the variables which had missing data.  Results indicated that the only 
difference that existed between cases with any missing data and the rest of the sample 
was that cases with missing data tended to be slightly older (t = -3.407; p = .001).  The 
difference in average age, while significant, was not large.  The mean age for respondents 
without missing data was 45.2, while the mean age for respondents with missing data was 
48.5.  Because the average age in the sample was approximately 46 years old, a decision 
was made that this difference was not large enough to negatively impact the results of 
any statistical analyses. 
 There are no missing data for the jury level characteristics that will be used to test 




defendant, there were no cases with missing data.  For those juries where information was 
not available from all of the individual jurors who served, aggregate variables were 
created using what information was available.  The aggregate jury level variables were 
created by taking the mean level of each variable as reported by the individual jurors 




 Measuring Group Climate 
 
 The first task of this analysis was to determine whether a scale could be created 
that adequately measured global group climate within these data.  In order to do this, 
analysis was undertaken to examine the role that fifteen variables could potentially play 
in creating a group climate variable.  The fifteen variables that were examined are 
described above in the section on dependent variables.  In order to create a global group 
climate variable, it was necessary to decide which of the fifteen variables, which as 
previously noted had been chosen for their ability to map into the theoretical constructs of 
group climate, grouped together into one global construct.  To do this, a principal 
components analysis was conducted.  Several analyses were performed in order to choose 
the most accurate and theoretically useful way to group these fifteen variables.  The 
results of these analyses suggested that not all of the fifteen variables factored together; 
further inspection suggested that only ten variables loaded together into a construct that 
appears to be the best measure of group climate for these data47.    Examination of the 
                                                 
47 Please see Appendix D for a discussion of the principal components analyses that were conducted in 
order to determine the final variables included in the group climate variable.  Factor loadings and 




scree plots and the accompanying eigenvalues suggested that the best way to group the 
ten variables was through a one factor solution.  The loadings for this factor are shown in 
Table 20.  The ten variables that are included within the group climate variable are:  
 
1. The group was likeminded, saw things the same way 
2. The group was closed-minded, intolerant of disagreement 
3. The group was too quick to make a decision, in hurry 
4. The group was friendly and respectful to one another 
5. The group was dominated by a few strong personalities 
6. The group got too emotionally involved in the case 
7. The group was confused by the judge’s instructions 
8. The group did not follow the judge’s instructions 
9. The group kept making mistakes 
10. The group made you feel like an outsider 
 
 These ten variables were then scaled to create a group climate that consisted of 
the average of each individual juror’s responses to the ten questions.48  Higher scores on 
the index indicated more positive perceptions of group climate.  The reliability for this 
index was calculated and was deemed to be adequately high for the purposes of further 
analysis (α = .71).  The mean for the group climate scale, which could range from 1 to 4, 
is 3.44 (S.D. = .39), indicating that on average, most of the respondents perceived the 
group interactions as positive. Table 19 reports the descriptive statistics for the scale.  
                                                 
48 As mentioned previously, the variables “the group was likeminded, saw things the same way” and “the 





Despite the fact that most respondents perceived the group climate as positive, bivariate 
correlations (see Appendix B) suggested that juror race was significantly and negatively 
related to perception of group climate, with Black jurors more likely to have more 
negative perceptions of group climate.  Verdict was also negatively and significantly 
related to group climate, with those jurors on trials with a death outcome more likely to 
report negative perceptions of group climate. 
 It would be helpful at this point to more closely examine the items that make up 
the global group climate scale.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the fields of 
industrial and organizational psychology generally examine at least one of four different 
types of group functioning: cohesion; cooperation; conflict; and, critical evaluations.  
Survey limitations with these data, however, prohibit the portioning of the group climate 
scale into a multidimensional measure; there simply are not enough questions available 
for use in this scale.  The use of a global group climate scale, as will be discussed in the 
next section, is not unprecedented.  Kivlighan and Tarrant (2001) use a similar 
unidimensional scale of group climate in their examination of the role that group 
functioning plays on therapeutic outcomes.  More importantly, however, is the fact that 
many of the variables used to create the current group climate are very similar to items 
used in other studies to measure all four of the constructs of group climate. 
 One of the most well-known studies of group functioning is Seashore’s (1954) 
study of the level of cohesion among workgroups.  Seashore’s (1954) original measures 
of cohesion are represented in this scale.  His two measures of “felt like part of a work 
group” and “how well the group got along” are very similar to two of the items used here: 




of Kivlighan and Tarrant (2001) is also well-represented; they ask respondents whether or 
not there was any “friction and anger between members,” a measure that is very similar 
to two measures used here: “closed-minded, intolerant of disagreement;” and, “dominated 
by a few strong personalities.”  These measures are very similar to those used by Jehn 
(1995) to measure group climate.  In her examination of the effects of conflict at both the 
individual and group level, Jehn asked respondents “how much are personality conflicts 
evident;” this measure is similar to two of the items in this scale: “friendly and respectful 
to one another;” and, “dominated by a few strong personalities,”  Jehn also asked 
respondents to describe the amount of “emotional conflict” that existed during 
interactions; this questions is similar to the one used here that asks jurors to rate if “the 
group got too emotionally involved in the case.”  The four remaining questions: “too 
quick to make a decision, in hurry;” “confused by the judge’s instructions;” “did not 
follow the judge’s instructions;” and, “kept making mistakes,” are all ways in which 
critical evaluations can be measured.  These are similar to the question used by Jehn and 
Shah (1997) which asked respondents to rate how often “people in your group disagreed 
about opinions regarding the work being done.” The consistency between the current 
measures used to create the group climate scale and the measures used is previous 
research, along with the results from the principal components analysis suggesting that a 
one factor solution is the most appropriate method, offer support for the decision to use a 






 Group Climate: A Global Measure of Group Functioning 
 It is best to consider the measure of group climate created from these data as a 
global measure of group functioning.  A global measure of group climate is not 
unprecedented in the group processes literature; in their assessment of the impact of 
group climate on therapeutic outcomes, Kivlighan and Tarrant (2001) use a global group 
climate questionnaire that also taps into members’ perception of the group functioning.  
The questions used by Kivlighan and Tarrant, as well as those created by Seashore (1954) 
in his pioneering work on group cohesion, map very well onto the questions used here to 
create the group climate scale.  While separate constructs of group functioning were not 
identified, a global climate measure fits well both in terms of prior research and the 
current goals for the following analyses. 
 In creating their measure of group functioning, Kivlighan and Tarrant also 
aggregate responses from individual respondents into a group level variable by taking the 
mean of the individual responses for each member of the group.  As with the community 
crime research, research on group processes oftentimes relies on information gathered 
from a group of individuals in order to represent the larger group of interest.  One 
difference that needs to be noted, however, is that Kivlighan and Tarrant had information 
available from all members of the group, whereas the current analyses depend on a global 
climate measure taken from a smaller number of jurors than comprise the entire jury.  As 
a result, we must turn to the community organization literature for the validity of the 
aggregate measure; using information aggregated up from some number of individuals, 
community crime scholars are able to create community level variables to measure such 




Groves, 1989).  Following the protocol borrowed from these two theoretical perspectives, 
the current use of aggregated measures as a way to get at group level interactions is an 
acceptable one.  While methodologically this practice may be acceptable, however, it is 
important to note that theoretically, aggregated individual measures are not the ideal way 
to understand complex group level processes.  Until the data become available to look at 
such phenomena at the group level, however, it is the best way in which to begin an 
examination of the impact that group level processes may have on various outcomes, 
including sentencing outcomes in capital trials. 
 
Assumptions of Normality 
 
 The group climate scale was also examined for its skew, as the distribution of a 
dependent variable is a deciding factor not only in what types of statistical tests can be 
conducted but also in the assumptions about how robust the results of those statistical 
tests may be.  In these data, the group climate scale is negatively skewed, with responses 
clustered more towards the higher end of the distribution.  Statistics for measuring how 
normally the variable is distributed, however, show that the distribution is not so skewed 
as to cause worry for statistical examination.  The skewness statistic, at -.961, is well 
within the accepted range of ±3 and the kurtosis statistic, at 1.075, is also well within its 
accepted range of ±7.  Figure 3 shows a histogram of the group climate variable and 
reports the mean and the standard deviation. While the negative skew is evident, a visual 
examination of the distribution also shows that the skew is not pronounced enough to 








 Hypothesis 1 
  
 The first set of hypotheses focuses on the effects that certain characteristics at 
both the individual level, including the race of the juror, and the trial level, such as the 
defendant characteristics, have on the individual juror’s perception of the group climate 
during deliberations.  Because the dependent variable for these hypotheses is the group 
climate variable, which is a scale and at the interval level of measurement, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression can potentially be utilized.  OLS regression techniques can 
examine the impact of more than one independent variable on the dependent variable of 
interest, which in this case is the group climate variable.  Because there is more than one 
independent variable, it is necessary to estimate more than one slope coefficient.  The 
OLS regression model describes the dependent variable as a function of both more than 
one independent variable and an error term that contains various omitted factors, so that 
the general equation to be used is: 
 
y = α + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + … βkxk + ε 
 
where: 
  k = the number of independent variables, and 




In order to make sure that OLS regression is the proper analytic technique, tests 
will first be undertaken to make sure that none of the assumptions of multivariate 
regression are violated, such as independence, linearity, homoscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and normally distributed error terms (Hoffman, 2004).  One concern 
about these data is that they violate the assumption of the independence of the 
observations, due to the fact that information has been collected from more than one 
person who has served on the same jury for the same trial.  As a result, these data actually 
exhibit hierarchical characteristics, with individual jurors nested within capital juries.  
Because of this, the jurors share certain characteristics, like trial experiences, that will 
therefore violate any assumptions of independence.  There are several ways in which to 
test whether or not the assumptions of OLS have been violated.  Each one of these tests 
will be undertaken to determine if a different analytic technique is necessary. 
Due to the nature of these observations, however, it should be noted that a 
violation of the independence of observations is already expected, which as previously 
mentioned, can lead to serial autocorrelation in the error terms and homoscedasticity, 
among other things (Hoffman, 2004).   Should these assumption be violated, the ordinary 
least squares regression model previously described will produce standard errors that are 
too small, which in turn will lead to a higher probability that the null hypothesis is 
rejected when, in fact, we should instead fail to reject the null hypothesis.  In order to 
correct for the problem of the lack of independence, a methodological strategy which 
takes into account both the individual juror level characteristics and the case level 
characteristics that are shared by the jurors must be estimated.  For the purposes of this 




linear model.  In order to ensure that this is the case, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
will be conducted on the residuals of the perception of group climate scale, to see 
whether jury membership predicts those residuals.  If jury membership does not 
significantly predict the residuals, there is no need to conduct a hierarchical model and 
the ordinary least squares results will be interpreted.  If jury membership does 
significantly predict the residuals, then a hierarchical modeling procedure will be utilized. 
As previously mentioned, the hierarchical model takes into account that these data 
consist of individual jurors which are nested within capital juries.  A hierarchical linear 
model allows us to examine the impact of both the variation within a jury of the 
perceived group climate for those jurors that served on the same jury and the variation 
between juries on the average perception of group climate.  In order to estimate this 
model, several steps must be taken.  First, the variables must be grouped into individual 
level variables, which are often termed “level 1” variables.  For the purposes of these 
analyses, all of the juror level variables are considered level 1 variables.  Those variables 
which are shared among jurors serving on the same capital trial are considered “level 2” 
variables.  In these analyses, all of the variables related to the trial characteristics and the 
jury racial composition are level 2 variables.  In using a two-level model, the dependent 
variable is generally at the individual level; in this case, the outcome for the first set of 
hypotheses is the individual juror’s perception of group climate, which indeed meets this 
criterion. 
The first step in estimating a multi-level model is to ensure that there is variation 




first hypothesis, which tests whether or not the perception of group climate during 
deliberation varies across juries.  The model used to estimate this is: 
 
Y = α + r 
where: 
 α = the intercept as measured by mean probability of Y, and 
 r = an error term 
 
From here, the proportion of variance in the perception of group climate between 
juries can be estimated using the following equation: 
 
ρ = τ00 / (τ00 + σ2) 
 
where: 
 ρ = the proportion of variance between juries; 
 τ00 = the variance component associated with the mean probability, and 
 σ2 = the level 1 variance component 
 
Once it has been determined that there is variance to be explained, a level 1 
random coefficients model will then be estimated.  The level 1 model tests the second of 
the first set of hypotheses and determines whether there is variation between how Black 
and White jurors perceive the quality of the group climate during deliberations.  It should 
be noted that for the level 1 model, the sample size is the number of individual 




The general level 1 model for the outcome for case i within unit j is as follows (see 
Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon, 2000): 
  
Yij = α  + β1j X1ij + β2j X2ij + … + βQj XQij + r ij 
where:  
 α = the intercept as measured by mean probability of Y; 
 βqj (q = 1,2,…,Q) = level 1 coefficients; 
 Xqij = level 1 predictor q for case i in unit j, and 
 r ij = level 1 random effect 
 
Both a fixed effects model, which reports the level 1 coefficients as the average 
within group slopes, and a random effects model, which reports the amount of variance 
that can be attributed to the level 1 predictors, will be reported for these analyses. 
The next step is to report a level 2 model, which is known as the intercepts and 
slopes as outcomes model (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).  This model allows us to 
estimate which characteristics of the trial predict why jurors on certain juries report 
higher levels of satisfaction as measured through group climate than do jurors who serve 
on other juries.  It should be noted that for this model, the sample changes from the 
individual juror observations to that of the trial observations; for these data, it means that 
the sample size will consist of the 269 capital trials from which jurors had been randomly 
selected for inclusion in the individual juror dataset.  For this model, each of the level 1 




variable in the level 2 model.  The general level 2 intercepts and slopes as outcomes 
model is as follows (see Raudenbush et al., 2000): 
 
βqj = α + γq1W1j + γq2W2j + … + γqSqWSqj + uqj 
where: 
 α = the intercept as measured by the level 2 mean probability of Y; 
 γqS (q = 1, 2, …, Sq) = level 2 coefficients 
 WSj = level 2 predictor 
 uqj = a level 2 random effect 
 
An easy way to understand the relationship between the level 1 and the level 2 
models is that the level 1 coefficients, including the intercept, become dependent 
variables for the level 2 model.  Furthermore, the level 2 model also takes into 
consideration that the probability of each of the level 1 predictors is based on each of 
their own intercepts, the level 2 predictors, and an error term.  By doing this, the model 
allows for both the intercepts and the slopes to vary.  Also, for ease of interpretation, each 
of the level 2 predictors (i.e. the trial and jury level characteristics) will be grand mean 
centered.  By estimating the proportion of explained variance in the level 2 model, we 
can explain the percentage of between group variation that can be attributed to both the 
differences in intercepts and slopes attributed to the level 1 predictors49. 
                                                 
49 Because these data also contain information about the state in which each trial was conducted, it 
may be possible to also conduct a level 3 analysis, taking into consideration the location of the trial.  At this 
time, however, it is premature to estimate a level 3 model, as the small number of cases contained within 
these data, relative to other utilizations of hierarchical linear modeling, lead to the question of whether it 
will be possible to explain more variation in a reliable model.  Should final estimations of the level 2 model 





 Hypothesis 2 
 
 The second hypothesis looks at the impact that the average perception of group 
climate within each jury has on the sentencing outcome of the trial, be it life or death.  
Because the dependent variable in this case is a dichotomous measure, a life or a death 
sentence, it is not possible to use an ordinary least squares regression model.  
Furthermore, because this hypothesis looks only at the impact that a group level 
independent variable, the average perception of group climate, has on a group outcome, 
the sentence, a hierarchical model is not necessary.  In order to take into account that this 
hypothesis has a limited dependent variable, an analytic strategy which takes into account 
how these data will violate many of the assumptions of the OLS model must be utilized.  
In this case, the best methodology for the question at hand is that of a multivariate 
logistical regression procedure.   
The logistic regression technique is different from the ordinary least squares 
regression model in that the logistic regression model examines the impact of the 
independent variables on the probability that the dependent variable will be equal to 1 
[P(Y=1)], where the probability that the dependent variable is equal to 1 being the log of 
the odds of the dependent variable (Hoffman, 2004, p. 47; Long, 1997, p. 49).  For these 
data, the model would examine the impact of the independent variables on the probability 
that the sentencing outcome is death.  The logistic regression model, or adjusted model, is 
able to take into account the effects of all of other variables in the model by controlling 
for them, generally by holding their values constant at their mean, and only report the 
individual effect for each variable.  This is helpful because it allows us to know how an 





independent variable will impact the dependent variable while still taking into 
consideration other factors of interest (Hoffman, p 52. 2004).  The generic logistic 
regression model takes on the form: 
 
P(Y=1|X) = 1 / 1 + exp (-α + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + … βkxk) 
 
For the current research, the model will take on the form: 
 
P(Y = Death|X) = 1 / 1 + exp (-α + β1(Average Group Climate) + β2(Race of Victim) + 
β3(Race of Defendant) + β4(Black Defendant and White Victim) + β5(Female Victim) + 
β6(Percent Black) + β7(Percent Male) + β8(Number of Victims) + β9(Mitigating Factors) 
+ β10(Aggravating Factors) + β11(Defendant Demeanor) + β12(Level of Heinousness) 
 
The coefficients obtained through the logistic regression model are generally 
interpreted in one of two ways: through the reporting of the odds ratio or through the 
reporting of the predicted probability.  An odds ratio is essentially just two odds that are 
compared to determine whether or not one group has higher or lower odds of some binary 
outcome.  Generally, an odds ratio is interpreted so that a number greater than one 
indicates a positive association between an independent variable and the dependent 
variable and a number between zero and one indicates a negative association (Hoffman, 
p. 49, 2004).  One limitation to reporting odds ratios, however, is that they are often 
dependent on the scaling of the independent variables and can be difficult to compare to 
one another.  One way to correct for this is to instead report predicted probabilities.  
Predicted probabilities allow us to compare the probability that Y = 1 (or in this case that 
there was a death sentence returned) between two populations, such as when there is a 




probabilities allow us to compare the probability that Y = 1 at different points in the 
distribution, such as at different quartiles or at the minimum and maximum point in the 
scale.  Both the odds ratios and the predicted probabilities for variables of interest will be 




Chapter 5:  Results 
 
Hypothesis 1: Preliminary Results 
 
Preliminary Hypothesis Testing: Robust Standard Errors 
 
 The first step of these analyses was to specify which individual level variables 
could predict a juror’s perception of group climate.  Because the group climate variable is 
measured as an interval level scale, ordinal least squares regression is the most 
appropriate statistical technique.  Due to the fact that individual jurors are grouped 
together within juries, however, a correction must be made to the ordinary least squares 
regression model in order to take into account the shared trial experience of the jurors.  
This was accomplished by using the cluster command in the Stata statistical software 
package.  Because jurors can be grouped within juries, the individual error terms are not 
independent; as such, the uncorrected regression model will estimate standard errors that 
are too small and increase the probability that a variable is significant.  The cluster 
command specifies more robust standard errors, decreasing the probability of rejecting 
the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. 
 Five models were specified.  The first model examines the role of individual level 
factors on an individual juror’s perception of group climate.  The second and third 
models examine the role of trial level characteristics on an individual juror’s perception 
of group climate.  The fourth model examines the role of jury level factors on an 
individual juror’s perception of group climate and the final model combines the four 




be discussed separately.  Correlations, means, and standard deviations for all of the 
variables used in these analyses can be found in Appendix B.   
 The first model evaluates which individual demographic characteristics predict an 
individual juror’s perception of the group climate.  The variables included in the model 
are the juror’s race (Black), gender (female), age, education, religion (Southern Baptist, 
Baptist, and Jewish), and income, as well as the juror’s perception of aggravation and 
mitigation in the trial, his/her perception of the level of heinousness of the crime, and 
his/her perception of the defendant’s demeanor during the trial.  This model also controls 
for whether the juror knew other jurors prior to the trial and whether the juror served as 
the foreperson.  An examination of the coefficients shows that age, religion, and the 
presence of mitigation all significantly predict the perception of group climate.  Older 
jurors are more likely to perceive the group climate in a more positive light, as are Baptist 
jurors.  Jewish jurors, however, have a lower perception of group climate, as do jurors 
who perceive there to be higher levels of mitigation during the trial.  No other variables 
reach traditional levels of significance, although it should be noted that both the gender of 
the juror (β =.-.07, p = .10)and the perception of the level of heinousness approach 
significance (β = .037, p = .10).  Female jurors are more likely to perceive the group 
climate as being negative, while jurors who perceive a higher level of heinousness are 
more likely to perceive the group climate as positive.  The Pearson’s R2 value of .08, 
however, suggests that this model does not have a high degree of explanatory power. 
 The second model examines the role that the trial level characteristics have on the 
prediction of an individual juror’s perception of group climate50.  The variables included 
                                                 
50 All trial level analyses were run both with and without the gender of the defendant included in the model.  




in this model are the race of the defendant (Black), the race of the victim (White), the 
gender of the victim (female), and the number of victims killed in the crime.  None of 
these variables approach significance and the Pearson’s R2 value of .01 is very low.  In 
order to take into consideration the possible racial interactions between jurors and 
defendants or victims that could impact a juror’s perception of group climate, three 
interactions were added to this model.  Along with the four trial level characteristics, an 
interaction term was added for a Black defendant and a White victim, a Black juror and a 
Black victim, and a Black juror and a Black defendant.  An examination of the results 
shows that the interaction between the race of the juror and the defendant is significant (β 
= -.191, p < .05); in a trial where a Black juror sits in judgment of a Black defendant, 
Black jurors have a more negative perception of group climate.  This third model had a 
Pearson’s R2 value of .02, which while an improvement over the second model, still 
shows low explanatory power. 
 The fourth model examines the impact that jury level characteristics, which serve 
as a proxy for the potential impact of individual characteristics on group level dynamics, 
have on an individual juror’s perception of group climate.  The two variables used in this 
model are the percent of Black jurors serving on each trial and the percent of male jurors 
serving on each trial.  These two variables were chosen because of their potential 
influence on group functioning, based on the research findings by Bowers and his 
colleagues (2001), which suggest that juries with one Black male juror are more likely to 
vote life and juries with at least five male jurors are more likely to vote death.  This 
model also includes a control for the number of jurors from each trial who are in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
cases, the decision was made to include data from jurors who served on cases with a male defendant and 




sample.  The results of this model show that the only variable that is significant is the 
number of jurors who are in the sample (β = -.037, p < .05).  Jurors from juries with a 
higher number of fellow jurors also in the sample report more negative perceptions of 
group climate.  One possible explanation for this is that the more jurors that are in the 
sample from any given jury, the more likely that a broader range of individual 
perceptions will be adequately measured and reported, leading to a lower value of group 
climate.  The Pearson’s R2 value for this model was .01, which is very low. 
 The final model combines the variables from each of the four prior models, in 
order to see which variables retain their significance when individual level and trial level 
predictors are included.  Examination of these results shows that this is the best model of 
the five, with a Pearson’s R2 value of .105.  Many of the variables that were significant in 
the earlier models retain their significance; juror age is significant and in the positive 
direction, indicating that older jurors are more likely to perceive the group climate as 
positive (β = .003, p < .05).  Jewish jurors (β = -.274, p < .05) and jurors who perceive 
more mitigating circumstances to be present are significantly less likely to perceive the 
group climate as positive (β = -.478, p < .01).  Also noteworthy is that in the final model, 
the gender of the juror reaches significance, with female jurors more likely to perceive 
the group climate as negative (β = -.064, p < .05).  The percentage of males on the jury 
also reaches significance, showing that jurors who serve on juries with more males are 
more likely to perceive the group climate as positive (β = .037, p = .10).  The individual’s 
perception of level of heinousness does not reach statistical significance in this model, 




 These results are suggestive of the fact that race may not be as salient of a 
predictor as originally hypothesized.  They also suggest that the role that gender plays in 
jury deliberations and in juror ratings of group climate is stronger than scholars have 
originally thought.  In order to ensure that these findings are robust, a hierarchical linear 
modeling strategy was employed to take into account not only the clustering of these 
data, but also the fact that jurors who are exposed to differing trial characteristics may 
vary in the way that their individual characteristics impact their perception of group 
climate.  The next section details the findings from the hierarchical linear modeling 
techniques, explicitly testing the first six hypotheses set forth in the previous chapter. 
  
Hypothesis 1: Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
 
Hypothesis 1A  
H1A: Perception of the quality of group climate varies between capital juries. 
 
 In order to measure variation between juries, hierarchical linear modeling is 
employed.  By specifying the dependent variable, group climate, to be a function of both 
its intercept and an error term, the unconditional hierarchical linear model is able to 
determine whether or not variation exists between groups.  In order to calculate the 
unconditional model and all subsequent analyses, the statistical program HLM 6.0 was 
used.  The unconditional model examines the cross-jury variations in the individual 
juror’s perception of group climate.  The unconditional model for perception of group 







 Perception of Group Climate = α + r 
where: 
 α = the intercept as measured by mean probability of Y, and 
 r = an error term 
 
 Table 22 reports the results of the unconditional model.  The significant variance 
component for the model intercept indicates that an individual juror’s perception of group 
climate varies significantly across juries.  These results show support for Hypothesis 1A 
and suggest initial evidence that jury level variations may explain some of the individual 
level variation of perception of group climate.  What this model does not do, however, is 
account for the differences in the types of trials that are experienced across juries.  The 
next step is to examine the effect of individual level characteristics on perception of 
group climate while accounting for the trial level differences that the members of each 
jury will experience. 
 In order to account for the impact that trial level differences, such as the race of 
the defendant, will have on the relationship between individual level characteristics and 
the perception of group climate, a regression model that takes into account the variation 
between trials must be specified.  In order to do this using hierarchical linear modeling 




vary based upon the particulars of the trial specific to each juror.  This is known as the 
intercepts and slopes as outcomes model and takes the following form51:  
Perception of Group Climate = α + β1(Black Juror) + β2(Female Juror) + β3(Age)      + 
β4(Education)  + β5(Baptist) + β6(Southern Baptist) + β7(Jewish) + β8(Less than 10K) + 
β9(10K-20K) + β10(20K-30K)  + β11(50K-75K) + β12(More than 75K) + β13(No Response)          
+ β14(Prior) + β15(Foreperson) + β16(Perceptions of Aggravation) + β17(Perceptions of 
Mitigation) + β18(Perceptions of Heinousness) + β19(Perceptions of Defendant 
Demeanor) + r 
 
 where: 
  α = γ00 + γ 01(Black Defendant) + γ 02(White Victim) + γ 03(Female Victim)  
  + γ 04(Number of Victims) + γ 05(Average Aggravation) + γ 06(Average  
  Mitigation) + γ 07(Average Level of Heinousness) + γ 08(Average  
  Defendant Demeanor) + γ 09(Percent Black) + γ 010(Percent Male) + u0 
 
  β1 = γ10 
 
  β2 = γ20 
 
  β3 = γ30 
 
  β4 = γ40 
 
  β5 = γ50 
 
  β6 = γ60 
   
  β7 = γ70 
   
  β8 = γ80 
 
  β9 = γ90 
 
  β10 = γ100 
 
  β11 = γ110 
   
  β12 = γ120 
                                                 
51 In some cases, the second model estimated after the unconditional model would be a random intercepts 
model.  Because I am not specifying that the effects of the individual level characteristics will vary between 
juries, this model is not necessary.  I am hypothesizing that the effect of the individual level characteristics 





  β13 = γ130 
 
  β14 = γ140 
 
  β15 = γ150 
 
  β16 = γ160 
 
  β17 = γ170 
 
  β18 = γ180 
 
  β19 = γ190 
 
 Table 23 reports the results for the slopes and intercepts as outcomes model.  This 
model includes all of the individual level characteristics that could potentially impact an 
individual juror’s perception of climate and includes an error term which accounts for all 
of the trial level characteristics that could mediate the relationship between individual 
level characteristics and perception of group climate.  The individual level characteristics 
included in this model are: race, gender, age, education, religion, and income of juror; the 
juror’s perception of aggravation and mitigation; the juror’s perception of the level of 
heinous of the crime; and, the juror’s perception of the defendant’s demeanor during trial.   
An examination of the coefficients and standard errors of the model shows that 
the results are very similar to those of the ordinary least squares results with robust 
standard errors.  The following sections will examine the results for each hypothesis and 






H1B:  Black jurors who serve on capital trials will be more likely than White 




Hypothesis 1B postulates that Black jurors who serve on capital trials will be 
more likely to perceive the group climate as negative.  While the coefficient for Black 
jurors is in the expected direction, suggesting that Black jurors are more likely to 
perceive the quality of group climate as lower than their White counterparts, it does not 
reach a traditional level of statistical significance (β = -.070, p = .263).  As a result, it is 
necessary to conclude that there is no difference in the perception of group climate 
between Black and White jurors.   
 
Hypothesis 1C 
H1C: The race of the victim will affect the association between the juror’s race 
and the juror’s perception of the quality of group climate.  Black jurors will be 
more likely to perceive the quality of the group climate as negative when the 
victim is Black. 
 
 
 The next hypothesis suggests that the race of the victim will impact the 
relationship between the juror’s race and his/her perception of group climate so that when 
both the juror and the victim are Black, the juror will be more likely to perceive the group 
climate as negative.  In essence, the model suggests that the intercept for the juror’s race 
will change based on the race of the victim.  An examination of the results suggests that 




.008, p = .886).  In these data, the race of the victim does not appear to impact a juror’s 
perception of the group climate.  
 
 Hypothesis 1D 
 
H1D: The race of the defendant will affect the association between the juror’s 
race and the juror’s perception of the quality of group climate.  Black jurors will 
be more likely to perceive the quality of the group climate as negative when the 
defendant is Black. 
 
  
I next hypothesize that the race of the defendant will impact the association 
between the race of the juror and the juror’s perception of group climate, so that Black 
jurors will be more likely to perceive group climate as negative when there is a Black 
defendant.  The coefficient for a Black defendant is non-significant, however (β =-.050, p 
= .184), suggesting that the race of the defendant on trial does not mediate the way that 
individual level characteristics impact an individual juror’s perception of group climate.  
There is no support for this hypothesis. 
 
 Hypothesis 1E 
 
H1E: The combination of the race of the victim and the race of the defendant will 
affect the association between the juror’s race and the juror’s perception of the 
quality of group climate.  Black jurors will be more likely to perceive the quality 




 It was not possible to test this hypothesis using the HLM program, as entering 




not specify the interaction term for a Black defendant and a White victim.  This most 
likely happened due to the small number of cases with Black defendants and White 
victims (only 24.1% of trials had a Black defendant and a White victim), as well as due to 
the fact that the number of jurors in each jury is small.  This makes it difficult for the 
program to estimate the error terms; as such, the evidence for this hypothesis comes from 
the ordinary least squares with robust standard errors analyses, which suggests that there 
is no support for the Hypothesis 1E.  Table 21 reports the results of the ordinary least 
squares regression analysis with robust standard errors.  The co-efficient for the 
interaction term for a Black defendant and a White victim is not significant (β = -.018, p 
= .801). 
 
 Hypothesis 1F 
 
H1F: The percentage of Black jurors on the jury will affect the association 
between the juror’s race and the juror’s perception of the quality of group 
climate.  Black jurors will be more likely to perceive the quality of the group 
climate as positive when there are a higher percentage of Black jurors. 
 
 
 The final hypothesis looks at the impact that the percentage of Black jurors will 
have on an individual juror’s perception of group climate, specifying that Black jurors 
will be more likely to perceive group climate as positive when there is a higher 
percentage of Black jurors serving on the jury.  The coefficient for the percent of Black 
jurors in the level 2 analysis suggests that there is no support for this hypothesis, as the 
percent of Black jurors does not significantly impact the way in which jurors of either 








 There is no support for any of the hypotheses that suggest that differences in 
racial dynamics may explain a juror’s perception of the group climate during jury 
deliberations.  The reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter.  Despite the lack 
of findings related to race, however, there are several noteworthy findings that should be 
discussed.  In these data, the level 1 characteristics that predict an increase in the juror’s 
perception of group climate are the juror’s age, with older jurors more likely to perceive a 
positive group climate, and the juror’s perception of the level of heinousness of the crime, 
with a higher perception of heinousness translating into a more positive perception of 
group climate.  The two level 1 characteristics that significantly predict a more negative 
perception of group climate are if the juror is Jewish and when the juror perceives a 
higher level of mitigating circumstances on the trial.  The one level 2 characteristic that 
predicts to a juror’s perception of group climate is the aggregate level of mitigating 
circumstances in the trial.  The coefficient for the aggregate mitigating circumstances 
shows that as the level of trial mitigating circumstances increases, the individual juror’s 
perception of the group climate during deliberation decreases.  These findings are 
consistent with the findings from the ordinary least squares with robust standard errors 
analyses. 
 Also worth noting is the fact that the coefficient for the gender of the juror, while 
it does not reach traditional levels of significance (β = -.054, p = .08), does suggest that 
women are more likely to perceive the group climate as negative.  While not significant, 




suggest that more exploration of this effect is necessary.  These findings will be discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter. 
 Perhaps the most noteworthy finding of this set of analyses is the low explanatory 
power of the R2 values for each of the models.  These low R2 values can be interpreted to 
be indicative of a poor model; because the explanatory power of these models is low, one 
could reasonably conclude that the variables in the model are doing a poor job of 
explaining what predicts group climate.  Although this does appear to be the case, I 
would caution the reader that this analysis is the first of its kind.  Such low explanatory 
power at this stage of exploratory research is not uncommon and therefore this is not 
cause for alarm.  What these low R2 values suggest is that more investigation is needed to 
more fully understand what variables predict an individual juror’s perception of group 
climate.  Furthermore, the final model, despite R2 = .105, shows that five coefficients are 
significance; in a model of this size (thirty coefficients), only 2 coefficients would be 
expected based on chance.  The fact that five of the thirty coefficients are significant 
suggests that this model does offer an improvement over chance. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Logistic Regression 
H2: Juries with a higher average level of perceived climate will be more likely to 
return a death sentence than those juries with a lower average level of perceived 
group climate, net of trial characteristics. 
 
 Using logistic regression techniques, the second hypothesis seeks to understand 
the impact that jury level characteristics have on the sentencing outcome, specifically 




order to test this hypothesis include both trial level characteristics that would be expected 
to impact a sentence, such as the level of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and 
the jury level characteristics that can potentially have an extralegal effect, such as group 
climate.  The question I seek to answer here is whether the aggregate level of group 
climate can add any explanatory power to those factors that will increase the probability 
of a death outcome.  In order to estimate the probability of a death sentence in these data, 
three models were specified.  The results from each of these models are discussed below.  
The correlation matrix for each of the variables used in the logistic regression, as well as 
their means and standard deviations, can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Model 1: Trial Level Characteristics 
 The first model specifies the trial level characteristics that prior research has 
suggested are important in whether or not a jury returns a death sentence.  The variables 
included in this model are the race of the defendant (Black defendant), the race of the 
victim (White victim), the gender of the victim (female victim), the defendant/victim race 
interaction (Black defendant/White victim), the number of persons killed in the crime, the 
aggregate average scale of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the aggregate 
average juror perception of the level of heinousness of the crime, and the aggregate 
average juror perception of the defendant’s demeanor during the trial.  Many of these 
characteristics as measured in these data are objective facts, such as the race of both the 
defendant and the victim, the gender of the victim, and the number of victims.  Some of 
these measures, however, while based on legal precedent, are subjective measures taken 




 The scales for both the aggregated average aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances fall into this category and are meant to capture the presence of both 
aggravating and mitigating factors on the trial witnessed by each individual jury.  Each 
juror on each trial was asked about the presence of several aggregating and mitigating 
circumstances on the trial which he/she had served; jurors responded ‘Yes’ when the 
factor was present (coded as 1) and ‘No’ when the factor was absent (coded as 0).  As 
previously described, these measures were created by aggregating the information from 
individual jurors into a jury level scale52.  The scales for the level of heinousness and the 
defendant’s demeanor were calculated in the same way; these two scales, however, are 
more indicative of the potential extralegal factors that could impact outcomes than of 
legal factors.  The level of heinous scale was created by asking individual jurors a series 
of questions about their opinion of the gravity of the crime, such as whether the victim 
was made to suffer53.  The defendant demeanor scale asked jurors about the defendant’s 
attitude during the trial, such as whether or not s/he appeared remorseful for the crime54.  
These items are included as trial level characteristics in order to control for the juror’s 
personal attitudes towards the crime and the defendant.   
 The final logistic regression model for the trial level characteristics is:   
 
 
P(Y = Death|X) = 1 / 1 + exp (-α + β1(Race of Victim) + β2(Race of Defendant) + 
β3(Black Defendant and White Victim) + β4(Female Victim) + β5(Number of Victims) + 
β6(Mitigating Factors) + β7(Aggravating Factors) + β8(Level of Heinousness) + 
β9(Defendant Demeanor) 
 
                                                 
52 The individual items used to create the aggravating circumstances scale can be found in Table 9.  The 
individual items used to create the mitigating circumstances scale can be found in Table 10. 
53 Individual items for the level of heinous scale can be found in Table 10. 




 The logistic regression results for this model can be seen in Table 24.  The results 
are generally consistent with what would be expected, with some notable exceptions.  
The racial factors that would be expected to impact outcome, based on prior research 
experience, specifically the race of the defendant and the race of the victim, are not 
significant.  The gender of the victim is also not significant, nor is the level of 
heinousness attributed to the crime.  The presence of aggravating factors, however, does 
significantly predict a death outcome, with a higher value on the scale of aggravating 
circumstances increasing the odds of a death sentence.  The presence of mitigating factors 
predicts to a death sentence in the opposite manner, which is to be expected; a decrease in 
the scale of mitigating circumstances increases the odds of a death sentence.  Similarly, 
the lower the jury’s perception of the defendant’s demeanor during the trial, the more 
likely it is that a death sentence will be returned.  Also expected is that the larger the 
number of victims of the crime, the more likely it is that a death sentence will be 
returned. 
 The explanatory power of this model, reported by Nagelkerke’s pseudo R2 value, 
is .310.  When the predicted probability of a death sentence for this model is calculated, 
the probability of receiving a death sentence when the defendant is Black, the victim is a 
White female, and all other variables are held constant at their mean is .36455.  The 
probability that a defendant received a death sentence when the defendant is White, the 
victim is a White female, and all other variables are held constant at their mean is .360.  
Under these same conditions, but where both the defendant and the victim are Black, the 
                                                 
55 All predicted probabilities were calculated twice.  The first calculation involved using all of the variables 
in the model.  The second calculation involved only those variables which are significant in the model.  
There is very little difference between the two calculations; as such, predicted probabilities reported in the 




probability of a death sentence is .524.  These results appear to contradict the research 
findings which show that cases with a black defendant and a white victim are the most 
likely to result in a death sentence, net of other characteristics.  What these predicted 
probabilities do not take into account, however, is the impact that jury level 




Model 2: Jury Level Characteristics 
 The second model specifies the qualities of the jury that are thought to impact the 
probability of a death sentence.  Based on both qualitative research and group psychology 
research, I hypothesize here that group functioning, as measured by the aggregate group 
climate variable, will predict the probability of a death sentence.  Also included in this 
model are a control variable for the percentage of Black jurors on the jury, a control 
variable for the percentage of male jurors, and a control variable for the number of jurors 
per jury in the sample.   
The final logistic regression model for the jury level characteristics is: 
 
 
P(Y = Death|X) = 1 / 1 + exp (-α + β1(Group Climate) + β2(Percentage Black) + 




 The results for this model are seen in Table 24.  The coefficients show that the 
only variable that significantly predicts to a death sentence is the group climate variable, 
which shows that, as expected, higher values on the group climate scale increase the 




the percentage of Black jurors nor the percentage of male jurors on the jury significantly 
predict sentencing outcome.  One reason for this could be that the aggregate percentage 
of people present on the jury is not a strong enough measure for the interactions that are 
expected to take place between those people present.  Indeed, this points to the fact that 
the group is more than the sum of its parts; this idea will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the following chapter. 
 The explanatory power of this model is lower than the model using just trial level 
variables as predictors to a death sentence; the Nagelkerke pseudo R2 value is .162.  
When predicted probabilities are calculated so that each variable is held at its mean, the 
probability of a death sentence is .56.  These results are suggestive of the potential 
importance of group climate during jury deliberations.  Before any conclusions can be 
drawn, however, it is first necessary to examine the results of the final model. 
  
 
Model 3: Full Model 
 The final model includes all of the variables for both the trial and jury levels.  The 
model specified is: 
 
P(Y = Death|X) = 1 / 1 + exp (-α + β1(Race of Victim) + β2(Race of Defendant) + 
β3(Black Defendant and White Victim) + β4(Female Victim) + β5(Number of Victims) + 
β6(Mitigating Factors) + β7(Aggravating Factors) + β8(Level of Heinousness) + 
β9(Defendant Demeanor) + β10(Group Climate) + β11(Percentage Black) + 




The results for the full model can be seen in Table 24. As would be expected, the 




directions, of a death sentence.  The number of victims is also a significant predictor, 
with cases with more victims more likely to result in a death sentence.  The defendant’s 
demeanor also remains significant, with trials with more sympathetic defendants less 
likely to receive a death sentence.  Similarly, the group climate variable remains 
significant, lending support to the hypothesis that group level characteristics impact death 
sentences, net of trial characteristics.  The other group level predictors, percent black and 
percent male, remain insignificant in the final model, as does the control variable for the 
number of jurors from the jury who are in the sample. 
The explanatory power of the full model is the best of the three, with a 
Nagelkerke R2 value of .404.  The predicted probability of a death sentence in cases with 
a Black defendant, a White female victim, and all other variables held constant at their 
means is .419.  The predicted probability of a death sentence in cases with a White 
defendant, a White female victim, and all other variables held constant at their means is 
.473.  The predicted probability of a death sentence in cases with a Black defendant and a 
Black female victim, with all other variables constant at their means, is .610.  As these 
predicted probabilities show, this final model is able to take into account many of the 
factors that contribute to a death sentence.  Of considerable interest, however, is the 
predictive power of the group climate variable; when this variable is removed from the 
final model, the probability of getting a death sentence in cases with a Black defendant 
and a White female victim decreases to .00035.  The ramifications of the importance of 












To date, the research on sentencing outcomes in capital trials has focused 
exclusively on the ways in which either individual level characteristics or case level 
variables have influenced sentencing outcomes.  The goal of this investigation was to 
expand upon previous research findings and examine the way that group functioning 
during jury deliberations may impact sentences.  The impact of group functioning, 
defined here as the group climate during jury deliberation, was explored using a two-step 
approach.  The first step was to examine how those individual and case level 
characteristics that have been previously found to significantly impact capital trial 
outcomes potentially influence the group climate.  The second step was to examine what 
impact the jury level of group climate has on final sentencing outcomes.  In this way, I 
have confirmed my hypothesis that the group climate mediates the relationship between 
the static individual and trial level characteristics and the sentencing outcome.   
This relationship can best be understood by examining the visual representation in 
Figure 2.  By examining only individual and case level characteristics, previous research 
on capital jury deliberations is unable to look at the impact that group dynamics may 
have on outcomes.  Jury deliberation by its nature is a dynamic group process, one where 
twelve individuals are asked to work together in order to come up with a unanimous 
decision about the guilt and where necessary, the punishment meted out to the defendant.  




the legal system has in essence recognized that the group dynamic is an important part of 
the process.  Until recently, however, research has been unable to tap into the dynamic 
nature of jury deliberations, instead focusing on the static variables previously described.  
As seen in Figure 2, I hypothesize that those static variables, specifically those related to 
the demographic characteristics of the individual juror, act on sentencing outcomes 
through the process of group climate.  My findings suggest that individual level 
characteristics may not have the direct effect on sentencing outcome that has been found 
in previous research.  Trial level characteristics, in turn, are interpreted by the juror, 
based on his/her personal experiences brought to deliberations, and then impact how that 
juror will interact with the others on the jury.  Trial level characteristics, furthermore, can 
have an independent impact on sentencing outcomes, as certain legal factors will guide 
jurors towards one decision or the other.  Such a model of capital jury decision-making 
can incorporate what is currently known about jury deliberations while also expanding 
our inquiry into the role that the group, envisioned as more than just the sum of its parts, 
can independently have on outcomes. 
One key question addressed in these analyses is what is the best way to measure 
group climate?  Research in the fields of organizational and industrial psychology 
provides guidance.  In studies of workgroups, group climate has been measured by 
looking at levels of cohesion and cooperation in the group, the amount of conflict present, 
and how the group members evaluate one another.  In these analyses, constructs were 
borrowed from this line of research in order to create a global measure of group climate.  
This global measure of group climate incorporated how the jurors felt about one another, 




deliberation process.  The questions used to create the group climate scale are similar to 
questions used in studies of workgroups, most notably Seashore’s (1954) study of 
cohesion in men working in factory groups and Kivlighan and Tarrant’s (2001) study of 
group climate during therapeutic group sessions for adolescents.  Principal components 
analysis confirmed that the questions factored together and the reliability of the scale was 
strong (α = .71). 
The results of the logistic regression models indicate that the group dynamics of 
the jury do independently impact the probability of a death sentence.  In trials where the 
jurors report a more favorable perception of group climate, there is a higher probability 
that the sentence will be death.  This relationship endures regardless of the characteristics 
of the crime, such as the presence of aggravation or mitigation, or racial interactions, 
such as the race of the defendant and the victim.  This robust finding emphasizes the 
importance of examining our assumptions about the capital jury deliberation process.  
These findings also suggest that the group is more than the sum of its parts; measuring 
group climate is the first step to understanding what is ultimately appears to be a much 
more dynamic process than has been previously understood.  The only other variable that 
significantly increases the probability of a death sentence is the number of victims of the 
crime, a legally relevant variable that should be expected to impact sentencing outcome.  
Defendant demeanor, on the other hand, decreases the probability of a death sentence, 
suggesting that jurors show mercy to defendants who appear remorseful.  In addition, is 
support of previous research (see Brewer, 2003), defendant demeanor decreases the 
probability of a death sentence, suggesting that jurors are more likely to be receptive to 




The first step in understanding how group climate may impact sentencing 
outcomes is to examine the factors that impact group climate.  Analyses of the factors 
predicting to a juror’s perception of group climate suggest that many of the individual 
juror level factors that previous research suggests impacts sentencing outcome, such as 
religion, may be more suited to the prediction of group climate.  Jurors who are Jewish, 
for example, are more likely to perceive the group climate to be negative.  Prior research 
suggests that Jewish jurors are more likely to disagree with statements about capital 
punishment (see Cowan et al., 1984; Ellsworth and Gross, 1994).  It is possible to 
surmise, therefore, that Jewish jurors perceive the group climate as more negatively 
because they do not want to vote for a death sentence, but feel pressure or resentment 
from other jurors during deliberation.  Similarly, the finding for Baptist jurors (p<.10) 
suggests that they are more likely to perceive the group climate as positive.  Studies of 
Southern Baptist jurors (see Eisenberg et al., 2001) suggest that they are both more likely 
to vote for the death penalty and more likely to have pro-capital punishment beliefs.  
Although Southern Baptists and Baptists do differ in doctrine, these two religions share 
similar attitudes towards social issues, leading this author to surmise that the findings 
between these analyses and prior research are consistent.   
The investigation of the relationship between previously identified characteristics 
that predict sentencing outcome and the perception of group climate also found that the 
juror’s perception of the presence of mitigating circumstances in the trial had a 
statistically significant impact on his/her perception of the group climate.  Jurors who 
perceived there to be more mitigating factors in a trial were more likely to have a more 




individual level, with an individual juror’s perception of the presence of mitigation 
predicting his/her perception of group climate, and at the trial level, with those trials that 
have more mitigating circumstances identified.  In both cases, jurors were more likely to 
perceive that the group climate was negative.  One potential explanation for this 
relationship is that when mitigation is present, more debate about the proper punishment 
ensues.  Jurors may disagree about a sentencing outcome because of the confusion of the 
role that mitigating factors should play in the decision-making process.  Eisenberg and 
Wells (1993) find that jurors tend to apply the burden of proof of beyond a reasonable 
doubt to mitigating factors, whereas the law states that only aggravating factors must 
meet such a high burden of proof.  When mitigating factors are present, therefore, jurors 
may be more likely to argue over the sentencing outcome or other aspects of the 
deliberation, making jurors who serve on those trials feel more negatively towards their 
experience. 
 Two other findings are worthy of discussion.  The first is the finding that a juror’s 
gender predicts his or her perception of group climate.  While this relationship did not 
reach traditional levels of significance in the hierarchical linear models (β = -.054, p = 
.08), it is significant in the ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors.  
Furthermore, the direction of the relationship is the same in both models; women are 
more likely to perceive that the group climate is negative when compared to men.  In 
studies of death penalty attitudes, women are less likely to support capital punishment 
(Ellsworth and Gross, 1994; Fitzgerald and Ellsworth, 1984; Haney et al., 1994); as such, 
women on capital juries may be more likely to perceive the group functioning as negative 




 This finding is interesting in light of the results on the percentage of men on the 
jury in predicting an individual juror’s perception of group climate.  When there are more 
men serving on the jury, the individual juror’s perception of group climate is more 
positive.  Such a result can be interpreted in one of two ways.  It is possible that this 
finding is just an aggregate of the finding for female jurors; male jurors perceive the 
group climate more positively than do female jurors, therefore having more male jurors 
means a more positive perception of group climate.  It is also possible that interactions 
occur differently depending on the gender composition of the jury; this is suggested by 
the fact that the gender composition only impacts the perception of group climate and 
does not predict sentence outcome.  When juries have more men serving on them, men 
may be more likely to keep deliberations focused on the task at hand, as men tend to be 
more results oriented than are women (see Tannen, 1990) thereby eliminating potential 
discussions that could lead to disagreement between jurors.   
One potential explanation for the difference in the ways that men and women 
perceive group climate is that men and women communicate with one another 
differently, a difference that is playing itself out during deliberations.  Women approach 
disagreement differently than men; women tend to work towards compromise, whereas 
men are more interested in the actual outcome (Tannen, p. 25, 1990).  Sentencing 
deliberations require that all of the jurors work together to come up with an appropriate 
outcome.  Inherent differences in the way that men and women communicate could be 
playing out so that women are more focused on the process of coming to agreement over 
the sentence, while men are more focused on the actual sentence.  When asked about the 




which could have potentially been a contentious one, and answer their questions about 
group climate based on their interaction experiences, explaining why women are more 
likely to perceive the group climate as negate.  Men, on the other hand, may be answering 
the questions about the group climate based on their satisfaction with the outcome, not 
based on the interactions during deliberation.  It is possible that for men, what is being 
measured in their satisfaction with the outcome, not their perception of group dynamics.  
Future directions for ways to further examine this relationship will be examined in the 
last section of this chapter. 
Finally, it is important to note the lack of racial effects in these data.  Contrary to 
my hypotheses, race did not predict a juror’s perception of group climate, nor did racial 
characteristics of the jury, the defendant, or the victim predict the sentencing outcome.  
This is not consistent with prior research finings; Bowers and his colleagues (2001; 
Bowers et al., 2004) have found the presence of a Black male on the jury will decrease 
the probability of a death sentence, whereas the presence of several White males on the 
jury will increase the probability of a death sentence.  Other investigations have 
suggested that trials with a Black defendant and a White victim are more likely to end in 
a death sentence (see Baldus et al., 1998).  Neither of these findings is supported with 
these data. 
One potential explanation for this finding is rooted in new research about the 
ability of jurors to understand and respond to aggravation and mitigation in trials 
(Brewer, 2004).  It is possible that racial characteristics do not operate through group 
climate, as previously suggested, but operate through other trial characteristics, such as 




he/she is receptive to aggravating and mitigating factors in trials with a same race 
defendant.  Race, therefore, is still a salient issue, but is operating in a different way than 
has been hypothesized here.  The presence of mitigation does predict an individual’s 
perception of group climate; it is possible, therefore, that there is a three path process 
being played out, with racial interactions impacting a juror’s receptivity to mitigation, 
mitigation in turn impacting a juror’s perception of group climate during deliberations, 
and the jury’s aggregate perception of group climate impacting the sentencing outcome.  
This is consistent with the research in organizational psychology, where theories 
explicitly reject the notion that an individual’s demographic characteristics, such as race 
and gender, will directly impact the group interactions (Jehn et al., 1999).  Instead, this 
line of inquiry proposes that diversity in individual level characteristics leads to diversity 
in perspective, which can be interpreted as leading to diversity in the ways that jurors 
would interpret aggravation and mitigation.  More research is needed in order to better 
understand these indirect relationships. 
 The results of the current investigation offer much in terms of new lines of inquiry 
in the study of capital juries.  The role that the group dynamics play in impacting 
sentencing outcomes is very strong in these analyses; the assertion that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts (Watts, p. 24, 2004) appears to be a very salient one in 
the issue of jury deliberations.  The last section will detail the ways in which future 
research can work to increase our understanding of the role that group interactions play in 









 Issues of Juror Recall 
 One limitation of this investigation is the possibility that jurors’ recall of the 
events of their capital trial has been diminished because of the passage of time between 
the trial and the interview; on average, jurors were interviewed approximately one to two 
years after their trial experiences (Foglia, 2003).  This raises several issues about the 
reliability of the jurors’ responses.  The first is the issue of juror recall: were jurors able 
to accurately remember their trial experiences, particularly the experiences during 
deliberation?  Prior research on this topic suggests that despite the time lapse between the 
capital jury experience and the interview, jurors are remembering the experience.  One 
reason for this is that serving on a capital trial is a very salient experience for jurors, 
suggesting that they are more likely to remember the details.  This has been corroborated 
by jurors’ own admission of recall of the capital jury experience, where the majority of 
respondents indicate that they remember all stages of the trial either “Very Well” or 
“Fairly Well56.”  Interviews with jurors also suggest that the capital trial experience was 
mentally taxing on them, in that they felt vested in the responsibility of making a 
punishment decision.  Research also suggests that individuals are more likely to 
remember an experience when they had actively worked with information, as opposed to 
passively listened to information (Meyers and Jones, 1993).   
 The time lapse between the trial and the interview also raises the potential 
for a juror to have modified their interpretation of the events that occurred during the 
                                                 




trial.  For instance, a juror who had been undecided about capital punishment prior to 
his/her experience on a capital trial but voted for a death sentence may have reframed 
his/her beliefs so that they are aligned with his/her death vote.  It is also possible that 
jurors have reframed their experiences to feel more positive about them; some 
psychological research suggests that with time, people are more likely to minimize the 
negative and accentuate the positive (Wood and Conway, 2006).  Such retrospective 
reconstruction could be responsible for the fact that many of the individual perceptions of 
group climate are clustered towards the more positive end of the distribution.  Jurors may 
be more prone to reconstruct their experiences positively because it makes it easier for 
them to remember the trial.   
Unfortunately, there is no way to know how much reconstruction may be 
occurring in these data.  One way that Foglia (2003) was able to examine the role of 
reframing in a sample of Pennsylvania jurors was to ask respondents whether their 
opinions about capital punishment had changed as a result of their capital trial 
experience.  Eighty-eight percent of respondents said that their feelings had not changed, 
indicating that, in general, their beliefs at the time of the interview are consistent with 
their beliefs during their jury service.  Jurors in this sample were not asked this question, 
so their responses cannot be compared.  The risk of reconstruction, however, is 
minimized by the fact that half of the sample served on a trial that ended in a life sentence 
and half ended in a death sentence.  At this time, there is no reason to expect that jurors 
on a life trial and those on a death trial would differentially reconstruct their experiences.  




 Other potential limitations related to asking jurors questions about their 
experiences after the fact are that jurors may not be able to understand the complex 
cognitive processes that led to their decision-making, making it difficult for them to 
articulate their reasons for a verdict, and that jurors may be concerned with the social 
desirability of their answers to sensitive questions, making them more likely to censor 
themselves (Costanzo and Costanzo, 1992).  This research limited analyses to the close-
ended questions on the interview instrument, so that jurors were guided in their answers 
to the questions of interest.  As a result, the inability of jurors to adequately describe 
complex cognitive processes is not so much a limitation for this research as it is for any 
future research wishing to investigate more fully the relationship between individual 
characteristics and juror perception of group functioning.  The potential for jurors 
censoring themselves, however, is a potential problem for these data, as jurors were asked 
to answer several questions about race and other sensitive issues.  This is not a problem 
in the current research as it pertains to the measurement of an individual juror’s 
perception of group climate, as the questions asked about the jurors’ trial experiences are 
rather straightforward.  It is possible, however, that a juror’s desire to answer in a socially 
acceptable fashion impacts his/her memory of the presence of aggravating and mitigating 
factors, such that jurors who returned a death sentence may be more likely to remember 
or possibly exaggerate aggravating factors as a way to explain to the interviewer why a 
death sentence was necessary.  There is no way at this time to test this assertion, although 
future research can address this by comparing the factual information about the trial that 




 Although issues such as recall and reframing could potentially bias these data, 
they are not problems that are insurmountable.  Because several jurors were interviewed 
in each trial, juror responses could be corroborated with one another; it was very rare for 
the juror responses on factual information to be different between jurors serving on the 
same trial.  In those cases where there was a discrepancy, however, there was information 
from at least one other juror from whom consensus about the events could be gained.  
This lends credibility to the assertion that the responses are indeed accurate. 
 
 Measurement 
 Another potential limitation comes from the fact that the scale used to measure 
the individual juror’s perception of group climate was not designed originally for this 
purpose.  The measures that were used to create the group climate scale were chosen 
from the instrument based on their similarity to items used in prior research on group 
functioning (see for example, Kivlighan and Tarrant, 2001; Seashore, 1954).  In order to 
ensure that the items chosen were appropriate to measure the construct, principal 
components analysis was undertaken.  An examination of the results of the principal 
components analysis from the original fifteen variables hypothesized to be indicative of 
group climate suggested that only ten of the fifteen variables merited inclusion in the 
scale.  Although the group climate scale has proven reliable in the current analyses (α = 
.71), it is still possible that a better measure can be derived, if not from these data than in 
future research on this topic.  Examination of the robustness of this measure of an 
individual juror’s perception of group climate is especially important in light of the fact 




sentencing outcome, with juries with higher levels of perception of group climate being 
more likely to return a death sentence.  Continued research as to the robustness of this 
measure will validate the findings reported here as well as potentially create interesting 
new avenues for future research. 
 Several avenues can be explored as potential ways to improve on the measure of 
group climate.  One way to enhance our understanding of group climate would be to 
create questions that are more strongly tied to the measures of group functioning that 
have been identified in the organizational psychology literature, such as group cohesion, 
group cooperation, and group conflict.  By including questions designed to tap into the 
specific constructs that make up group climate, a more nuanced scale could help improve 
our understanding of what aspects of group climate most strongly predict sentencing 
outcome.  The current study, by virtue of its exploratory nature, uses a unidimensional 
scale to measure the perception of group climate but future research would benefit by 
using a multidimensional approach.  A multidimensional approach would allow both for 
an understanding of how traditional constructs of group climate predict sentencing 
outcome as well as examine whether there are other aspects of group climate that may be 
important for understanding the dynamics of jury deliberations. 
 The dynamic nature of the group climate during deliberations can also be 
measured by exploring the role that relationships between jurors have on sentencing 
outcome.  Relationships can be examined by asking a juror to identify those fellow jurors 
who had important contributions to the discussion or those fellow jurors who shaped 
his/her decision-making behavior.  The types and qualities of the relationships that are 




outcome, especially in circumstances where jurors feel more comfortable and more 
respected.  Data currently being collected in the third phase of the Capital Jury Project 
will potentially be able to answer some of these questions, as the respondents are being 
asked to nominate influential jurors, describe those jurors who dominated the discussion, 
and identify those jurors whose opinions mattered to him/her.  Future research using 
these newly collected data will examine the role that relationships play in broadening our 
understanding of group climate during jury deliberations and potentially yield stronger 
ways to measure the group climate. 
 Another way to enhance our understanding of group climate would be to utilize 
an objective measure of group climate as opposed to a subjective one.  The current group 
climate variable is operationalized so that it measures an individual juror’s perception of 
the group climate during jury deliberations, as opposed to the actual climate during jury 
deliberations.  An objective measure of group climate during deliberations could only be 
obtained through the process of observing deliberations; although it is not possible to 
observe actual juries in the act of deliberation, mock trial experiments could be designed 
such that observation was possible.  Objective measures of group climate would include 
the tone of voice and the choice of words by jurors, the direction of the flow of 
conversation during deliberations, and the amount of time spent on certain subjects 
during the course of deliberations, such as those subjects that appear to be more 
controversial to the jurors (i.e. the application of aggravating and mitigation 
circumstances to the sentencing decision).  Such objective measures of group climate 
could be used to determine whether deliberations pattern themselves in any way and 




 The issue of measurement is also very important with regards to the use of the 
variables for the percent of Black jurors and the percent of Male jurors as a proxy for 
interpersonal dynamics on the jury.  The research on the role that race plays in capital 
jury deliberations suggest that some type of interpersonal interaction occurs between 
members of the jury and that race may impact this interaction (see, for example, Bowers 
et al., 2001; Fluery-Steiner, 2002).  Expanding on the work of Bowers and his colleagues 
(Bowers et al., 2002), this research attempts to use the percent of Black jurors and the 
percent of male jurors serving on a jury as a way to model this interaction, the reasoning 
being that on trials with more Black jurors, group dynamics may behave differently than 
on trials with fewer black jurors.  The same rationale can be applied to the role that the 
percentage of males on the jury plays in determining sentencing outcome.  What this 
measurement assumes, however, is that these percentages will act as a reasonable proxy 
by which to measure interactional dynamics.  This assumption is a risky one, as it 
underestimates the complexities of measuring interpersonal interaction.  The lack of 
significant findings for these variables emphasizes that future research needs to find 
better ways to measure interaction, as well as better ways to investigate the role that 
individual level characteristics like race play in this interaction. 
 This limitation, however, does not lessen the results of the current investigation; if 
anything, the importance of the role that a jury’s average perception of group climate 
plays in impacting sentencing outcome suggests that more research focusing on group 
interactions is needed.  What the current research does is eliminate some of the potential 




emphasizes the need for further exploration of how these interactions can be measured 
dynamically. 
 
 A Representative Sample 
 The sampling procedures utilized in the collection of these data were rigorous and 
well designed.  Once the states for inclusion were chosen and the eligible capital 
punishment cases were identified, a randomized sampling technique was employed to 
maximize the probability that each juror had an equal chance of selection into the final 
sample.  The rigors of sampling selection, however, do not preclude sampling bias, as 
every juror had the right to refuse to be interviewed.  What is unknown is whether those 
jurors who refused to be interviewed are any different than those who did agree to the 
interview.  Ideally, there are no differences between the two groups and any 
generalizations made from these data can be applied to all capital jurors.  Experience 
holds, however, that this is most likely not the case.   
 This author had the opportunity to be involved in a third wave of data collection 
for the Capital Jury Project, where data was collected from jurors serving on capital trials 
in the state of Maryland.  For one trial, six jurors were interviewed about their 
experiences.  All six of these jurors mentioned that there was one Black male juror who 
had a significant impact on the sentencing outcome, as he had told his fellow jurors that 
he would not vote for a guilty verdict if they had planned to vote for a death sentence.  
The six jurors interviewed all suggested that the life sentenced meted out in that trial was 
the result of his insistence on not voting for guilty unless the life sentence was 
guaranteed.  Repeated efforts to interview this juror, however, were in vain.  No incentive 




Black jurors were interviewed from that trial.  If this juror’s refusal to participate in the 
study is similar to the refusal of other Black jurors to participate, the sampling bias would 
act in such a way as to homogenize the rest of the respondents, as Black jurors with 
strong beliefs are not included in this sample.  This could also explain the lack of any 
direct racial effects on perception of group climate or sentencing outcome in these data.  
Those Black jurors who do agree to be interviewed potentially share attitudes similar to 
those White jurors who agree to be interviewed, negating any racial effects that may exist 
during the process of actual deliberations (see also Cowan, et al., 1984; Haney, Hurtado, 
and Vega, 1994).   
 The sample is potentially biased in another way, although not as the result of 
sampling procedures.  Research on death qualification suggests that those Black jurors 
who are placed on a capital jury are more likely to share the attitudes of their White 
counterparts due to the fact that they support the death penalty, or at least are willing to 
enforce the death penalty.  Haney (1981) suggests that the voir dire process works to 
eliminate racial differences among jurors in capital cases, as all jurors involved must fit a 
certain criteria.  Black jurors and White jurors are therefore the same by virtue of their 
belief system.  The lack of racial differences in these data could be indicative of the way 
that the death qualification process has been designed, so that differences among jurors 
are eliminated.  This could explain why there are no racial effects for these data, despite 
the racial differences found between Blacks and Whites in jury simulations and mock 
trial research, as well as in studies of capital punishment attitudes.  Should this be the 
case, however, the findings here would be indicative of the capital trial process, as those 




chosen to sit on a capital jury.  The question still remains, however, as to whether these 
Black individuals are representative of Black individuals in the greater population.  This 




 The Role of Gender 
 The current research raises some interesting questions about the potential impact 
of the role of gender in capital jury deliberations.  Prior research suggests that at the level 
of a capital trial, gender is not a factor in decision-making (Bowers et al., 2001), despite 
what is known about the relationship between gender and capital punishment attitudes.  
One reason for the lack of a relationship in prior studies could be that, although women 
are more likely than men to disapprove of capital punishment (see Ellsworth and Gross, 
1994), the process of death qualification during voir dire minimizes these differences by 
eliminating all jurors, male and female, that are inclined to oppose the death penalty 
(Haney, 1981; Haney, Hurtado, and Vega, 1994).  The lack of difference on capital 
punishment attitudes could explain why research to date has not found any significant 
differences in the role that gender has on sentencing outcome.  The emphasis on group 
interactions in the current investigation, however, changes the focus from attitudes to 
interpersonal skills.  This new emphasis opens the door for gender differences to emerge 
in the study of how group functioning impacts sentencing outcome. 
 Communication research suggests that men and women communicate differently, 




(Tannen, 1990).  This difference appears to be playing out in the ways that men and 
women perceive the group climate during jury deliberation, a variable that in turn 
predicts to the probability of a sentencing outcome.  Tannen (1990) points out that 
women are more likely than men to view interaction based on the experience with others, 
whereas men are more likely to view interaction in terms of a goal.  In the case of capital 
jury deliberations, therefore, women may be more likely to answer questions about the 
group climate using their experiences during deliberation as their anchor, while men may 
be more likely to describe their perceptions of group climate based on their satisfaction 
with the outcome.   
 Similar research also finds that men and women behave differently during 
interactions.  In their summary of the findings related to gender and interaction, 
Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1999) point out that men and women have different 
conversational styles and goals; these different styles are potentially being played out 
over the course of jury deliberations.  For instance, women are more likely than men to 
express agreement and are also less likely to be assertive (p. 260).  In terms of the current 
study, women’s tendency to be more unsure and deferential during conversation may 
make their recollections of their experiences more negative in those cases where there are 
more men on the jury, as men tend to be more direct in their conversational style (p. 261).  
Men, furthermore, are more likely to interrupt women during mixed-sex interactions (p. 
261) and more likely to talk more in mixed-sex groups (p. 263), which could also 
increase the likelihood that women perceive the group climate as negative.  Women may 
feel undervalued during jury deliberations and may feel that their contributions are not 




between men and women, which could explain why men perceive higher levels of group 
climate than do women. 
Such findings from other fields, combined with the current results, point to the 
importance of the effects of gender differences during interactions and their subsequent 
impact on jury deliberations.  Future research needs to integrate what is known in the 
field of communications to what we know about the process of jury deliberations.  In 
doing so, the role that gender plays in the final sentencing outcome can be better explored 
and an understanding of how these differences impact capital punishment deliberations 
and capital punishment sentencing outcomes can be more fully investigated.  The current 
findings show that the average level of group climate on a jury is one of the strongest 
predictors of sentencing outcome; gendered differences in the perception of group 
climate offer one clear route by which to understand the ways that discretion in capital 
trials is operationalized and leads to an uneven application of the death penalty. 
   
 Measuring Consensus 
The results of this research underscore the importance of examining capital jury 
deliberations as a function of group interactions.  The findings here indicate that the 
average level of the perception of group climate predicts sentencing outcome, with higher 
levels of group climate increasing the probability of a death sentence, net of trial 
characteristics.  What the current research is not able to determine, however, is why a 
more positive perception of group climate increases the probability of a death sentence.  
One reasons for this could be that in trials with obvious aggravating factors, jurors tend to 




deliberation climate more positively and are also more likely to vote for a death sentence 
due to the trial characteristics.  In this way, the average perception of group climate could 
be a proxy for the role that aggravating factors play in determining sentencing outcomes. 
This explanation does not take into account that jurors could also just as easily 
come to consensus about a life sentence, as instead it assumes that consensus must be 
equivalent to a death sentence.  Although this assumption is supported in some of the 
literature, such as the work of Sandys (1995), which suggests that jurors are often willing 
to switch their vote from death to life in order to avoid a hung jury and thus no 
punishment, it is still an empirical question that has not been addressed in the current 
analyses.  If jurors are switching their votes from death to life in order to placate other 
jurors and ensure some form of punishment, it is possible that the group interactions on 
these juries could be perceived as more negative, since jurors are not in agreement.  One 
way to test this would be to compare the perception of group climate of those juries 
where the first vote was the same as the final vote to those juries who had to deliberate in 
order to reach consensus.  The data for such analyses are available and it is the goal of 
this author to next examine the relationship between consensus and group climate in an 
effort to better understand the way that group climate impacts sentencing outcome. 
 
 The Jury as the Group 
 The results of these analyses underscore the importance of treating the jury as a 
group phenomenon instead of as a sum of individuals.  The impact of the average level of 
group climate on sentencing outcomes suggests that a group level of explanation can 
increase our understanding of the factors by which capital trials are decided.  Such an 




behavior, which focus on the patterns of interactions among groups and individuals (p. 
54).  The study of jury deliberations must encompass both the individual level of 
explanation for behavior, as was accomplished here by examining the impact that 
demographic characteristics have on an individual’s perception of group climate, and this 
micro sociological level of explanation for behavior, which will allow us to examine the 
impact of group dynamics on outcomes.  This was attempted here by examining the role 
that the average level of group climate had on sentencing outcomes.  Such an 
investigation takes into consideration how individual and group level characteristics 
interact in a dynamic fashion to produce outcomes.  Without this focus, any study of jury 
deliberations is just a study of what individual people who served on juries think; there is 
no way to examine how the actual jury operates. 
 Wirth (1939) suggests that the collective activities of a society, such as language 
and religion, cannot be understood as merely a collection of the traits of those individuals 
who make up the society.  Rather, the collective identity of the group must be understood 
in terms of the interactions of the individual who make up that group; such interactions 
create and sustain culture.  Similarly, a jury cannot be understood as simply the collection 
of traits attached to individual jurors.  A jury is by definition a group commanded to 
interact with one another; these interactions, even on their small scale, create and sustain 
the group climate that in turn leads to sentencing outcomes.  In order to better understand 
the process by which decisions leading to those outcomes work, it is necessary to 
understand the dynamics that occur during these interactions.   
 The measure of group climate used here is the first way to begin to understand the 




suggested that group dynamics in some way, operationalized here as climate or 
functioning, does impact outcomes, net of individual level characteristics.  Such a finding 
gives credibility to Short’s (1985) contention that there is an intermediate level of 
explanation, one that goes beyond the individual level of understanding but is not yet of 
the macro sociological level of understanding.  A micro sociological level of explanation 
is one focused on the development of patterns and how these patterns can explain larger 
phenomena (p. 54).  The research to date on jury deliberations does suggest that patterns 
have emerged; these patterns have only been studied at the individual level, leaving a gap 
in what is known about how juries work.  This gap must be addressed by switching our 
focus from the individual to the group.   
 Using the percent of Black jurors and the percent of male jurors were other ways 
that this research attempted to understand group dynamics; they proved to be poor 
measures and as such should inform future research on this topic.  One reason that these 
measures proved to be poor could be that they are only aggregate measures of individual 
level characteristics; using such aggregates to explain group level phenomena ignores the 
notion of the group as distinct from the collection of individuals.  The fact that these 
measures did not explain sentencing outcomes in capital trials emphasizes the fact that 
the interactions of those individuals within the group matter.  The aggregate level of any 
individual characteristics is just that – an individual level characteristic.  Group 
interactions must be measured in more sensitive and dynamic ways in order to understand 
how a group operates in ways that are different from the individuals who make up the 
group, just as we have begun to understand how a society is different than the sum of 







 The issues surrounding capital sentencing outcomes, while certainly lending for 
interesting scholarly exercises, also have serious implications for the legal practice of 
capital punishment.  Capital punishment, as the most severe punishment that can be 
inflicted upon a defendant by a court, requires the state to ensure that it be delivered with 
the most extreme levels of caution and deliberateness.  One way that the states have   
attempted to instill this level of caution is through the enactment of guided sentencing 
statutes, meant to purge the arbitrariness that was identified in Furman v. Georgia.57 
These statutes were designed to assist juries in coming up with the most appropriate 
sentencing option; as such, these statutes underscored the importance of the role that the 
jury played in the capital punishment decision-making process.  The United States 
Supreme Court has recently amplified the importance that the jury plays in this process in 
their ruling in Ring v. Arizona58, where the Court specified that all sentencing decisions 
for capital trials must be returned by a jury.  Prior to this ruling, some states (such as 
Florida) allowed juries to offer only advisory sentences, with judges making the final 
determination of the appropriate sentence.  Now, however, the task of the jury is even 
more high stakes, as there are no longer any safeguards to ensure that the proper legal 
decision has been made.  This ruling, taking in conjunction with the fact that research to 
date still suggests that the death penalty is unequally applied, emphasizes the importance 
of understanding the processes by which such sentencing decisions are made.   
                                                 
57 Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972) 





 Despite a vested interest in ensuring that capital punishment is meted out in a fair 
and Constitutional manner, the U.S. Supreme Court has not once addressed the issue of 
what happens when a group of people are asked to come to a unanimous decision about 
the life of another human being (Haney, 1995; Hans, 1995).  Instead, the Court has 
focused on the issue of ensuring equal representation of individuals on a jury, such as in 
its efforts to make sure that Blacks and women are fairly represented in both the jury pool 
and on juries.  They have patently refused, however, to focus on the way that these 
individuals may interact so that the jury as a whole acts differently than would be 
expected if the jury were only the sum of its parts (see Hans, 1995).  The current research 
has shown that such consideration is necessary if we are to better understand the process 
of jury deliberation in capital trials and ensure that the deliberation ends in fair 
application of the death penalty.  These results suggest that the arbitrariness that should 
have been purged from the decision-making process by virtue of the guided discretion 
statutes has not disappeared; rather, it has moved to a different part of the process during 
the course of jury deliberations.  The logistic regression results show that the level of 
group climate is one of the strongest predictors of a sentencing outcome, with juries 
experiencing higher levels of perceived group climate more likely to sentence a defendant 
to death.  The impact of group climate remains even when legally relevant factors, such 
as the level of aggravation and mitigation, are included in the model.  It appears that 
group dynamics, something that has not been addressed by the Court to date, may impact 
the ways in which discretion is operationalized and then applied; such a possibility needs 
to be considered more closely, as the level of group functioning is not a factor addressed 




outcomes is strong, suggesting both a need for further study and a need for extreme 
caution in the application of the death penalty. 
 The current research also emphasizes the need to understand group interactions as 
more than just a sum of individual actions.  Juries work together to come to a decision, in 
most cases one of the most weighty decisions they will ever be asked to make during 
their lifetime, but the members of the jury do not act in a vacuum to make this decision.  
Rather, they rely on the experiences and perspectives of each other, as well as the social 
cues they receive from other participants in the trial, like lawyers and judges (see Haney, 
1981).  This interplay of personal background and group interactions is one that future 
research must address in order to better understand the process by which capital 
punishment decisions are made.  The results of this research, for instance, suggest that 
men and women may interpret their experiences differently, which in turn leads to 
differing outcomes dependent upon the gender composition of the jury.  Similarly, the 
work of Brewer (2004) suggests that Blacks and Whites may vary in their receptivity to 
mitigation in a trial; the importance that the role of mitigation plays in determining 
sentencing outcomes requires that such differences be further explored.  Without a better 
understanding of whether or not the U.S. Supreme Court has indeed reached its goal and 
the causes of arbitrariness in capital punishment have been purged, we as a society may 
be fooling ourselves into thinking that the safeguards we are taking to ensure fair 
application of the death penalty are enough. 
 The study of capital punishment lends itself well to policy recommendations, 
although such recommendations must exhibit great care, given the controversial nature of 




capital punishment is still being meted out in an uneven manner, points to the need for 
the abolition of capital punishment.  Arbitrariness and capriciousness still exist; the 
current analyses have identified at least one source of this arbitrariness.  Groups interact 
in ways that are still being examined by scholars; juries, as one type of group, deserve 
special attention because of the decision with which they are tasked.  Until there is a 
stronger understanding of the ways that jurors work together to come to a sentencing 
decision, as an examination of these results suggests that these decisions are not based on 
the facts of the trial alone, leaving a capital punishment decision to a jury is still akin to 
leaving this decision to fate.  As such, it is our responsibility to advocate that this 
punishment be halted until we can understand the process by which it is made.  Until that 









Table 1: Sentencing Guidelines by State* 
 
 Forms of Guided Discretion 
Definition of Capital 
Homicide Threshold Balancing with Sentencing Directed 
  Advisory Binding  
Narrow VA AL CA, LA TX 
Traditional GA, KY, SC FL, IN NC, PA, TN, MO  
 




Table 2: Number of Jurors per Trial 
 
 
 Frequency % 
3 Jurors 64 26.2 
4 Jurors 140 57.4 
5 Jurors 27 11.1 
6 Jurors 11 4.5 
7 Jurors 1 .4 
8 Jurors 1 .4 
   





Table 3: Sentencing Outcome by State 
 
 Death Life Total 
Alabama 4 8 12 
California 13 17 30 
Florida 17 11 28 
Georgia 8 8 16 
Indiana 10 8 18 
Kentucky 13 11 24 
Louisiana 6 0 6 
Missouri 6 7 13 
North Carolina 11 10 21 
Pennsylvania 10 4 14 
South Carolina 17 11 28 
Tennessee 7 4 11 
Texas 10 4 14 
Virginia 4 5 9 
    





Table 4: Number of Trials for each Sentencing Guideline 
 
 
Sentencing Guidelines  Definition of Capital 
Homicide Threshold Balancing Directed Total 
Narrow 9 48 14 71 
Traditional 68 105 0 173 




Table 5: Number of Jurors within each Sentencing Guideline 
 
 
Sentencing Guidelines  Definition of Capital 
Homicide Threshold Balancing Directed Total 
Narrow 38 189 44 271 
Traditional 260 387 0 647 




Table 6: Jurors’ Recall about Trial 
 





Not At All 
(4) 
 N f % f % f % f % 
          
Jury Selection 1051 733 69.7 288 27.4 29 2.8 1 0.1 
Guilt Evidence 1040 622 59.8 391 37.6 26 2.5 1 0.1 
Guilt Deliberations 1026 685 66.8 325 31.7 14 1.4 2 0.2 
Punishment Evidence 1043 600 57.5 275 36.0 63 6.0 5 0.5 





Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Group Climate Variables 
 
How well do the following words describe the jury? 
 N Min Max Mean S.D. 
Like-minded, saw things the same way… 1043 1 4 2.84 .80 
Close-minded, intolerant of 
disagreement… 1048 1 4 3.50 .72 
Too quick to make a decision, in a hurry… 1049 1 4 3.58 .72 
Friendly and respectful to one another… 1051 1 4 3.70 .54 
Decided on guilt and punishment at the 
same time… 1018 1 4 3.10 1.01 
Dominated by a few strong personalities… 1046 1 4 2.98 .98 
Got too emotionally involved in the case… 1035 1 4 3.08 .94 
Was confused by the judge’s 
instructions… 1048 1 4 3.30 .87 
Did not follow the judge’s instructions… 1046 1 4 3.37 .68 
Kept making mistakes… 1046 1 4 3.82 .48 
You felt like an outsider… 1046 1 4 3.84 .55 
Please answer the following questions about your experience serving on a capital 
jury… 
 N Min Max Mean S.D. 
Do you wish you had done anything 
differently? 1053 0 1 .87 .34 
Was the experience emotionally upsetting? 1041 0 1 .39 .49 
Did you have trouble sleeping? 1047 0 1 .64 .48 
If asked to serve on another capital trial, 





Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Juror Level Control Variables 
 
 N f % 
Gender 1063   
Male  505 47.5 
Female  558 52.5 
    
Race 1059   
White  921 87.0 
Black  100 9.4 
Other  38 3.6 
    
Age 1046 µ = 46.02 S.D. = 12.75  
    
Education 1060   
Less than High School  59 5.6 
Finished High School  275 25.9 
Some Technical School  80 7.5 
Some College  250 23.6 
College Graduate  222 20.9 
Graduate/Professional School  174 16.4 
    
Religious Preference 1055   
Baptist  170 16.1 
Southern Baptist  110 10.4 
Lutheran  45 4.3 
Methodist  123 11.7 
Presbyterian  55 5.2 
Other Protestant  160 15.2 
Roman Catholic  197 18.7 
Jewish  15 1.4 
Other Religion  68 6.4 
No Preference  112 10.6 
    
Income 1055   
Less than $10K  35 3.3 
$10K - $20K  99 9.4 
$20K - $30K  171 16.2 
$30K - $50K  292 27.7 
$50K - $75K  213 20.2 
More than $75K  162 15.4 
Refused to Answer  83 7.9 
    
Jury Foreperson 1069   
Yes  121 11.3 
    
Prior Relationships 1050   




Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Aggravating Factors 
 
Aggravating Factors59 
 N Mean S.D. 
Murder committed during another felony 1033 .39 .49 
Victim was a male 1029 .12 .32 
Victim was respected in the community 1017 .39 .49 
Victim had a loving family 1023 .62 .48 
Defendant had a history of violent crime 1028 .39 .49 
Defendant was a stranger in the community 1023 .15 .36 
Defendant showed no remorse 1019 .65 .46 
Defendant would be dangerous in the future 1028 .74 .44 
Victim’s family suffered severe loss or grief 1020 .69 .46 
Victim’s family asked for the death penalty 1009 .18 .39 
Community was outraged 1010 .30 .46 
Community wanted the death penalty 1000 .14 .34 
Defendant did not testify on his/her own behalf 706 .54 .50 
                                                 




Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Mitigating Factors 
 
Mitigating Factors60 
 N Mean S.D. 
Defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time 
of the crime 1029 .21 .41 
Defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time of 
the crime 1028 .20 .40 
Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional stress at the time of the crime 1025 .20 .40 
Victim was a stranger in the community 1022 .07 .25 
Victim was a known trouble-maker 1023 .04 .19 
Victim had a criminal record 1024 .04 .19 
Victim was an alcoholic 1019 .04 .19 
Victim was a drug addict 1020 .05 .22 
Defendant had no prior criminal record 1026 .28 .45 
Defendant was mentally retarded 1027 .05 .22 
Defendant was under the age of 18 when the crime was 
committed 1026 .05 .22 
Defendant was an alcoholic 1023 .14 .35 
Defendant was a drug addict 1022 .20 .40 
Defendant had a history of mental illness 1025 .10 .30 
Defendant had a background of extreme poverty 1024 .27 .45 
Defendant had been seriously abused as a child 1020 .25 .43 
Defendant had been placed in institutions but never given 
the opportunity to receive real help for his/her problems 1022 .20 .40 
Defendant had been convicted with evidence from an 
accomplice who received a reduced sentence 1024 .21 .41 
Defendant would be a hardworking and well behaved 
inmate 1024 .20 .40 
                                                 




Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Level of Heinousness Scale Variables 
 
In your mind, how well do the following words describe the killing? 
 N Min Max Mean S.D. 
Bloody 1061 1 4 3.26 .97 
Gory 1059 1 4 3.12 1.03 
Vicious 1062 1 4 3.60 .74 
Depraved 1045 1 4 3.08 1.00 
Calculated 1055 1 4 3.07 1.02 
Cold-Blooded 1056 1 4 3.72 .61 
Senseless 1053 1 4 3.85 .44 
Repulsive 1055 1 4 3.60 .73 
The work of a “mad-man” 1050 1 4 2.49 1.14 
It made you feel sick to think about it 1060 1 4 3.19 1.00 
The victim(s) was/were made to suffer 
before death 1039 1 4 2.82 1.21 
The body(ies) was/were maimed or 




Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Defendant Demeanor Scale Variables 
 
How did the defendant appear to you during the trial?61 
 N Mean S.D. 
Bored (i.e., indifferent, remote) 1053 .48 .50 
Sorry for what s/he had done 1033 .21 .41 
Sincere (i.e. honest) 956 .28 .45 
Self-Confident 956 .28 .45 
Bitter (i.e. resentful) 1029 .79 .41 
 
                                                 




Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Trial Race Variables 
 
 N f % 
Defendant Race 244   
White  142 58.2 
Black  102 41.8 
Victim Race 244   
White  196 80.3 




Table 14: Race Dyads: Victim and Defendant 
 
 Victim Race  
Defendant Race Black White Total 
Black 43 (17.6%) 59 (24.2%) 142 
White 5 (2%) 137 (56.1%) 102 




Table 15: Race Dyads: Juror and Victim 
 
 Victim Race  
Juror Race Black White Total 
Black 20 (2.2%) 70 (7.6%) 90 
White 155 (16.9%) 673 (73.3%) 828 




Table 16: Race Dyads: Juror and Defendant 
 
 Defendant Race  
Juror Race Black White Total 
Black 49 (5.3%) 41 (4.5%) 90 
White 323 (35.2%) 505 (55.0%) 828 




Table 17: Number of Black Jurors per Trial 
 
Number of Black Jurors f % 
0 65 26.6 
1 48 19.7 
2 49 20.1 
3 31 12.7 
4 18 7.4 
5 6 6.6 
6 8 3.3 
7 6 2.5 
8 1 .4 
9 2 .8 




Table 18: Number of Jurors per State 
 
State f % 
Alabama 44 4.8 
California 122 13.3 
Florida 107 11.7 
Georgia 58 6.3 
Indiana 72 7.8 
Kentucky 95 10.3 
Louisiana 23 2.5 
Missouri 52 5.7 
North Carolina 71 7.7 
Pennsylvania 47 5.1 
South Carolina 107 11.7 
Tennessee 38 4.1 
Texas 44 4.8 
Virginia 38 4.1 




Table 19: Descriptive Statistics for Scale Variables 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Perception of Group Climate 3.44 .40 1.8 4.0 
Perception of Aggravation .40 .18 0 .92 
Perception of Mitigation .14 .12 0 .68 
Perception of Level of Heinousness 3.10 .61 .03 4 
Perception of Defendant Demeanor .42 .30 0 1 
Percent Black 14.27 15.04 0 75.0 





Table 20: Loadings for Principal Components Analysis 
 
Predictors Component 1 
  
Likeminded, saw things the same way .487 
Closed-minded, intolerant of disagreement .606 
Too quick to made a decision, in a hurry .586 
Friendly and respectful to one another .527 
Dominated by a few strong personalities .579 
Got too emotionally involved in the case .502 
Was confused by the judge’s instructions .495 
Did not follow the judge’s instructions .452 
Kept making mistakes .612 






Table 21: Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Perception of Group 












Independent Variable β (S.E.) β (S.E.) β (S.E.) 
Black Juror -.078 (.065) ----- ----- 
Female Juror -.07 (.029) ----- ----- 
Age .003 (.001)*** ----- ----- 
Education -.010 (.008) ----- ----- 
Baptist .080 (.036)* ----- ----- 
Southern Baptist .011 (.045) ----- ----- 
Jewish -.277 (.115)* ----- ----- 
Less than 10K -.026 (.069) ----- ----- 
10K - 20K .015 (.046) ----- ----- 
20K - 30K -.069 (.039) ----- ----- 
50K - 75K -.023 (.040) ----- ----- 
More than 75K -.019 (.046) ----- ----- 
No response for Income -.032 (.044) ----- ----- 
Prior Relationships .043 (.036) ----- ----- 
Served as Foreperson .029 (.038) ----- ----- 
Perception of Aggravation -.054 (.071) ----- ----- 
Perception of Mitigation .524 (.158)*** ----- ----- 
Perception of Level of Heinousness .037 (.022) ----- ----- 
Perception of Defendant Demeanor -.031 (.048) ----- ----- 
Black Defendant ----- -.050 (.036) .007 (.099) 
White Victim ----- .029 (.050) .076 (.091) 
Female Victim ----- .033 (.029) .032 (.029) 
Number of Persons Killed ----- -.044 (.029) -.046 (.029) 
Black Defendant/White Victim ----- ----- -.037 (.107) 
Black Juror/Black Victim ----- ----- .136 (.141) 
Black Juror/Black Defendant ----- ----- -.191 (.099)* 
Percent Black ----- ----- ----- 
Percent Male ----- ----- ----- 
Number of Jurors in Sample ----- ----- ----- 
Constant 3.347 (.105)*** 3.478 (.068)*** 3.435 (.098)*** 
Model Summary       
R2 .084 .015 .022 




Table 21 (Page 2): Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Perception of 
Group Climate – Robust Standard Errors (N = 918) 
 
 
  Model with Jury Characteristics Full Model 
Independent Variable Β (S.E.) β (S.E.) 
Black Juror ----- -.020 (.080) 
Female Juror ----- -.064 (.028)* 
Age ----- .003 (.001)*** 
Education ----- -.009 (.008) 
Baptist ----- .064 (.037) 
Southern Baptist ----- -.002 (.046) 
Jewish ----- -.274 (.112)* 
Less than 10K ----- -.013 (.070) 
10K - 20K ----- .020 (.047) 
20K - 30K ----- -.062 (.040) 
50K - 75K ----- -.023 (.040) 
More than 75K ----- -.016 (.045) 
No response for Income ----- -.024 (.044) 
Prior Relationships ----- .035 (.036) 
Served as Foreperson ----- .032 (.038) 
Perception of Aggravation ----- -.050 (.075) 
Perception of Mitigation ----- -.478 (.158)** 
Perception of Level of Heinousness ----- .032 (.022) 
Perception of Defendant Demeanor ----- -.038 (.048) 
Black Defendant ----- .009 (.092) 
White Victim ----- .062 (.083) 
Female Victim ----- .024 (.026) 
Number of Persons Killed ----- -.028 (.028) 
Black Defendant/White Victim ----- -.025 .099) 
Black Juror/Black Victim ----- .164 (.145) 
Black Juror/Black Defendant ----- -.175 (.128) 
Percent Black -.002 (.010) .000 (.001) 
Percent Male .001 (.001) .002 (.001)* 
Number of Jurors in Sample -.037 (.017)* -.031 (.018) 
Constant 3.553 (.094)*** 3.365 (.159)*** 
Model Summary    
R2 .013 .105 





Table 22: HLM Unconditional Models of Perception of Group Climate 
 
 Group Climate 
Fixed Effects β S.E. T-Ratio df 
Intercept 3.44 .016 211.14 243 
Random Effects Variance S.D. χ2 df 
Level 2 .03 .174 462.02*** 243 




Table 23: Hierarchical Models of Perception of Group Climate – Slopes and 
Intercepts as Outcomes Model 
 
  Level 1: Fixed Effects 
Independent Variable β (S.E.) 
Constant 3.438 (.016)*** 
Level 1 Variables  
Black Juror -.070 (.062) 
Female Juror -.054 (.031) 
Age .002 (.001)* 
Education -.006 (.010) 
Baptist .065 (.040) 
Southern Baptist .032 (.047) 
Jewish -.286 (.108)** 
Less than 10K -.042 (.069) 
10K – 20K .054 (.057) 
20K – 30K -.031 (.039) 
50K – 75K .015 (.040) 
More than 75K -.016 (.051) 
No response for Income -.021 (.049) 
Prior Relationships .001 (.040) 
Served as Foreperson .045 (.040) 
Aggravating Circumstances -.125 (.111) 
Mitigating Circumstances -.394 (.184)* 
Level of Heinousness .047 (.024)* 
Defendant Demeanor .008 (.062) 
Level 2 Variables  
Average Perception of Aggravation -.046 (.113) 
Average Perception of Mitigation -.0688 (.221)** 
Average Level of Heinousness .043 (.046) 
Average Defendant Demeanor -.070 (.082) 
Black Defendant -.050 (.038) 
White Victim .008 (.053) 
Female Victim .026 (.030) 
Number of Persons Killed -.018 (.030) 
Average Percent Black -.001 (.002) 
Average Percent Male .001 (.001) 
Random Effects Variance S.D. χ2 df 
Level 2 .03 .163 421.57*** 233 




Table 24: Logistic Regression on Death Sentence (N = 244) 
 
  Model 1: Trial Level Characteristics Model 2: Jury Level Characteristics 
  N = 244   N = 244  
Independent Variables β S.E. Wald Odds Ratio β S.E. Wald Odds Ratio 
Constant 0.294 1.637 0.032 1.341 -8.811*** 2.343 14.14 0.000 
Trial Level Characteristics         
Black Defendant -0.367 1.236 0.088 0.693     
White Victim -1.039 1.194 0.757 0.354     
Female Victim 0.176 0.317 0.307 1.192     
Black Defendant/White Victim 0.381 1.297 0.086 1.464     
Number of Persons Killed 0.446 0.242 3.388 1.562     
Average Aggravating Factors 1.876 1.155 2.637 6.527     
Average Mitigating Factors -4.476* 1.764 6.442 0.011     
Average Level of Heinousness 0.323 0.435 0.551 1.381     
Average Defendant Demeanor -4.068*** 0.845 23.171 0.017     
         
Jury Level Characteristics         
Average Group Climate     2.835*** 0.616 21.178 17.031 
Percent Black of Jury     -0.014 0.011 1.777 0.986 
Percent Male of Jury     0.002 0.010 0.050 1.002 
Number of Jurors in Sample         -0.152 0.172 0.778 0.859 
Nagelkerke R2 0.310       0.162       






Table 24 (Page 2): Logistic Regression on Death Sentence (N = 244) 
 
  Model 3: Full Model 
  N = 244  
Independent Variables β S.E. Wald Odds Ratio 
Constant -8.413** 3.166 7.062  0.000 
Trial Level Characteristics      
Black Defendant -0.259 1.256 0.043  0.771 
White Victim -0.815 1.189 0.470  0.771 
Female Victim 0.246 0.337 0.534  1.279 
Black Defendant/White Victim 0.040 1.315 0.001  1.041 
Number of Persons Killed 0.637* 0.279 5.226  1.891 
Average Aggravating Factors 2.308 1.220 3.577  10.057 
Average Mitigating Factors -3.116 1.886 2.729  0.044 
Average Level of Heinousness 0.101 0.466 0.047  1.106 
Average Defendant Demeanor -4.265*** 0.909 22.028  0.014 
      
Jury Level Characteristics      
Average Group Climate 2.886*** 0.726 15.815  17.915 
Percent Black of Jury -0.006 0.013 0.241  0.994 
Percent Male of Jury 0.006 0.012 0.279  1.006 
Number of Jurors in Sample -0.275 0.197 1.956  0.759 
Nagelkerke R2 0.404        
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Figure 4: Average Jury Perception of Group Climate Distribution 
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I.  FACE SHEET 
 
1.Defendant's name: ___________________/________________ 




2.Trial dates:  ___/___/____ (jury selection began) 
 
       ___/___/____ (jury's sentencing verdict) 
       (mo)(dy)(yr) 
 
         location: __________________/___________/_________ 
      (town/city)        (county)    (state) 
 
     sentence:  ___ death sentence 
                    ___ prison term of  ___________________ 
 
 
3.Juror's name: ___________________/____________________ 
                   (last)             (first) 
 
          address: ________________________________________ 
 
       __________________/____________/________ 
      (city/town)         (state)      (zip) 
 
            phone: _____________/_____________/____________ 




4.Interview date: _______/_______/_______ 
                     (month)  (day)  (year) 
 
               place: _____________________________________ 
 
                      _____________________________________ 
 
 
5.Interviewer's name:  _________________/_______________ 
                          (last)            (first) 
 
INTERVIEW STARTING TIME: _____:_____/_______  




II.  THE CASE 
 
THE GROUND RULES ARE THAT YOU SHOULD INTERRUPT AS WE GO 
ALONG TO MAKE THINGS CLEAR AND TO TELL ME WHAT YOU THINK IS 
IMPORTANT.  WE ARE HERE TO LEARN FROM YOUR EXPERIENCE, SO 
DO NOT HESITATE TO BRING UP ANYTHING YOU THINK WILL HELP US 
UNDERSTAND WHAT IT WAS LIKE FOR YOU AS A JUROR ON THIS 
CASE.   
 
I'D LIKE TO BEGIN WITH SOME VERY GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT 
THE (THE DEFENDANT'S) _______'S CASE. 
 
1.Did this case attract much attention in your community? 
 
 ___ a great deal 
 ___ a fair amount 
 ___ not very much  
 ___ none at all 
 
 
2.Did any of your friends or neighbors come to the trial? 
 
 ___ many did  
 ___ some did  
 ___ a few did 
 ___ none did 
 
 
II.A  THE CRIME 
 
 
1. Now, I'd like you to tell me about the crime.  In your 
own words, give me the details I need to understand 
what happened and why. 
 
(RECORD THE ELEMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT'S NARRATIVE IN 
SEQUENCE AS S/HE RELATES THEM.  THE ELEMENTS 
COULD INCLUDE FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
CRIME, REASONS WHY THINGS HAPPENED, CHARACTER OR 
MOTIVES OF THE DEFENDANT AND/OR VICTIM(S), ETC.) 
 








































































2.In your mind, how well do the following words describe 
the killing? 
 ┌────   
 │ 1 very well  2 fairly well  3 not so well  4 not at all  
 └─┐  
   │ ___ bloody 
   │ ___  gory 
   │ ___  vicious  
   │ ___  depraved 
   │ ___  calculated  
   │ ___  cold blooded 
   │ ___  senseless 
   │ ___ repulsive  
   │ ___  the work of a "mad man" 
   │ ___ it made you feel sick to think about it 
   │ ___  the victim(s) was/were made to suffer before 
death 
   │ ___  the body(ies) was/were maimed or mangled after 
death 
   │ ___  other, specify _________________________________ 




3.Is there anything about this case that sticks in your   
mind, or that you keep thinking about? 
 
 
4.Now let me make sure I have some basic facts straight. 
 
 a.  As I understand it, there was/were . . .  
 
  #_____ person(s) killed 




   #_____ person(s) responsible for the killing 
 
 b. Do you remember the victim's(s') name(s)? 
 
  V1 ________________________ 
  V2 ________________________ 
  V3 ________________________ 
 
 (IF MORE THAN ONE,) which one did you find most 
memorable or think most about? 
 
  (INDICATE BY CIRCLING V1, V2, OR V3 ABOVE) 
 c.  I'd like some facts about the defendant(s) and 
victim(s).  When you're not sure, just give me 
your best guess.  I'll note that you're not sure. 
(USE "_" LETTERS TO INDICATE RESPONSES; ADD "?" MARK TO 
INDICATE "NOT SURE"; MAKE ADDITIONAL COLUMNS FOR 
MORE THAN THREE DEFENDANTS OR VICTIMS) 
 
             Defendant(s)         Victim(s)      
 
     D1 D2 D3       V1 V2 V3  
 
MALE/FEMALE   _________ ___ ___     ___ ___ ___ 
  
WHITE/BLACK/ 
HISPANIC/OTHER    _____  ___ ___     ___ ___ ___  
 
Age (# YRS)  _________ ___ ___     ___ ___ ___ 
  
Education (# YRS) _________ ___ ___     ___ ___ ___ 
  
MARRIED/SINGLE   ___ ___ ___       ___ ___ ___ 
  
Children (#)  _________ ___ ___     ___ ___ ___ 
  
Occupation       D1 _____________     V1 _____________ 
  (WHEN LAST 
   EMPLOYED)     D2 _____________     V2 _____________ 
 
             D3 _____________     V3 _____________  
 
 
5. Were the defendant(s) and victim(s) related in any of 





 (IF MORE THAN ONE DEFENDANT OR VICTIM, INDICATE PAIR 
 SPECIFIC RELATIONSHIPS, E.G. D1-V3 SPOUSE)  
 ┌─── 
 │ 1  yes   2  no   3  not sure   (FOR D1-V1) 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ spouse, ex-spouse  
   │ ___ family relations   
   │ ___ neighbors 
   │ ___ friends 
   │ ___ acquaintances    
   │ ___ strangers     
   │ ___ lovers 
   │ ___ co-workers 
   │ ___ employer/employee 
   │ ___ tenant/landlord 
   │ ___ other relationship, specify________________ 
 
6.How Often did the defense and prosecuting attorneys most 
often refer to the defendant in court? 
   ┌─────── 
   │ Defense attorney(s) most often used ... 
   └─┐  ┌────     
 │  │ Prosecuting attorney(s) most often used ... 
     │  └─┐ 
     │    │ 
 ___ ___  last name preceded by Mr./Mrs./Ms. 
 ___ ___ last name only (no formal address) 
 ___ ___ first name 
 ___ ___ first and last name 
 ___ ___ nickname, (IF SO, SPECIFY) _________ 
 ___ ___ the impersonal phrase "the defendant" 
 
 
7.Which of these names for the defendant should I use in 








II.B  THE DEFENDANT(S) 
 
NOW, I'D LIKE TO GET YOUR PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF (THE 
DEFENDANT) _________ .  (THE ONE NAMED ON THE FACE SHEET IN 
Q.#I.1, IF MORE THAN ONE)  
 
1. In your mind, how well do the following words describe 
(DEF) _________  
 ┌──────        
 │ 1 very well   2 fairly well   3 not well   4 not at all 
 │                                                            
└─┐ 
   │ ___ from a poor or deprived background 
   │ ___  a "loner" without many friends 
   │ ___ doesn't know his/her place in society 
   │ ___ doesn't know right from wrong 
   │ ___  has gotten a raw deal in life 
   │ ___ vicious like a mad animal 
   │ ___ mentally defective or retarded 
   │ ___ emotionally unstable or disturbed 
   │ ___  dangerous to other people 
   │ ___  went crazy when s/he committed the crime 
   │ ___  sorry for what s/he did 
   │ ___ severely abused as a child 
   │ ___  raised in a warm loving home 
   │ ___  someone who loved his/her family 
   │ ___  lacks basic human instincts 
   │ ___  drug addict  
   │ ___  occasional drug abuser  
   │ ___  alcoholic  
   │ ___  occasional alcohol abuser  
   │ ___  had a history of violence and crime 
   │ ___  a good person who got off on the wrong foot 
   │ ___  other, specify 
___________________________________ 
          
__________________________________________________ 
 
2. Did (DEF) ______ remind you of someone or make you   
think about anyone? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) who?  Describe the person(s). 
 
 





 ___ a business suit, coat and tie 
 ___ casual civilian clothes 
 ___ prison clothing or a uniform 
 ___ can't remember 
 
4. How did (DEF) ______ appear to you during the trial? 
  ┌─── 
  │ 1 yes    2 no    
  └┐ 
   │ ___ uncomfortable or ill at ease 
   │ ___ bored (i.e., indifferent, remote) 
   │ ___ spruced up to make a good appearance 
   │ ___ frightening (i.e., threatening, defiant) 
   │ ___ sorry for what s/he had done  
   │ ___ sincere, (i.e., honest) 
   │ ___ self confident 
   │ ___ bitter (i.e., resentful) 
   │ ___ other, specify _________________________________ 
     ________________________________________________ 
 
5. How did the defense attorney(s) treat (DEF) _______ ? 
  
     ___ acted like (DEF) ______ wasn't even there 
     ___ occasionally spoke to (DEF) ______, but mostly  
      ignored him or her 
     ___ frequently talked to (DEF) ______, but didn't seem 
  to involve him or her in their decisions 
     ___ seemed to have a close working relationship with  
 (DEF) ______ as part of the defense team 
 
6. Did (DEF) ______'s mood or attitude change after     
the guilty verdict was handed down and the focus of 
the trial shifted to what the punishment should be? 
 
 ___ no 




7. Did you have any of the following thoughts or feelings 
about (DEF) _______? 
  ┌─── 
  │  1 yes   2 no   
  └┐ 
   │ ___ found (DEF) ______ frightening to be near 
   │ ___ felt anger or rage toward (DEF) ______ 




   │ ___ found (DEF) ______ likable as a person 
   │ ___ was disgusted or repulsed by (DEF) ______  
   │ ___ couldn't stand to look at (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___ imagined being like (DEF) ______  
   │ ___ imagined yourself in (DEF) ______'s situation 
   │ ___ other reactions, specify _________________________ 
         __________________________________________________ 
 
8. Did any of (DEF) ______'s family members come to the 
trial? 
 
 ___ no, I am sure they did not 
 ___ no, I don't think so 
 ___ yes, I think so 
 ___ yes, I am sure they did 
 
  (IF YES,)indicate which family member(s) you 





(IF YES,)did any member of (DEF) ______'s family remind you 
of someone or make you think about 
anyone? 
 
 ___ no 





9.Whether or not they came to the trial, did you have any 
of the following thoughts or feelings about (DEF) 
______'s family? 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 yes   2 no  3  (NOT SURE, NO ANSWER) 
 └┐ 
  │ ___ imagined yourself in their situation 
  │ ___ felt anger or rage toward (DEF) ______'s family 
  │ ___ felt contempt or hatred for (DEF) ______'s family 
  │ ___ felt sympathy or pity for (DEF) ______'s family 
  │ ___ they seemed very different from your own family 
  │ ___ wished you knew (DEF) ______'s family personally 
  │ ___ imagined yourself as a member of (DEF) ______'s       
│  family 




 II.C   THE VICTIM(S) 
 
NEXT, I'D LIKE TO GET YOUR PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF (THE 
VICTIM) ______. (IF MORE THAN ONE, THE VICTIM "YOU THOUGHT 
MOST ABOUT" OR FOUND MOST "MEMORABLE" FROM Q.#II.A.4.)  
 
1.In your mind, how well do the following words describe 
(THE VICTIM) _________? 
  ┌──── 
  │ 1 very well  2 fairly well  3 not well  4 not at all    
│ 
  └┐ 
   │ ___ admired or respected in the community 
   │ ___ from a poor or deprived background 
   │ ___  raised in a warm loving home 
   │ ___  someone who loved his/her own family 
   │ ___  a "loner" without many friends 
   │ ___ had a wonderful future ahead 
   │ ___  was an innocent or helpless victim 
   │ ___  had an unstable or disturbed personality 
   │ ___  had a problem with drug or alcohol  
   │ ___  was too careless or reckless 
   │ ___  other, specify 
___________________________________ 
   │      
__________________________________________________ 
     
     
2.   Did (VIC) _______ remind you of someone or make you          
think about anyone? 
     
     ___ no 
     ___ yes; (IF SO,) who?  Describe the person(s). 
    
    
 
3. Did you have any of the following thoughts or feelings 
about (VIC) ________?  
 ┌─── 
 │  1 yes   2 no   
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ admired or respected (VIC) ______  
   │ ___ imagined yourself in (VIC) ______'s situation 
   │ ___ imagined yourself as a friend of (VIC) ______  
   │ ___ imagined (VIC) _____ as a member of your own 
family 




   │ ___ were disgusted or repulsed by (VIC) ______  
   │ ___ wished (VIC) ______ had been more careful 
   │ ___ other reactions, specify  ________________________     
      
 
4.   Did any of (VIC) ______'s family members come to the        
trial? 
 
 ___ no, I am sure they did not 
 ___ no, I don't think so 
 ___ yes, I think so 
 ___ yes, I am sure 
 
  (IF YES,)indicate which family member(s) you 





(IF YES,)did any member of (VIC) ______'s family remind you 
of someone or make you think about 
anyone? 
 
 ___ no 






5.Whether or not they came to the trial, did you have any 
of the following thoughts or feelings about (VIC) 
______'s family? 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 yes   2 no  3  (NOT SURE, NO ANSWER) 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ imagined yourself in their situation 
   │ ___ felt their grief and sense of loss 
   │ ___ felt distant or remote from them 
   │ ___ felt they were partly to blame for what happened      
│ ___ they seemed very different from your own family 
   │ ___ wished you knew (VIC) ______'s family personally 
   │ ___ imagined yourself as a member of (VIC) _______'s    
  family 






III.  THE TRIAL 
 
LET'S TURN NOW TO THE TRIAL, AND TALK ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE 
AND IMPRESSIONS AS A JUROR.  RECALL THAT YOU FIRST HEARD 
EVIDENCE ABOUT (DEF) _______'S GUILT AND DECIDED WHETHER 
S/HE WAS GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY; YOU THEN HEARD EVIDENCE 
ABOUT WHAT THE PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE AND DECIDED WHETHER OR 
NOT TO GIVE (DEF) ________ THE DEATH PENALTY.   
 
 
1.How well do you remember each of the following stages of 
the trial? 
 ┌───── 
 │  1 very well  2 fairly well  3 not well  4 not at all  
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ the selection of the jury 
   │ ___ hearing evidence about (DEF) _____'s guilt 
   │ ___ jury deliberations about (DEF) _____'s guilt 
   │ ___ hearing evidence about (DEF) _____'s punishment 
   │ ___ jury deliberations about (DEF) _____'s punishment 
 
 
2. Did any part of the trial seem too long to you or make 
you impatient? 
 ┌─── 
 │  1 yes   2 no 
 └─┐  
   │ ___ the selection of the jury 
   │ ___ hearing evidence about (DEF) _____'s guilt 
   │ ___ jury deliberations about (DEF) _____'s guilt 
   │ ___ hearing evidence about (DEF) _____'s punishment 
   │ ___ jury deliberations about (DEF) _____'s punishment 
    
 
 
3.When the trial began, did you know that the jury would 
decide what the punishment should be, if it found the 
defendant guilty of capital murder, that is murder for 
which the death penalty could be imposed? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes 






III.A  GUILT TRIAL 
 
LET'S NOW TURN TO THE FIRST PART OF THE TRIAL, WHERE YOU 
HEARD EVIDENCE ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT (DEF) ______ WAS 
GUILTY. 
 
1.How many days in court did it take to hear all the 
evidence about whether or not (DEF) _____ was guilty? 
 
 ____# of (FULL AND PARTIAL) days in court 
 
2. To the best of your memory, roughly how many people 
testified or presented evidence about whether (DEF) 
_____ was guilty or not guilty?  About how many . . .  
 
 _____# testified for the prosecution 
 
 _____# testified for the defense 
 
3.What kinds of evidence did the prosecutor use to link 
(DEF) ______ to the crime? 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 yes   2 no  3 not sure 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ formal confession to authorities by (DEF) ______  
   │ ___ testimony of an accomplice or co-defendant 
   │ ___ fingerprint identification 
   │ ___ other scientific evidence, such as blood or hair        
│  analysis, ballistics tests etc. 
   │ ___ testimony of a medical or forensic expert 
   │ ___ photographs of the crime scene 
   │ ___ photographs of the victim's body showing the 
manner   of the killing 
 ___ DNA typing 
 
4. Did any witness other than the police or an accomplice 
testify that he or she . . .  
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 yes   2 no  3 not sure 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ actually saw (DEF) ______ commit the crime  
   │ ___ heard (DEF) ______ admit the crime 
   │ ___ could place (DEF) ______ at the time and          
│   location of the crime 






5.What was (DEF) _______'s main motive for the murder, 
according to the prosecutor? 
6.What were the main reasons why (DEF) ______ should be 
found not guilty, according to the defense? 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 yes   2 no  3  (NOT SURE, NO ANSWER) 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ had no role whatsoever in the killing 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ had only a minor role in the killing 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ killed in self defense 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ killed in defense of others 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ was provoked by the victim or others 
   │ ___ it was an unintentional or impulsive act  
   │ ___ it was an accident or mistake 
   │ ___ (DEF) ______ was mentally ill and could not fully      
│  appreciate the wrongfulness of his/her actions 
   │ ___ (DEF) ______ was insane 
   │ ___ (DEF) ______ simply was not proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
   │ ___ other, specify 
____________________________________ 
 
7.Did you find the testimony of any of the witnesses for 
the prosecution or the defense hard to believe? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) which witnesses, what testimony, and 
   why? 
8.Did (DEF) ____ testify at the guilt stage of the trial? 
 
 ___ no; (IF NO,) what impression did this make on you? 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) what impression did s/he make on 
you? 
 
9.What do you think was the strongest evidence of (DEF) 
_____'s guilt? 
 
10.After you heard the judge's instructions to the jury for 
deciding about (DEF) _____'s guilt, but before you 
began deliberating with the other jurors, did you then 
think (DEF) ______ was . . .  
 
 ___ guilty of capital murder; that is, murder for 
which the death penalty could be imposed 
 ___ guilty, but not of capital murder 
     ___ not guilty 




 (IF GUILTY OF CAPITAL OR NONCAPITAL MURDER,)  
  a.  How strongly did you think so? 
  ___ absolutely convinced  
  ___ pretty sure 
  ___ not too sure 
  b.  When did you first think so? 
 
III.B  GUILT DELIBERATIONS 
 
LET'S NOW TALK ABOUT HOW THE JURY DECIDED WHETHER (DEF) 
_______ WAS GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY.   
 
1. About how long did it take the jury to reach its verdict 
about (DEF) ______'s guilt? 
 
 ____# of days; ____# of hours; ____# of minutes 
 
2.How much did the discussion among the jurors focus on the 
following topics? 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 great deal   2 fair amount   3 not much   4 not at all 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s background or upbringing 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s history of crime and violence 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s motives or reasons for the crime 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s role or responsibility in the crime 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s mental condition or sanity  
   │ ___ alcohol as a factor in the crime  
   │ ___ drugs as a factor in the crime 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s dangerousness if ever back in 
society 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s dangerousness to others in prison 
   │ ___ pain and suffering of the victim 
   │ ___ loss and grief of the victim's family 
   │ ___ brutal or vile manner of the killing 
   │ ___ strengths or weaknesses of the evidence of guilt 
   │ ___ believability of certain witnesses 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s appearance or manner in court 
   │ ___ the ways the attorneys presented their cases 
   │ ___ jurors' feelings for the family of the victim 
   │ ___ jurors' feelings toward (DEF) ______  
   │ ___ jurors' feelings about the right punishment 
   │ ___ the judge's instructions to the jury 
   │ ___ the meaning of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" 
   │ ___ other topics, specify ____________________________ 





3. Among the topics you did discuss, what were the main 
areas or points on which jurors disagreed? 
 
4. Among the topics you did discuss, what was the single 
most important factor in the jury's decision about 
(DEF) ______'s guilt? 
5.Was there any discussion of whether (DEF) ______ was 
guilty of murder, but not of capital murder? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) what were the main points? 
6. In deciding guilt, did jurors talk about whether or not 
(DEF) _____ would, or should, get the death penalty? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) what did they say? 
 
 
61.In deciding guilt, was there any discussion of what the 
punishment might be if the defendant was found guilty 
of less than capital murder 
 
___ no 
___yes (if so,) what did most jurors think the punishment 
would be? 
 
62. what did you think the defendant's punishment would be 
if s/he was found guilty of less than capital murder? 
 
 
63.Was there any discussion among the jurors about the 
meaning of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt?" 
 
___ no  
___ Yes (if so,) what did the jurors think it meant? 
 
 
64.During your guilt deliberations, did the jury stop to 
ask the judge any questions? 
 
___ no  
___yes (if so,) what was/were the question(s), what was the 
judge's response, and what was the jury's reaction? 
 
7. Were any jurors reluctant to go along with the majority 





 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) were you at all reluctant?  ___ yes 
           ___ no 
8. About how much time passed before the first jury vote 
was taken on whether (DEF) ______ was guilty of 
murder? 
 
 ___ less than 10 minutes 
 ___ 10 to 20 minutes  
 ___ 20 to 40 minutes 
 ___ 40 to 60 minutes 
 ___ 1 to 2 hours 
 ___ more than 2 hours 
 
9. When the first jury vote on the murder charge was taken, 
roughly how many jurors . . .  
 
     _____# voted guilty of capital murder 
 _____# voted guilty of a lesser crime 
     _____# voted not guilty 
     _____# were undecided 
 (= 12)  
 
10. When the first jury vote was taken, how did you vote? 
 
 ___ guilty of capital murder 
 ___ guilty of a lesser crime 
 ___ not guilty 
 ___ undecided 
 
 (IF NOT GUILTY OF CAPITAL MURDER,) what caused you  
 to change your vote to guilty by the final ballot? 
 
11.Can you think of anything more we haven't talked about 
yet that was important in understanding the jury's 
guilt decision? 
 
12. After the jury found (DEF) ______ guilty of capital 
murder but before you heard any evidence or testimony 
about what the punishment should be, did you then 
think (DEF) _____ should be given . . .  
 
 ___ a death sentence 
 ___ a life (OR THE ALTERNATIVE) sentence 






(IF A DEATH OR A LIFE SENTENCE,)  
 
  a.  How strongly did you think so? 
 
  ___ absolutely convinced 
  ___ pretty sure 
  ___ not too sure 
 
  b.  When did you first think so? 
  
13. Did you believe that once you had convicted (DEF) _____ 
of this particular kind of murder, the law of this 
state made the death penalty . . .   
 
 ___ the only acceptable punishment 
 ___ the most appropriate punishment  
 ___ just one available punishment 
 
III.C  SENTENCING TRIAL 
 
LET'S TURN NOW TO THE SECOND PART OF THE TRIAL,  WHERE YOU 
HAD TO DECIDE WHAT THE PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE. 
 
 
1.How many days in court did it take to hear all the 
evidence about what (DEF) _____'s punishment should 
be? 
 
 ____# of (FULL AND PARTIAL) days in court 
 
 
2.To the best of your memory, about how many people 
testified or presented evidence about what (DEF) 
_____'s punishment should be?  Roughly how many. . . 
 
 _____# testified for the prosecution 
 
 _____# testified for the defendant 
 
 
3. Did the prosecution witnesses at the punishment stage of 
the trial include . . .  
 ┌─── 
 │   1  yes   2 no  3  not sure           
└─┐     
   │ ___ the arresting or investigating police officers 




   │ ___ a medical or forensic expert 
   │ ___ a psychologist or psychiatrist  
   │ ___ an expert on the death penalty 
   │ ___ any others involved in the crime 
   │ ___ an employer, co-worker or business acquaintance of    
│  the victim(s) 
   │ ___ a friend or neighbor of the victim(s) 
   │ ___ a family or ex-family member of the victim(s) 
   │  (IF SO,) specify relation 
________________________ 
   │ 
 __________________________________________________ 
   │ ___ others not listed; specify 
________________________ 
        
___________________________________________________ 




4.What prosecution evidence or witness at the punishment 
stage of the trial was most important or influential, 
in your mind, and why? 
 
5.Did any of the testimony by prosecution witnesses at the 
punishment stage of the trial "backfire," or actually 
hurt their case? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) explain 
 
 
6.Did the defense witnesses at the punishment stage of the 
trial include . . . 
 ┌─── 
 │  1 yes   2 no   3 not sure 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ a clergyman who knows (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___ a school teacher of (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___ a social worker or investigator familiar with          
│  (DEF) _____'s background and upbringing 
   │ ___ a medical or forensic expert 
   │ ___ a psychological or psychiatric expert 
   │ ___ an expert on the death penalty 
   │ ___ any others involved in the crime 
   │ ___ an employer, co-worker or business acquaintance of    




   │ ___ a friend or neighbor of (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___ a family or ex-family member of (DEF) ______ 
   │  (IF SO,) specify relation 
________________________ 
   │ 
 __________________________________________________ 
   │ ___ others not listed; (IF SO,) please specify 
________ 
    
 __________________________________________________ 
 
7.What defense evidence or witness at the punishment stage 
of the trial was most important or influential, in 





8.Did any of the testimony by defense witnesses at the 
punishment stage of the trial "backfire," or actually 
hurt their case? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) explain 
 
 
9. How much did the prosecutor's evidence and arguments at 
the punishment stage of the trial emphasize . . . 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 great deal  2 fair amount  3 not much  4 not at all 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ the death penalty is what (DEF) _____ deserved 
   │ ___ the death penalty will deter others from killing 
   │ ___ the death penalty will keep (DEF) _____ from 
killing again  
   │ ___ the character and motives of (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___ past crime or violence of (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___ drugs as a factor in this crime 
   │ ___ the brutal or savage character of this crime 
   │ ___ the reputation and character of the victim(s) 
   │ ___ the pain and suffering of the victim(s) 
   │ ___ the loss and grief of victim's(s') family(ies) 
   │ ___ the punishment wanted by victim's(s') family(ies) 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s dangerousness to others in prison  
   │ ___ danger to the public if (DEF) _____ ever escaped 




   │ ___ how (DEF) _____ or this crime compare to other 
criminals or crimes  
   │ ___ other topics, 
specify______________________________ 
   │     
___________________________________________________ 
       
10.How much did the defense evidence and arguments at the 
punishment stage of the trial emphasize . . . 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 great deal   2 fair amount   3 not much   4 not at all 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ the death penalty is not humane  
   _ the death penalty is not a superior deterrent 
   ___ (DEF) _____'s abuse or mistreatment as a child 
   ___ the influence of mental illness on (DEF) _____  
   ___ the influence of alcohol on (DEF) _____  
   ___ the influence of drugs on (DEF) _____  
   ___ how factors (DEF) _____ could not control led to the 
crime  
   ___ the recklessness or provocation of the victim(s) 
   ___ the major responsibility of others for the crime 
   ___ the risk of mistakenly executing the wrong person 
   ___ basic human qualities and potential of (DEF) _____ 
   ___ that (DEF) _____ was sorry or asked for mercy 
   ___ how (DEF) _____ had changed since this crime 
   ___ that (DEF) _____ had become a model prisoner 
   ___ that (DEF) _____ had found religion 
   ___ how (DEF) _____ or this crime compared to other 
criminals or crimes  
   ___ other topics, specify ____________________________ 
 
11.Did (DEF) _____ testify or make a closing statement at 
the punishment stage of the trial? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes, as a sworn witness who could be examined and  
 cross examined by the attorneys 
 ___ yes, though not as a sworn witness, but only to  
 make a closing statement to the jury 
 
 (IF NO,) what kind of impression did this make on you? 







12. What did the prosecutor stress most as the reason why 
(DEF) _____ should get the death penalty?  
 
 
13.What did the defense attorney stress most as the reason 
why (DEF) _____ should not get the death penalty?  
 
 
14.What do you remember about the judge's instructions to 
the jury for deciding what the punishment should be? 
 
(NOTE IF RESPONDENT USES THE TERMS "AGGRAVATING" AND/OR 
"MITIGATING") 
 
15.After hearing all the evidence and the judge's 
instructions to the jury for deciding on the 
punishment, but before you began deliberating with the 
other jurors, did you then think (DEF) _____ should be 
given . . . 
 
     ___ a death sentence 
     ___ a life (OR THE ALTERNATIVE) sentence 
     ___ undecided 
 
 (IF A DEATH OR A LIFE SENTENCE,)  
 
  a.  How strongly did you think so? 
 
  ___ absolutely convinced 
  ___ pretty sure 
  ___ not too sure 
 
  b.  When did you first think so? 
 
  (PROBE FOR TIMING: PRETRIAL; JURY SELECTION; 
GUILT EVIDENCE, ARGUMENTS,  INSTRUCTIONS, OR 
DELIBERATIONS; PUNISHMENT EVIDENCE)  
 
16. After hearing all of the evidence, did you believe it 
proved that . . . 
 ┌───── 
 │ 1  yes   2  no    3  undecided 
 └─┐  
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s conduct was heinous, vile or     
   │  depraved 






17.After hearing the judge's instructions, did you believe 
that the law required you to impose a death sentence 
if the evidence proved that . . . 
 ┌─────── 
 │ 1  yes   2  no    
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s conduct was heinous, vile or     
   │  depraved 




18. From what you could tell, did you think the judge 
believed (DEF) _____ should be sentenced to death? 
 
    ___ pretty sure the judge favored a death sentence 
 ___ pretty sure the judge opposed a death sentence 
 ___ think the judge favored a death sentence 
 ___ think the judge opposed a death sentence 
 ___ had no idea what the judge favored or opposed 
 
III.D  SENTENCING DELIBERATIONS 
 
NOW WE'RE READY TO TALK ABOUT HOW THE JURY DECIDED WHAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE. 
 
1. In your own words, can you tell me what the jury did to  
reach its decision about (DEF) _____'s punishment?  
How did the jury get started; what topics did it 
discuss, in what order; what were the major 
disagreements and how were they resolved? 
 
(RECORD THE ELEMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT'S   NARRATIVE 
IN SEQUENCE AS S/HE RELATES THEM.) 
 














































2. How much did the discussion among the jurors focus on 
the following topics? 
┌──── 
│ 1 great deal  2 fair amount  3 not much  4 not at all 
└──┐ 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s background or upbringing 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s history of crime or violence 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s role or responsibility in the crime 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s motive for the crime 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s planning or premeditation 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s IQ or intelligence 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s sorrow, remorse, or lack of it 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s appearance or manner in court 
   │ ___ alcohol as a factor in the crime 




   │ ___ mental illness as a factor in the crime 
   │ ___ insanity as a factor in the crime 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s dangerousness to others in prison 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____'s dangerousness if ever back in 
society 
   │ ___ how likely s/he would be to get a parole or pardon 
   │ ___ how long before s/he would get a parole or pardon 
   │ ___ need to prevent him/her from ever killing again  
   │ ___ death penalty as a deterrent to killings by others 
   │ ___ death penalty as what (DEF) _____ deserved 
   │ ___ reputation or character of the victim(s) 
   │ ___ the victim(s)' role or responsibility in the crime 
   │ ___ innocence or helplessness of the victim(s) 
   │ ___ pain or suffering of the victim(s) before death 
   │ ___ loss or grief of victim's(s') family(ies) 
   │ ___ punishment wanted by victim's(s') family(ies) 
   │ ___ the way in which the victim(s) was/were killed 
   │ ___ how weak or strong the evidence of guilt was 
   │ ___ how well the attorneys presented their cases 
   │ ___ jurors' own attitudes about capital punishment 
   │ ___ jurors' feelings for the family of the victim 
   │ ___ jurors' feelings toward (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___ jurors' feelings toward (DEF) _____'s family 
   │ ___ what religious beliefs require 
   │ ___ what moral values require 
   │ ___ what community feelings require 
   │ ___ what the law requires 
   │ ___ similarity to other crimes and other murderers 
   │ ___ other, specify 
____________________________________ 
        
___________________________________________________ 
     
___________________________________________________ 
 
3. Among the topics you did discuss, what was the single 
most important factor in the jury's decision about 
what (DEF) _____'s punishment should be? 
 
4. Among the topics you did discuss, what were the main 
areas or points on which jurors disagreed? 
 
 
5. Did you have any difficulty understanding or following 
the judge's sentencing instructions to the jury? 
 




 ___ yes; (IF SO,) explain 
 
 
6.During your sentencing deliberations, did the jury stop 
to ask the judge  . . . 
 ┌────── 
 │ 1  yes   2  no    
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ for further explanation of the law or 
clarification    │  of the instructions to the jury 
   │ ___ for an indication of what would happen if the jury    
│  could not reach a decision  
   │ ___ for a review or transcript of certain testimony 
   │ ___ for information on how long before (DEF) _____         
│  could be released if not given a death sentence 
   │ ___ for other information or instructions, specify 
____ 





  (IF SO,)what was the judge's response and what 
was the jury's reaction? 
 
 
7.Would you say the judge's sentencing instructions to the 
jury . . . 
 ┌────── 
 │ 1  yes   2  no    
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ simplified the decision making process 
   │ ___ confused the decision making process 
   │ ___ helped jurors reach agreement 
   │ ___ actually led to disagreement 
   │ ___ simply provided a framework for the decision most      
│  jurors had already made 




8.Were any jurors especially reluctant to go along with the 
majority on (DEF) _____'s punishment. 
 
 ___ no 





         ___ no 





9.About how much time passed before the first jury vote was 
taken on what sentence to impose? 
 
 ___ less than 10 minutes 
 ___ 10 to 20 minutes  
 ___ 20 to 40 minutes 
 ___ 40 to 60 minutes 
 ___ 1 to 2 hours 
 ___ more than 2 hours 
 
10. When the first jury vote was taken, roughly how many of 
the jurors . . .  
 
     _____# voted for a death sentence 
     _____# voted for a life (OR ALTERNATIVE) sentence 
     _____# were undecided 
 (= 12) 
 
11. As best you can remember, how many votes did the jury 
take on what sentence to impose? 
 
     ______# of votes 
 
12. About how long, overall, did the jury deliberate on 
(DEF) _____'s punishment in order to reach its final 
decision? 
 
 ____# of days; ____# of hours; ____# of minutes 
 
 
13.Can you think of anything more we haven't talked about 







IV.  THE RESPONDENT'S SENTENCING DECISION 
 
NOW I WANT TO ASK HOW YOU REACHED YOUR OWN DECISION ABOUT 
WHAT THE PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE. 
 
1.How important were the following considerations for you 
in deciding on what (DEF) _____'s punishment should 
be? 
┌──── 
│  1 very    2 fairly    3 not very    4 not at all 
└─┐  
  │ ___ sentences imposed for similar crimes 
  │ ___ sentences imposed on similar defendants 
  │ ___ the pain and suffering of the victim(s) 
  │ ___ the loss and grief of the victim(s) family(ies) 
  │ ___ the punishment wanted by the victim(s) family(ies) 
  │ ___ your feelings about what such crimes deserve 
  │ ___ the principle of an eye for an eye 
  │ ___ the goal of rehabilitation 
  │ ___ keeping (DEF) _____ from ever killing again 
  │ ___ keeping other people from killing 
  │ ___ lingering doubts about (DEF) _____'s guilt 
  │ ___ the vicious or brutal manner of the killing 
  │ ___ feelings of vengeance or revenge 
  │ ___ desire to avoid a horrible mistake 
  │ ___ desire to avoid deliberately killing someone 
  │ ___ weight of aggravating and mitigating factors 
  │ ___ desire to see justice done 
  │ ___ desire to apply the law correctly  
  │ ___ desire to see the law enforced 
  │ ___ community outrage over this crime 
  │ ___ punishment wanted by most members of the community 
  │ ___ feelings of compassion or mercy for (DEF) _____ 
  │ ___ the belief that (DEF) _____ should have a chance 
to   │  pay for the crime and become a law abiding 
citizen 
  │ ___ other, specify 
____________________________________ 
 
2.When you were considering the punishment, did you have 
any of the following thoughts about (DEF) _____'s 
guilt; for instance, that s/he . . . 
 ┌──── 
 │ 1  yes    2  no    3  not sure 
   





___ definitely had planned or intended to kill the victim, 
but might not be the one who did so 
___ definitely killed the victim, but might not have 
planned, intended, or wanted to do so 
___ might not be one most responsible for the killing  
 
3.When you were considering the punishment, did you believe 
that (DEF) _____ was truly sorry for the crime? 
 
___ yes, sure (DEF) _____ was sorry 
___ yes, think (DEF) _____ was sorry 
___ not sure, (DEF) _____ acted sorry but it might have 
been just a show 
___ no, (DEF) _____ acted sorry but it was a show 
___ no, (DEF) _____ didn't even pretend to be sorry 
 
4.How true are the following statements about the role of 
mercy in your decision about (DEF) _______'s 
punishment? 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 very true  2 fairly true   3 not very true   4 not 
true 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ the idea of mercy never occurred to you 
   │ ___ the law required the jurors to decide about       
   │      punishment without thinking about mercy 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ didn't deserve mercy because s/he          
│  didn't show any toward the victim(s) 
   │ ___ If (DEF) _____ wanted mercy, s/he should have         
│  admitted his/her guilt from the very beginning 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ deserved mercy because s/he was sorry  
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ deserved mercy due to mental problems       
│ ___ (DEF) _____ deserved mercy because other people         
│  wanted to see him/her have another chance 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ deserved mercy because you felt s/he 
      would try to make up for what s/he did 
 
5.How well do these statements reflect the thoughts or 
feelings you had as you considered the punishment?  
 ┌────── 
 │ 1 very well   2 fairly well  3 not so well   4 not at 
all 
   │ ___ anyone who commits such a crime must be crazy; you    
│  have to be out of your mind to do such a thing 
   │ ___ saying (DEF) _____ was sorry isn't worth much 




   │ ___ drugs and alcohol aren't excuses; they make the       
│  crime worse, so the punishment should be worse 
   │ ___ saying (DEF) _____ was mentally ill is just trying 
 to play on our emotions  
6. When you were considering the punishment, were you 
concerned that (DEF) _____ might get back into society 
someday, if not given the death penalty? 
 
 ___ yes, greatly concerned  
 ___ yes, somewhat concerned  
 ___ yes, but only slightly concerned 
 ___ no, not at all concerned 
7.How long did you think someone not given the death 
penalty for a capital murder in this state usually 
spends in prison?                       
 
 ______ # of years 
 
8.How likely did you think it was that murderers  sentenced 
to death in this state will be executed? 
 
     ___ nearly all will eventually be executed 
 ___ most will be executed 
 ___ about half will be executed 
 ___ less than half will be executed 
 ___ very few will ever be executed 
 
9.How likely did you think it was that a jury decision for 
the death penalty would be accepted or rejected by the 
trial judge?  
 
 ___ the judge must accept the jury's decision; it's  
 final    
 ___ the judge would probably accept the jury's 
decision 
 ___ the judge would probably reject the jury's 
decision 
 ___ had no idea what the judge would do 
 
10. How likely did you think it was that a death sentence 
in this case would be accepted or rejected by the 
appeals courts? 
 
  ___ appeals courts accept nearly all death sentences  
 ___ appeals courts accept most death sentences 
 ___ appeals courts reject as many as they accept 




 ___ appeals court reject nearly all death sentences 
 ___ had no idea what the appeals courts would do 
 
11.Did the chances that your punishment decision might by 
overruled or changed make you feel . . . 
 ┌───── 
 │ 1  yes   2  no   3  not sure 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ good, because you would not have the death of          
│     another human being on your conscience 
   │ ___ good, because it meant that any mistakes we       
│  might have made could be corrected 
   │ ___ bad, because it makes our sentencing decision less     
│ important 
   │ ___ bad, because it means that (DEF) _____ might not 
get what s/he deserves 
 
12.When you were considering the punishment, did you think 
that whether (DEF) _____ lived or died was. . . 
 
 ___ strictly the jury's responsibility and no one 
else's 
 ___ mostly the jury's responsibility, but the judge or 
appeals courts take over responsibility whenever 
they overrule or change the jury's decision 
 ___ partly the jury's responsibility and partly the 
responsibility of the judge and appeals courts 
who review the jury's sentence in all cases 
 ___ mostly the responsibility of the judge and appeals 
courts; we make the first decision but they make 
the final decision  
 
13. Rank the following from "most" through "least" 
responsible for (DEF) _____'s punishment.  
 ┌───── 
 │ Give 1 for most through 5 for least responsible 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ the law that states what punishment applies 
   │ ___ the judge who imposes the sentence 
   │ ___ the jury that votes for the sentence 
   │ ___ the individual juror since the jury's decision       
│      depends on the vote of each juror 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ because his/her conduct is what      
    actually determined the punishment 
 
14.When the first jury vote was taken on the punishment to 





 ____ death sentence 
 ____ life (or alternative) sentence 
 ___  undecided 
 
15. Was your final vote  the same as your first vote? 
 
 ___ yes 
 ___ no; (IF NO,) what caused you to change your mind? 
 
 
16.Was there any information you did not have about (DEF) 
_____ or his/her crime that you feel would have helped 
in making your decision about punishment? 
 
 ____ no 
 ____ yes; (IF SO,) what information? 
 
17.What information about (DEF) _____ or the crime could 
have made you change your mind about what the 
punishment should be? 
 
IV.A  DECISION MODELS 
 
JURORS HAVE DIFFERENT WAYS OF MAKING HARD DECISIONS ABOUT 
PUNISHMENT.  I'M GOING TO DESCRIBE SOME OF THE WAYS JURORS 
GO ABOUT IT, AND ASK IF YOU USED ANY OF THESE APPROACHES. 
 
1.Some jurors feel that the decisions about guilt and 
punishment go together once they understand what 
happened and why; other jurors feel these are separate 
decisions based on different considerations.  Which 
comes closest to the approach you took? 
 
 ___ made your guilt and punishment decisions together 
on the basis of similar considerations 
 ___made your guilt and punishment decisions separately 
on the basis of different considerations 
 ___ (CAN'T CHOOSE OR SAY THEY DID BOTH) 
 
2. In making your punishment decision, did you compare 
(DEF) _____ or his/her crime to any other murderers or 
murder cases you knew about?  
 
 ___ no, not at all 
 ___ yes, to a minor extent; (IF SO,) . . .   




  a.  What other case(s) or murderer(s) did you use 
      as comparison(s)? ___________________________ 
               ____________________________________________ 
 
  b.  How did you know or learn about the other  
          case(s) or murderer(s)? 
 
  c.   What were the similarities or differences          
that helped you decide on the punishment? 
 
 
3.In making your punishment decision, did you use the 
evidence to develop your own "story" about what 
happened, and why, that made you feel you knew what 
the punishment should be? 
 
 ___ no, not at all 
 ___ yes, to a minor extent; (IF SO,) . . .  
 ___ yes, to a major extent; (IF SO,) . . . 
 
  a.   How did you develop your own story of what  





b.   Were there any problems of missing evidence        or 
evidence that didn't seem to fit into your 
 story? 
 
  ___ no 
  ___ yes; (IF SO,) what was this evidence and how          
did you deal with it? 
 
 
4.In making your punishment decision, did you find a 
specific feature or aspect of the case that made you 
feel you knew whether life or death should be the 
punishment? 
 
 ___ no, not at all  
 ___ yes, to a minor extent; (IF SO,) . . .  
 ___ yes, to a major extent; (IF SO,) . . .  
 







 b. Why did it make you feel that way? 
 
5. In making your punishment decision, did you "add up" the 
factors in favor of a death sentence and "add up" the 
factors against a death sentence, and then "weigh"  
one side against the other side? 
 
 ___ no, not at all  
 ___ yes, to a minor extent; (IF SO,) . . .  
 ___ yes, to a major extent; (IF SO,) . . .  
 
 a.By how much did the factors on one side "outweigh" 
the factors on the other side? 
 
  ___ greatly 
  ___ moderately 
  ___ slightly 
  ___ about even 
 





 c. What were the strongest factors for and against a 







6. Of the following ways jurors make such hard decisions, 
rank them in order of importance for your punishment 
decision.  
 ┌────── 
 │ Rank from 1 for most through 4 for least important 
 └─┐   
   │ ___ comparing or contrasting with other cases or  
   │  murderers you knew about 
   │ ___ putting together your own story of what happened       
│      and why in this case 
   │ ___ adding up the factors for and against a death       
│  sentence and weighing one side against the other 
   │ ___ finding one specific factor or aspect of the case   




IV.B  AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS 
SOME FACTORS ABOUT A MURDER, THE VICTIM, OR THE DEFENDANT 
MAKE PEOPLE FEEL A DEATH SENTENCE IS MORE OR LESS 
APPROPRIATE.  I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT FACTORS THAT MIGHT 
HAVE INFLUENCED YOUR DECISION IN THE ______ CASE. 
 
1.  I am going to read you a list of factors that might be 
true or present in a murder case.  For each factor on 
the list, I want you to tell me: 
 
a. Was this a factor in the _____________ case? 
┌─── 
│  1. yes 
│  2. no 
│  3. not sure 
├─── 
│  b. (IF YES,) how important was this factor in your    
│     punishment decision? 
│  ┌─── 
│  │  1. very important in your sentencing decision 
│  │  2. fairly important in your sentencing decision 
│  │  3. not important in your sentencing decision 
│  ├─── 
│  │  c. Did /(IF NO) Would/ this factor make you . . . 
│  │  ┌───(ASK IN ALL SITUATIONS) 
│  │  │  1. much more likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  2. slightly more likely to vote for death 
│  │  │  3. slightly less likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  4. much less likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  5. just as likely to vote for death  
│  │  ├─── 
│  │  │ FIRST ARE FACTORS ABOUT THE KILLING: 
 
__ __ __ the killing was not premeditated but was committed 
during another crime, such as a robbery, when the victim 
tried to resist 
__ __ __  the killing was especially bloody or gory 
__ __ __ the killing was brutal, involving torture or 
physical abuse 
__ __ __ the killing was committed while (DEF) _____ was     
under the influence of alcohol 
__ __ __ the killing was committed while (DEF) _____ was     
under the influence of drugs 
__ __ __ the killing was committed while (DEF) _____ was     
under the influence of an extreme mental or       
emotional disturbance 




__ __ __ (DEF) _____ maimed or mutilated the victim's body   
after death 
a. Was this a factor in the _____________ case? 
┌─── 
│  1. yes, it was a factor in this case 
│  2. no, it was not a factor in this case 
│  3. not sure whether it was a factor in this case 
├─── 
│  b. (IF YES,) how important was this factor in your      
│     punishment decision? 
│  ┌─── 
│  │  1. very important in your sentencing decision 
│  │  2. fairly important in your sentencing decision  
│  │  3. not important in your sentencing decision 
│  ├─── 
│  │  c. Did /(IF NO) Would/ this factor make you . . . 
│  │  ┌─── 
│  │  │  1. much more likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  2. slightly more likely to vote for death 
│  │  │  3. slightly less likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  4. much less likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  5. just as likely to vote for death  
│  │  ├─── 
│  │  │  NEXT ARE FACTORS ABOUT THE VICTIM: 
__ __ __  the victim was a female 
__ __ __  the victim was a child 
__ __ __ the victim was a respected person in the community 
__ __ __  the victim was a stranger in the community 
__ __ __  the victim was a known troublemaker 
__ __ __ the victim had a criminal record 
__ __ __  the victim was an alcoholic 
__ __ __  the victim was a drug addict 
__ __ __  the victim had a loving family 
 
  NEXT ARE FACTORS ABOUT THE DEFENDANT: 
 
__ __ __  (DEF) _____ had no previous criminal record 
__ __ __ (DEF) _____ had a history of violent crime 
__ __ __ (DEF) _____ was mentally retarded 
__ __ __ (DEF) _____ had a loving family 
__ __ __  (DEF) _____ was under 18 when the crime occurred 
__ __ __  (DEF) _____ was an alcoholic 
__ __ __  (DEF) _____ was a drug addict 
__ __ __  (DEF) _____ had a history of mental illness 
__ __ __ (DEF) _____ had a background of extreme poverty 
__ __ __  (DEF) _____ was a stranger in the community 




__ __ __ (DEF) _____ had been placed in institutions in the 
past but never given any real help or treatment for his 
problems 
__ __ __ (DEF) _____ did not express any remorse, regret or   
sorrow for the crime 
a. Was this a factor in the _____________ case? 
┌─── 
│  1. yes, it was a factor in this case 
│  2. no, it was not a factor in this case 
│  3. not sure whether it was a factor in this case 
├─── 
│  b. (IF YES,) how important was this factor in your      
│     punishment decision? 
│  ┌─── 
│  │  1. very important in your sentencing decision 
│  │  2. fairly important in your sentencing decision  
│  │  3. not important in your sentencing decision 
│  ├─── 
│  │  c. Did /(IF NO) Would/ this factor make you . . . 
│  │  ┌─── 
│  │  │  1. much more likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  2. slightly more likely to vote for death 
│  │  │  3. slightly less likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  4. much less likely to vote for death  
│  │  │  5. just as likely to vote for death  
│  │  ├─── 
│  │  │ FINALLY, THERE ARE ADDITIONAL FACTORS THAT MIGHT 
│  │  │   HAVE AFFECTED YOUR SENTENCING DECISION:  
 
__ __ __ (DEF) _____ was convicted with evidence from an     
accomplice who testified against (DEF) _____ in    
return for a reduced charge or sentence 
__ __ __ (DEF) _____ would be a hardworking well behaved     
inmate, and would make positive contributions in    
prison 
__ __ __ there is a possibility that (DEF) _____ would be a   
danger to society in the future 
__ __ __  the victim's family suffered severe loss or grief 
__ __ __  the vicim's family asked for the death penalty 
__ __ __  the community was outraged over the crime 
__ __ __  most community members wanted the death penalty  
__ __ __ although the evidence was sufficient for a capital   
murder conviction, you had some lingering doubt     
that (DEF) _____ was the actual killer 





IF THERE ARE FACTORS NOT ON THIS LIST THAT AFFECTED YOUR 
SENTENCING DECISION, PLEASE INDICATE WHAT THEY 
ARE,  
 
__ __ __  other factors 
____________________________________ 
__ __ __  other factors 
____________________________________ 
__ __ __  other factors 
____________________________________ 
__ __ __  other factors 
____________________________________ 
 
V.  SENTENCING GUIDELINES  
 
LET'S TAKE A MINUTE OR TWO TO TALK ABOUT THE JUDGE'S 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DECIDING WHAT THE PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE. 
1.As you understood the judge's instructions for deciding 
punishment, could the jury consider . . .  
 
 ___ all the evidence presented at the entire trial 
 ___ only the evidence presented at the second stage of 
  the trial after (DEF) _____ was convicted  
 ___ (DON'T KNOW) 
 
2.Among factors in favor of a death sentence, could the 
jury consider . . .  
 
 ___ any aggravating factor that made the crime worse 
 ___ only a specific list of aggravating factors  
 mentioned by the judge 
  ___ (DON'T KNOW) 
 
3.For a factor in favor of a death sentence to be 
considered, did it have to be . . . 
 
 ___ proved beyond a reasonable doubt  
     ___ proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
 ___ proved only to a juror's personal satisfaction  
 ___ (DON'T KNOW) 
 
4.For a factor in favor of a death sentence to be 
considered, did . . .  
 
 ___ all jurors have to agree on that factor  





 ___ (DON'T KNOW) 
 
5.To the best of your memory, was the jury required to 
impose a death sentence, or free to choose between 
death and a lesser sentence, if it found . . . 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 death required 2 free to choose 3 (DON'T KNOW) 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ one or more factors favoring a death sentence 
   │ ___ one or more factors favoring a death sentence and      
│  none opposing it 
   │ ___ more factors favoring than opposing a death          
│  sentence  
   │ ___ stronger factors favoring than opposing a death       
│  sentence  
   │ ___ an equal balance between factors favoring and     
  opposing a death sentence  
 
6.Among factors in favor of a life or lesser sentence, 
could the jury consider . . . 
 
 ___ any mitigating factor that made the crime not as  
 bad 
 ___ only a specific list of mitigating factors  
 mentioned by the judge  
 ___ (DON'T KNOW) 
 
7.For a factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to be 
considered, did it have to be . . . 
 
 ___ proved beyond a reasonable doubt  
     ___ proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
 ___ proved only to a juror's personal satisfaction  
 ___ (DON'T KNOW) 
 
8.For a factor in favor of a life or lesser sentence to be 
considered, did . . .  
 
 ___ all jurors have to agree on that factor 
 ___ jurors did not have to agree unanimously on that  
 factor  
 ___ (DON'T KNOW) 
 
9.To the best of your memory, was the jury required to 
impose a sentence of life or less or free to choose 





 │1 life or less required  2 free to choose 3 (DON'T KNOW) 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ one or more factors opposing a death sentence 
   │ ___ one or more factors opposing a death sentence and      
│  none favoring it 
   │ ___ more factors opposing than favoring a death          
│  sentence  
   │ ___ stronger factors opposing than favoring a death       
│  sentence  
   │ ___ an equal balance between factors opposing and  
 favoring a death sentence  
 
10.Do you believe that these guidelines or instructions led 
to the right or to the wrong punishment for (DEF) 
_____? 
 
 ___ led to the wrong punishment, but jurors followed  
 their own consciences and decided on the right  
 punishment 
 ___ led to the wrong punishment, and jurors accepted 
it 
 ___ led to the right punishment 
 ___ led to no particular punishment 
 
VI.  THE JUDGE, PROSECUTOR(S), AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY(S) 
 
LET'S TALK NEXT ABOUT THE JUDGE AND THE OPPOSING ATTORNEYS. 
 
1.  In your mind, how well do the following words describe 
the judge? 
┌──── 
│ 1 very well  2 fairly well  3 not so well  4 not at all 
└──┐  
   │ ___ stern (i.e., often grim faced) 
   │ ___  good humored (i.e., often smiling) 
   │ ___  self-confident 
   │ ___  easy going (i.e., relaxed) 
   │ ___  a warm outgoing person  
   │ ___  a forceful, take-charge person 
   │ ___  strict about rules and procedures 
   │ ___  sometimes looked bored 
   │ ___  sometimes looked annoyed 
   │ ___  acted friendly toward jurors 
   │ ___  acted friendly toward (DEF) _____ 
   │ ___  acted friendly toward the prosecuting attorney(s) 
   │ ___  acted friendly toward the defense attorney(s) 




   │ ___  someone you came to admire 
   │ ___  someone you did not like personally 
   │ ___  other, 
specify____________________________________ 
        
 __________________________________________________ 
 
2. Toward which side--the defense or the prosecution--did 
it seem to you that the judge's attitude was more . . 
. 
 ┌─── 
 │ 1  defense   2  prosecution   3 (NEITHER, NO DIFF.) 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ sympathetic  
   │ ___ accepting of requests or objections 
   │ ___  impatient  
   │ ___  careful about what s/he said or did 
   │ ___  favorably inclined 
 
3. For the prosecution, how many attorneys were involved? 
 
 _____ # of prosecuting attorneys 
  (IF MORE THAN ONE,) how did they allocate the 
work?  
___ one took primary responsibility throughout the trial 
___ they divided responsibility; one handled the guilt 
portion of the trial; another handled the punishment 
portion of the trial. 
___ they shared responsibility for presenting evidence 
throughout the trial 
 
(ASK ABOUT THE "SENTENCING STAGE" ATTORNEY IF 
RESPONSIBILITY WAS DIVIDED; ABOUT THE "MOST MEMORABLE" 
ONE IF IT WAS SHARED; OTHERWISE ABOUT THE "PRIMARY" OR 
"ONLY" PROSECUTING ATTORNEY.)  
 
4.Please indicate how well you think the following words 
describe the (DESIGNATED) prosecutor. 
┌──── 
│ 1 very well  2 fairly well  3 not so well  4 not at all 
└──┐ 
   │ ___  a forceful, take-charge person 
   │ ___  competent and professional 
   │ ___  did an outstanding job of presenting his/her case 
   │ ___  didn't seem to have his/her heart in the case 
   │ ___  was polite and respectful toward the judge 




   │ ___  was hostile toward the defense attorney(s) 
   │ ___  was hostile toward defense witnesses 
   │ ___  cared more about winning than seeing justice done 
   │ ___  someone you came to admire (respect) 
   │ ___  someone you did not like personally 
   │ ___  other, 
specify____________________________________ 
         
__________________________________________________ 
 
5. Did the prosecutor's decision to ask for the death 
penalty in this case make you think that . . . 
  ┌──── 
  │  1 yes   2 no   3 not sure  
  └┐ 
   │ ___ the case against (DEF) _____ must be strong 
   │ ___ (DEF) _____ must deserve the death penalty 
 
6. For the defense, how many attorneys were involved? 
 
 _____ # of defense attorneys 
 
  (IF MORE THAN ONE,) how did they allocate the          
work?)  
  ___ one took primary responsibility throughout     
the trial 
  ___ they divided responsibility; one handled the   
guilt portion of the trial; another handled   
the punishment portion of the trial 
  ___ they shared responsibility for presenting       




7.How well do you think the following words describe the 
(DESIGNATED) defense attorney? 
┌──── 
│  1 very well  2 fairly well  3 not so well  4 not at all 
└──┐ 
   │ ___  a forceful, take-charge person  
   │ ___  competent and professional 
   │ ___  did an outstanding job of presenting his/her case 
   │ ___  didn't seem to have his/her heart in the case 
   │ ___  was warm and friendly toward (DEF) _____  
   │ ___  was friendly toward the judge 
   │ ___  was hostile toward the prosecuting attorney(s) 




   │ ___  cared more about winning than seeing justice done 
   │ ___  someone you came to respect (admire) 
   │ ___  someone you did not like personally 
   │ ___  other, 
specify____________________________________ 
 
8.In your judgment, by how much did the prosecution or the 
defense have the advantage in these respects,  
┌──── 
│ Prosecution Advantage:   1 great   2 moderate   3 slight 
│ Defense Advantage:       4 great   5 moderate   6 slight 
│ No Advantage:            7 (NEITHER HAD THE ADVANTAGE) 
└──┐ 
   │ ___ did better communicating with the jury 
   │ ___ prepared their case better for trial 
   │ ___ had more money and resources to work with 
   │ ___ had a stronger commitment to winning the case 
   │ ___ fought harder at the guilt stage of the trial 
   │ ___ fought harder at the punishment stage of the trial 
 
9.Finally, I would like you to rate the prosecution and the 
defense on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 being "the 
hardest possible" and 1 being "not hard at all." 
 
 a. How hard did the prosecuting attorney(s) work to 
convince you that (DEF) _____ . . .  
       ┌─── 
   │ Scale of 1 to 10 
   └┐ ___  was guilty of capital murder 
    │ ___  deserved a penalty of death 
         
 b. How hard did the defense attorney(s) work to 
convince you that (DEF) _____ . . .  
       │ Scale of 1 to 10 
   └┐│__ was not guilty of capital murder 




VII.  JURY SELECTION AND COMPOSITION 
 
NOW, I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT SELECTION OF THE JURY.  
 
 
1. During jury selection, were you questioned alone or in a 
group with others?  
 
 ___ alone 
 ___ in a group; (IF SO,) with how many # ____ ?   
 ___ both in a group and alone (IF SO,) with how many 
#_ 
 
2.During jury selection, who asked you the most difficult 
questions? 
 
     ___ the judge 
    ___ the prosecutor(s) 
    ___ the defense attorney(s) 
 
 
3.  During jury selection were you asked what you had heard 
or knew about the ________ case? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes 
 
 
4. Had you heard about the ________ case before the trial? 
 
 ___ no, nothing at all 
 ___ yes, but very little 
 ___ yes, knew some details 
 
5. During jury selection were you surprised at the number 
of questions you were asked about your attitude toward 
the death penalty, when (DEF) _____ had not yet been 
convicted of murder? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes, somewhat surprised  
 ___ yes, very surprised 
 
6.Did these questions make you think (DEF) _____ . . . 
 
 ___ must be guilty 




 ___ probably was not guilty 
 ___ must be not guilty 
 ___ no effect one way or the other 
 
7.Did the questions make you think the appropriate 
punishment for (DEF) _____ . . .  
 
  ___ must be the death penalty 
  ___ probably was the death penalty 
  ___ probably was not the death penalty  
  ___ must not be the death penalty 
  ___ no effect one way or the other 
 
8.  Were any of the question you were asked during jury 
selection especially hard for you to answer? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) which question(s); why were they          




9. During jury selection, who made the most favorable and 
who made the least favorable impression on you?  
 ┌──────                                                   
 │ 1 most favorable  2 least favorable 3 Neither most or    
│         least favorable 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ the judge 
   │ ___ the prosecutor(s) 
   │ ___ the defense attorney(s) 
 
NOW I WANT TO FIND OUT WHO GOT CHOSEN FOR THE JURY;  IF 
YOU'RE NOT SURE OF AN ANSWER, JUST GIVE ME YOUR BEST GUESS. 
I'LL MAKE A NOTE THAT YOU'RE NOT SURE. 
 
10. To the best of your memory, how many of the 12 jurors 
 
     were:      │   and how many of the men and women were: 
                │ 
    WHITE  BLACK  HISPANIC 
 #___ men   │#___ men  #___ men  #___ men 
 #___ women │ #___ women #___ women #___ 
women 
     (=12)       
 





 ___ you, yourself 
 ___ male/white 
 ___ male/minority (SPECIFY _____________) 
 ___ female/white 
 ___ female/minority (SPECIFY _____________) 
 
12. During the jury deliberations: 
 
 a.   How many of the jurors would you say . . . 
 
  #___ talked a lot 
  #___ almost never talked 
  #___ were between these extremes 
      (=12) 
 
 b.   Were you among . . . 
 
  ___ the most talkative 
  ___ the least talkative 
  ___ in between 
 
13. Did you know any of the other jurors before the trial? 
  
     ___ no 
     ___ yes, (IF SO,)  
                      #___ by sight though not personally 
                   #___ as personal acquaintances 




14.   Have you stayed in touch with any of the jurors since        
the trial? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) #_____ you knew before the trial 
               #_____ you met during the trial 
 
15.In your mind, how well do the following words describe 
the jury? 
 ┌───── 
 │  1 very well  2 fairly well  3 not so well  4 not at all   
└─┐ 
   │ ___  likeminded, saw things the same way 
   │ ___  closedminded, intolerant of disagreement 




   │ ___  friendly and respectful to one another 
   │ ___  decided on guilt and punishment at the same time 
   │ ___  dominated by a few strong personalities 
   │ ___  got too emotionally involved in the case 
   │ ___  was confused by the judge's instructions 
   │ ___  did not follow the judge's instructions 
   │ ___  kept making mistakes 
   │ ___  you felt like an outsider 
16.Can you think of anything more about the jury that helps 
to explain how or why it reached its decisions? 
 
VIII.  CRIME AND PUNISHMENT ATTITUDES 
 
I NOW HAVE JUST A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR FEELINGS TOWARD 
PUNISHMENT FOR CONVICTED MURDERERS.  
 
0.Do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
about crime and the criminal justice system? 
┌───────    
│ Agree:  1 strongly 2 moderately 3 slightly 
│ Disagree: 4 strongly 2 moderately 6 slightly 
│   7 (NOT SURE; CAN'T SAY; UNDECIDED) 
└┐    
 │   ___ it is better for society to let some guilty people 
 │  go free than to risk convicting an innocent 
person 
 │ ___ even the worst criminals should be considered for 
 │  mercy 
 │ ___ if the police obtain evidence illegally, it should 
 │  not be permitted in court, even if it would help 
 │  convict a guilty person 
 │ ___ the insanity plea is a loophole that allows too  
 │  many guilty people to go free 
 │ ___ a person on trial who doesn't take the witness 
 │  stand and deny the crime is probably guilty 
 │ ___ prosecutors have to be watched carefully, since   
│  they will use any means they can to get 
 │  convictions 
 │ ___ defense attorneys have to be watched carefully, 
 │  since they will use any means to get their 
clients 
 │  off 
 │ ___ if we really cared about crime victims, we would 
 │  make sure that criminals were given harsh 
 │  punishments 
 │ ___ if we really cared about crime victims, we would 








1.Do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
about punishment for convicted murderers? 
 ┌──── 
 │ Agree:     1 strongly  2 moderately  3 slightly   
 │ Disagree:  4 strongly  5 moderately  6 slightly 
 │            7 (NOT SURE; CAN'T SAY; UNDECIDED) 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ you wish we had a better way than the death          
│  penalty of stopping murderers 
   │ ___ the death penalty is too arbitrary because some       
│  people are executed while others serve prison         
│  terms for the same crimes 
   │ ___ if the death penalty were enforced more often 
there 
   │  would be fewer murders in this country 
   │ ___ even convicted murderers should not be denied hope    
│  of parole some day, if they make a real effort to     
│  pay for their crimes 
   │ ___ murderers owe something more than life in prison 
to     │    society and especially to their victims' 
families     │ ___ defendants who can afford good lawyers 
almost never    │  get a death sentence 
   │ ___ the death penalty should be required when someone      
│  is convicted of a serious intentional murder 
   │ ___ you have moral doubts about death as punishment 
   │ ___ persons sentenced to prison for murder in this          
│      state are back on the streets far too soon 
    
2.Would you prefer the following alternatives: 
 ┌─── 
 │  1 yes   2 no   3 not sure 
 └─┐ 
   │___ If murderers in this state could be sentenced to       
│      life in prison without the possibility of ever        
│      being released on parole, would you prefer this as     
│      an alternative to the death penalty?      
   │___ What if murderers in this state could be sentenced      
│      to life with absolutely no chance of parole and       
│      also required to work in prison for money that        
│      would go to the victims' families; would you          
│      prefer this as an alternative to the death           




   │___ What if murderers in this state could be sentenced      
│      to life in prison with no chance of parole for 25     
│      years and even then be eligible for parole only if     
│      they earned and paid a required amount of money to     
│      the families of their victims; would you prefer       
│      this as an alternative to the death penalty? 
 
3. For convicted murderers, do you now feel that the death 
penalty is . . .     
 
 ___ the only acceptable punishment  
 ___ the most appropriate of several punishments 
 ___ just one of several appropriate punishments 
 ___ the least appropriate of several punishment  
 ___ an unacceptable punishment 
 
 
4.Do you feel that the death penalty is the only accept-
able punishment, an unacceptable punishment, or 
sometimes acceptable as punishment for the following 
specific kinds of murder and other crimes?  
 ┌─── 
 │ 1 only acceptable  2 unacceptable  3 sometimes 
acceptable 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ a planned, premeditated murder 
   │ ___ a planned murder, when the victim survives 
   │ ___ a killing that occurs during another crime 
   │ ___ murders in which more than one victim is killed 
   │ ___ murder by someone previously convicted of murder 
   │ ___ murder by a drug dealer 
   │ ___ killing of a police officer or prison guard   
   │ ___ when an outsider to the community kills an admired    
│       and respected member of the community 
   │ ___ a rape with permanent injury to the victim  
    
5.Have your personal feelings about the death penalty 
changed as a result of serving on the ______ case? 
 
 ___ yes, more opposed than I was before 
 ___ yes, more in favor than I was before 
 ___ no, feelings have not changed 
 
6.Do you now generally favor or oppose the death penalty 
for convicted murderers?  
 




____ somewhat favor 
____ somewhat oppose 
____ strongly oppose 
 ___  (NOT SURE; DON'T KNOW) 
 
7.Do you now think that your personal feelings about the 
death penalty at the time of the ______ trial affected 
your guilt or punishment decisions in any way? 
 ┌───── 
 │ 1 yes   2 no   3 not sure 
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ guilt decision; (IF SO,) in what way . . . 
   │ ___ punishment decision; (IF SO,) in what way . . . 
 
IX.  PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
 
FINALLY, I NEED TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF. 
 
1. Check respondent's (ASK ONLY IF NOT SURE) 
 
 a. sex: 
 
  ____ male 
  ____ female 
 
 b. race/ethnicity: 
 
  ____ white 
  ____ black 
  ____ Hispanic 
  ____ Asian 
  ____ other 
 
2. What was your age at your last birthday? 
 
 ______# years old 
 
3. Have you ever been married? 
 
 ___ no, never been married 
 ___ yes, been married once 
 ___ yes, been married more than once 
 
4. Are you now married? 
 
 ____ married and living with your spouse 




 ____ divorced 
 ____ widowed 
 
5.Do you have any children, step children or foster 
children; (IF SO,) what is the age and sex of each? 
 
   (RECORD AGE [# YRS] AND SEX [M OR F] OF 
EACH) 
 
 ___ no children 
 ___ yes, your own  ____  ____  ____  ____  ____  ____ 
 ___ yes, step      ____  ____  ____  ____  ____  ____ 
 ___ yes, foster    ____  ____  ____  ____  ____  ____ 
 
  (IF YES,) which, if any, are now living with you? 
 
   (CIRCLE AGE/SEX OF CHILDREN LIVING WITH YOU)  
 
6. What was the last grade of school you completed? 
 
 ______# grade completed (IF LESS THAN 12TH GRADE) 
 
 ____ finished high school (OR 12TH GRADE) 
 ____ some technical school beyond high school 
 ____ some college but did not graduate 
 ____ graduated from college 




7. Are you currently employed outside of the home? 
 
 ___ yes, full-time 
 ___ yes, part-time 
 ___ no, housewife, homemaker, child rearing 
 ___ no, injury, disability 
 ___ no, layoff, strike 
 ___ no, student 
 ___ no, retired 
 ___ no, without explanation  
 
  (IF NO,) have you been employed  
 
   ___ within the past 5 years? 
   ___ more than 5 years ago? 





  (IF EVER EMPLOYED,) 
 









8. Roughly speaking, in which of the following categories 
does your current family income fall? 
 
 ___ less than $10,000 a year 
 ___ $10,000-$20,000 a year 
 ___ $20,000-$30,000 a year 
 ___ $30,000-$50,000 a year 
 ___ $50,000-$75,000 a year 
 ___ more than $75,000 a year 
 ___ (NO ANSWER; REFUSAL) 
 
9. Are you involved in any local groups or organizations? 
 ┌──── 
 │ 1  yes   2  no    
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ school or parent/teacher association 
   │ ___ youth activities, e.g., Little League, Boy Scouts 
   │ ___ political parties, candidates or campaigns 
   │ ___ church or religious groups 
   │ ___ special interest groups, e.g., Sierra Club, NRA 
   │ ___ others, specify 
___________________________________ 
        
___________________________________________________ 
 
 (IF ANY SUCH INVOLVEMENTS,) have you held office or          
taken a leadership role?  Explain. 
 
10. Over the past week, on how many days did you . . . 
 
 a. read a newspaper? . . . . . . . . .  ______# of 
days 
 






11.What do you like most to do for recreation? 
 
 
12. What is your religious preference? 
 
  (PROBE FOR SPECIFIC RELIGION OR DENOMINATION) 
 
 ___ Baptist 
 ___ Southern Baptist 
 ___ Lutheran 
 ___ Methodist 
 ___ Presbyterian 
 ___ other Protestant, specify _______________ 
 ___ Roman Catholic 
 ___ Jewish 
 ___ Other religion, specify _________________ 
 ___ No religious preference 
 
13. How often do you attend religious services? 
 
 ___ more than once a week 
 ___ once a week 
 ___ several times a month 
 ___ once a month 
 ___ several times a year 
 ___ once a year 
 ___ never 
 
14. Did your religious beliefs have any impact on your 
decision in the ___________ case? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) what impact did they have? 
 
 
15. Have you served in the military? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) what branch and what was the nature          
of your service? 
 
16.How long have you lived at your current address? 
 







17.Do you rent or own your own home? 
 
 ___ renter 
 ___ home owner 
 
AND LASTLY, I HAVE A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR PREVIOUS 
EXPERIENCE WITH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. 
 
18. Did you ever serve on a trial jury before this case? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes, (IF SO,)   ___ on a criminal case 
                     ___ on a civil case 
 
19.  Did you ever attend a criminal trial in some other 
 capacity before this case? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes, (IF SO,)   ___ as a spectator 
                     ___ as a witness 
                     ___ as a defendant 
 
20.Have you or other members of your household been the 
victim of a serious crime in the past five years? 
      
 ___ no 
 ___ yes, (IF SO,)   ___ you yourself 
                     ___ other members of your 
household 
 
 (IF YES,) how often in the past five years? ____times 
 (IF YES,) how often since (DEF) ____'s case? ____times  
 
21. Do you know people who work in the law enforcement or 
criminal justice fields? 
 ┌───── 
 │ 1 yes   2 no   
 └─┐ 
   │ ___ in the police, including private security 
   │ ___ in the courts, including judges, prosecutors, 
   │       defense attorneys, clerks or other staff 
   │ ___ in corrections, including jails, prisons or 







22.  When you think back about serving as a juror on the 
 ______ case, is there anything you wish you had said 
or  done differently? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) what was it?  
 
23. Did you find the experience emotionally upsetting? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) in what ways? 
 
 
24. During the trial or right after it, did you have any 
trouble sleeping, any bad dreams or nightmares, or 
lose your appetite? 
 
 ___ no 
 ___ yes; (IF SO,) explain or elaborate.  
 
25.How would you feel if you were asked to serve on another 
death penalty case?  Would you . . .  
 
 ___ welcome the opportunity 
 ___ do so reluctantly 
 ___ try to get out of it 
 ___ refuse to do so  
 
26.Have you been interviewed by anyone else, attorneys, 
investigators, media etc. about your experience as a 
juror on this case? 
 
 ___ yes 
 ___ no 
 
How much have you talked to others about this experience?  
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION. 








     a. interruptions (e.g., phone call(s), visitor(s)) 
    If so, at what points (Q#s) and for how long  
  (minutes at each Q#) ________________________ 
     b. others present (e.g., spouse, offspring) 
   If so, who and for how long (from Q# to Q# for  
  each instance) _________________________ 
     c. unfinished but completed later by phone 
     d. never completed 




2. Were any questions or topics awkward for the respondent 




3. Did the respondent appear to have trouble remembering 
events or circumstances of the crime or the trial?  If 
so, which events of circumstances? 
 
 
4. In your opinion, was the respondent less than candid or 




5. Did you tape record the interview entirely or in part?  
Did this create any problems?  Explain. 
 
 
6. What were the main problems with this interview?  What 




 lack of rapport 
 weak or faulty recall 
 doubts about confidentiality 
 defensiveness or insecurity 
 








 Correlation Matrix for Individual Level Variables 
   Mean S.D.               
 Variable     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Perception of Group Climate 3.44 .40 1 -.06 -.07* .14** -.07* .09** .01 
2 Juror Race .10 .30  1 -.04 -.03 -.02 .16** -.01 
3 Juror Sex .47 .50   1 -.08* .05 -.04 -.02 
4 Juror Age 45.88 12.85    1 -.10** -.01 -.06 
5 Juror Education 3.78 1.57     1 -.21** -.05 
6 Baptist .17 .37      1 -.16** 
7 Southern Baptist .11 .31       1 
8 Jewish .02 .12        
9 Roman Catholic .17 .38        
10 Less than 10K per year .03 .17        
11 10K to 20K per year .09 .29        
12 20K to 30K per year .17 .37        
13 30K to 50K per year .28 .45        
14 50K to 75K per year .20 .40        
15 More than 75K per year .15 .36        
16 No Income Response .08 .27        
17 Know Others Before Trial .24 .43        
18 Foreperson .12 .32        
19 Aggravating Circumstances .40 .18        
20 Mitigating Circumstances .14 .12        
21 Level of Heinousness 3.10 .61        
22 Defendant Demeanor .42 .30        
23 Number of Victims 1.34 .72               





 Correlation Matrix for Individual Level Variables 
   Mean S.D.               
 Variable     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24 Defendant Race .41 .49        
25 Victim Race .81 .39        
26 Female Victim .45 .50        
27 Black Defendant/White Victim .24 .43        
28 Black Juror/Black Victim .02 .15        
29 Black Juror/Black Defendant .05 .22        
30 Percentage Black 14.27 15.04        
31 Percentage Male 48.31 15.37        
32 Number of Jurors in Sample 4.13 .89               




















 Correlation Matrix for Individual Level Variables 
 Variable 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Perception of Group Climate -.10** -.02 .00 .07* -.04 .03 -.02 -.02 -.01 
2 Juror Race -.04 -.10** .24** .04 .06 .02 -.10** -.09** -.04 
3 Juror Sex .01 .02 -.08 -.06 .00 -.00 .06 .07* -.04 
4 Juror Age .03 -.03 .03 .10** .00 -.07* -.04 -.01 .05 
5 Juror Education .06 .03 -.16** -.20** -.17** .03 .15** .25** -.05 
6 Baptist -.06 -.20** .09** .11** .08* -.02 -.09** -.09* -.02 
7 Southern Baptist -.04 -.16** -.02 -.00 .02 .03 .02 .06 -.01 
8 Jewish 1 -.06 -.02 -.04 -.06 -.06 .05 -.00 .13** 
9 Roman Catholic  1 -.05 -.01 -.03 -.05 .02 .09** .04 
10 Less than 10K per year   1 -.06 -.08 -.11** -.09** -.07 -.05 
11 10K to 20K per year    1 -.14** -.20** -.16** -.13** .-09** 
12 20K to 30K per year     1 -.28** .23** -.19** -.13** 
13 30K to 50K per year      1 -.31** -.26** .18** 
14 50K to 75K per year       1 .21** -.15** 
15 More than 75K per year        1 -.12** 
16 No Income Response         1 
17 Know Others Before Trial          
18 Foreperson          
19 Aggravating Circumstances          
20 Mitigating Circumstances          
21 Level of Heinousness          
22 Defendant Demeanor          
23 Number of Victims                   






 Correlation Matrix for Individual Level Variables 
 Variable 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 Perception of Group Climate .08* -.00 .05 -.19** .08* -.06 -.08* -.08* .07* 
2 Juror Race -.01 -.05 .04 .07* .03 .17** -.05 .09** -.05 
3 Juror Sex .03 .20** .00 .02 .07* .01 -.03 .00 .04 
4 Juror Age -.01 -.03 -.15** .15** .00 .07* -.02 -.02 .03 
5 Juror Education -.08* .138* .01 .01 .07* .00 .04 .07* .02 
6 Baptist .15** -.06 .04 0.01 .10** .00 -.06 -.06 .10** 
7 Southern Baptist .03 -.03 .05 -.02 .04 -.06 .02 -.04 .04 
8 Jewish -.05 .04 .01 .02 -.01 .02 -.02 .08* -.03 
9 Roman Catholic .06 .03 .01 -.03 -.04 -.05 .08* .05 .03 
10 Less than 10K per year -.01 .07* -.02 -.01 .00 .09** -.01 .05 .01 
11 10K to 20K per year .05 -.08* -.03 -.03 -.03 .05 -.04 -.07* .02 
12 20K to 30K per year .00 -.07* .09** .01 .06 .00 -.01 -.02 -.01 
13 30K to 50K per year .08* .02 .01 .02 .05 .00 .03 .02 .01 
14 50K to 75K per year -.01 .02 .-2 -.01 .04 -.05 .00 .04 .06 
15 More than 75K per year .11** .15** .00 .01 -.11** -.02 .00 -.02 .06 
16 No Income Response .01 .03 -.05 .01 -.05 .02 .01 .02 .02 
17 Know Others Before Trial 1 .01 .09** -.08* .10** .01 -.09** -.07* .12** 
18 Foreperson  1 -.08* .01 -.05 .00 -.04 .00 .00 
19 Aggravating Circumstances   1 .12** .17** -.15** .09** .00 .13** 
20 Mitigating Circumstances    1 .00 .15** .14** -.01 -.05 
21 Level of Heinousness     1 -.19** .03 -.09** .06 
22 Defendant Demeanor      1 .00 -.01 .01 
23 Number of Victims             1 -.01 .11** 






 Correlation Matrix for Individual Level Variables 
 Variable 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
24 Defendant Race        1 -.48** 
25 Victim Race         1 
26 Female Victim          
27 Black Defendant/White Victim          
28 Black Juror/Black Victim          
29 Black Juror/Black Defendant          
30 Percentage Black          
31 Percentage Male          
32 Number of Jurors in Sample                   





















 Correlation Matrix for Individual Level Variables 
 Variable 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
1 Perception of Group Climate .04 -.03 .03 -.09** -.06 .06 -.08* 
2 Juror Race -.01 .07* .48** .72** .33** -.08* -.05 
3 Juror Sex -.02 .04 -.05 -.04 -.03 .26** .01 
4 Juror Age -.01 .02 -.03 -.01 -.08* -.01 .06 
5 Juror Education -.02 .08* -.05 -.05 .02 .03 .04 
6 Baptist .04 .01 .08* .15** .06 .01 -.11** 
7 Southern Baptist -.02 -.01 -.01 -.04 .05 .01 -.07 
8 Jewish -.01 .06 -.02 -.03 .01 .00 .03 
9 Roman Catholic .04 .02 -.07* -.08* .05 .06 .05 
10 Less than 10K per year .07* .07* .10** .21** .10** -.03 -.01 
11 10K to 20K per year -.02 -.05 .02 .03 -.01 -.04 .01 
12 20K to 30K per year .00 .04 .10** .06 .02 -.08* 0 
13 30K to 50K per year .01 .03 -.02 .01 -.02 .05 -.05 
14 50K to 75K per year -.03 -.01 -.06 -.08* -.01 .07* -.04 
15 More than 75K per year .04 .03 -.07* -.07* .02 -.01 .09* 
16 No Income Response -.05 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.01 .04 
17 Know Others Before Trial .01 .03 -.04 .02 -.02 .06 -.04 
18 Foreperson .00 .00 -.04 -.03 .02 -.02 -.02 
19 Aggravating Circumstances .10** .11** -.03 .03 .01 .01 .03 
20 Mitigating Circumstances -.01 .03 .07* .11** .08* .00 -.01 
21 Level of Heinousness .14** -.04 -.06 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.06 
22 Defendant Demeanor -.09** .01 .04 .11* .07* .03 -.03 
23 Number of Victims .10** -.12** .05 -.07* .03 -.03 .03 






 Correlation Matrix for Individual Level Variables 
 Variable 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
24 Defendant Race -.07* .67** .16** .29** .29** -.08* -.07 
25 Victim Race .06 .27** .32** -.13** -.20** 0.06 .08* 
26 Female Victim 1 -.03 0 -.02 -.02 -.01 0.05 
27 Black Defendant/White Victim  1 -.09** .20** .13** -.03 -.01 
28 Black Juror/Black Victim   1 .60** .15** .08* .05 
29 Black Juror/Black Defendant    1 .29** -.09** -.04 
30 Percentage Black     1 -.20** -.15** 
31 Percentage Male      1 -.03 
32 Number of Jurors in Sample             1 









 Correlation Matrix for Jury Level Variables 
  Mean S.D.        
 Variable   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Verdict   1 .119 -.048 .021 .055 .105 -.215** 
2 White Victim .80 .40  1 -.479** .279** .058 -.125 -.070 
3 Black Defendant .42 .49   1 .666** -.141** -.003 -.027 
4 Black Defendant/White Victim .24 .43    1 -.116 -.142* -.056 
5 Female Victim .48 .50     1 .146* -.051 
6 Number of Persons Killed 1.34 .73      1 .149* 
7 Average Mitigating Factors .14 .09       1 
8 Average Aggravating Factors .40 .14        
9 Average Level of Heinousness 3.14 .39        
10 Average Defendant Demeanor .42 .22        
11 Average Group Climate 3.44 .27        
12 Percent Black 13.56 13.56        
13 Percent Male 46.57 13.94        
14 Number of Jurors in Sample 3.97 .81        
 *p < .05, **p< .01          







 Correlation Matrix for Jury Level Variables 
 Variable 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Verdict .211** .198** -.422** .333** -.122 .063 -.067 
2 White Victim .161* .063 .018 .105 -.224** .082 .095 
3 Black Defendant .007 -.110 -.012 -.139* .300** -.050 -.058 
4 Black Defendant/White Victim .139* -.059 .023 -.081 .126 .026 -.013 
5 Female Victim .096 .266** -.087 .111 .008 .000 .039 
6 Number of Persons Killed .100 .081 -.043 -.063 .023 -.026 .005 
7 Average Mitigating Factors .064 -.058 .200** -.284** .122 .023 .000 
8 Average Aggravating Factors 1 .210** -.234** .004 .002 .032 .019 
9 Average Level of Heinousness  1 -.345** .106 -.004 -.005 -.077 
10 Average Defendant Demeanor   1 -.141* .101 .014 -.034 
11 Average Group Climate    1 -.150* .087 -.066 
12 Percent Black     1 -.219** -.156* 
13 Percent Male      1 -.065 
14 Number of Jurors in Sample       1 
 *p < .05, **p< .01        











 This section discusses the process by which the principal components analyses 
were conducted and the final group climate variable was created.  The first step of the 
process was to conduct a principal components analysis for all fifteen of the variables 
that, based on prior research and theoretical constructs, would potentially yield a global 
group climate variable.  The fifteen variables came from two separate parts of the survey 
instrument; they included a set of questions asking respondents about their experiences 
with the jury and a set of questions asking respondents about their general experiences 
serving on a capital trial.   
The first eleven variables came from the section of the questionnaire where 
respondents were asked to describe how well several phrases described the jury.  The 
responses to each of the eleven phrases were scaled on a four point scale which ranged 
from 1, Very Well, to 4, Not At All.  The eleven phrases were: likeminded, saw things 
the same way; close-minded, intolerant of disagreement; too quick to make a decision, in 
a hurry; friendly and respectful to one another; decided on guilt and punishment at the 
same time; dominated by a few strong personalities; got too emotionally involved in the 
case; was confused by the judge’s instructions; did not follow the judge’s instructions; 
kept making mistakes; and, you felt like an outsider.  The responses to the two phrases 
likeminded, saw things the same way and friendly and respectful to one another were 
recoded so that higher values (i.e. Not At All) indicated a more positive response about 
the respondent’s perceptions about his or her experiences on the jury. 
The next four variables came from the section of the instrument that asked 
respondents a series of questions about their experiences serving on a capital trial.  The 




anything differently over the course of the trial.  The respondent answered either Yes (0) 
or No (1).  The next question asked whether the juror found the experience to be 
emotionally upsetting; again, the response set with either Yes (0) or No (1).  The third 
question asked jurors whether or not they had any trouble sleeping; jurors again 
responded either Yes (0) or No (1).  The last question asked jurors whether or not they 
would again serve on a capital trial if asked.  The response set for this question was: I 
would welcome the opportunity (4); I would do so reluctantly (3); I would try to get out 
of it (2); and, I would refuse to serve (1).  All of these questions were also coded so that 
higher values indicated a more positive experience serving on a capital trial. 
The first principal components analysis that was conducted included all fifteen of 
these variables and was set up so that only components with an eigenvalue larger than 1 
would be returned.  No rotation was specified.  This analysis returned a four factor 
solution.  The following table contains both the factor loadings and the eigenvalues for 












     
Do you wish you had done 
anything differently? .349 .227 -.035 .042 
Did you find the experience 
emotionally upsetting? .326 .723 .071 -.063 
Did you have any trouble 
sleeping? .243 .687 .015 -.083 
If asked to serve on another 
capital trial, would you… .262 .552 -.063 .246 
Likeminded, saw things the 
same way .453 -.162 -.586 -.104 
Closed-minded, intolerant of 
disagreement .559 -.255 .023 -.383 
Too quick to made a 
decision, in a hurry .550 -.202 .269 -.352 
Decided on guilt and 
punishment at the same time .057 .003 .791 -.182 
Friendly and respectful to 
one another .515 -.081 -.240 -.051 
Dominated by a few strong 
personalities .562 -.100 -.072 -.251 
Got too emotionally involved 
in the case .522 .176 .011 -.137 
Was confused by the judge’s 
instructions .490 -.096 .019 .389 
Did not follow the judge’s 
instructions .411 -.236 .204 .555 
Kept making mistakes .621 -.186 .175 .319 
You felt like an outsider .564 -.060 .040 .089 
Eigenvalues 3.143 1.634 1.194 1.041 
 
 
 Based on an examination of both the eigenvalues and the scree plot, along with 
the fact that, theoretically, a global measure of group climate is the best way in which to 
proceed with the current research, another principal components analysis was conducted 
on these fifteen variables where the number of factors was forced to be one.  A global 




parsimonious option would be utilized.  Because this is the first analysis of its kind, the 
global group climate measure offers the most direct test of the hypotheses; a multi-
dimensional scale at this stage of understanding would unnecessarily complicate the 
model before an understanding of the impact of group climate could be fully formed.  
Future analyses, however, should address the impact of a more nuanced measure of group 
climate.  The following table contains both the factor loadings and the eigenvalues for 
this one factor solution.   
 
Predictors Component 1 
  
Do you wish you had done anything differently? .349 
Did you find the experience emotionally upsetting? .326 
Did you have any trouble sleeping? .243 
If asked to serve on another capital trial, would 
you… .262 
Likeminded, saw things the same way .453 
Closed-minded, intolerant of disagreement .559 
Too quick to made a decision, in a hurry .550 
Decided on guilt and punishment at the same time .057 
Friendly and respectful to one another .515 
Dominated by a few strong personalities .562 
Got too emotionally involved in the case .522 
Was confused by the judge’s instructions .490 
Did not follow the judge’s instructions .411 
Kept making mistakes .621 







 Upon closer inspection of the factor loadings for the one factor solution with all of 
the fifteen included variables, a determination was made to eliminate five of the variables 
from the analysis because their loadings did not exceed .40; while there is no standard 
determination of how large a loading should be before it is removed from the analysis, a 
loading of .40 or larger is generally considered an acceptable standard.  The five variables 
that were eliminated were: would you do anything differently; was the experience 
emotionally upsetting; did you have any trouble sleeping; if asked to serve on another 
capital trial, would you; and, the jury decided on guilt and punishment at the same time.   
 The elimination of these variables is also theoretically consistent with ensuring 
that the global group climate measure includes only those constructs that can be mapped 
into group functioning.  The five variables that were eliminated could potentially be 
measures of group functioning; they also could be measures of the trauma experienced by 
the jurors during the course of the trial.  The current analysis cannot parcel out the 
different ways that these five variables could be measuring the trauma of the trial as 
compared to the trauma that could be related to jury deliberations.  The inability to make 
this distinction, combined with the desire for parsimony, points to the utility of a global 
climate measure using only those variables that load highly on the same factor for the 
current analyses. 
 In order to ensure that the ten remaining variables loaded together well, a third 
principal components analysis was conducted.  This analysis was conducted with no 
rotation and was set so that all factors with an eigenvalue larger than one would be 
returned.  This was done to make sure that the remaining ten variables did not load on 




a two factor solution.  The following table shows the results from this principal 
components analysis. 
 
Predictors Component 1 
Component 
2 
   
Likeminded, saw things the same way .487 -.415 
Closed-minded, intolerant of disagreement .606 -.314 
Too quick to made a decision, in a hurry .586 -.176 
Friendly and respectful to one another .527 -.317 
Dominated by a few strong personalities .579 -.132 
Got too emotionally involved in the case .502 -.012 
Was confused by the judge’s instructions .495 .365 
Did not follow the judge’s instructions .452 .550 
Kept making mistakes .612 .464 
You felt like an outsider .559 .056 
Eigenvalues 2.948 1.075 
 
 
 Because all of the variables have high enough loadings on the first component, a 
decision was made to continue to pursue a one factor solution, as a global group climate 
construct is the best fit for the present research.  Table 17 shows the final one factor 
solution for the ten variables that make up the group climate variable.  As this table 
shows, all ten of the variables have factor loadings greater than .40, making them 
acceptable for the use in the creation of the group climate variable.  The text in Chapter 4 
describes the steps which were taken to create the group climate variable in more detail 
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